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Introduction
0.1 Four Essays
This dissertation contains four essays addressing a cluster of related topics in the
metaphysics of mind and the nature of representation, particularly conceptual
representation. Officially, the essays are independent from each other. Each can
be read and evaluated on its own merits. However, the essays complement each
other and together form a coherent picture, but not a sequential narrative.
The dissertation takes as its starting impetus a particular problem in the meta-
physics of mind. This problem stems from the so-called “hard problem” of con-
sciousness, and was forcefully brought into the contemporary philosophical dis-
cussion by David Chalmers’ seminal work The Conscious Mind [1996].1
The problem stems from a triad of claims that are in tension. (The presentation
is mine, not Chalmers’).
(EG) Epistemic Gap: There is an epistemic explanatory gap between the
physical and conscious experience.
(Phys) Physicalism: Our world is, in some important sense, entirely physi-
cal. This entails, at the least, a modal connection between the physical and
1Chalmers’ work had important precursors in Jackson (1982), Kripke (1972), Levine (1983) and
Nagel (1974), among others. But Chalmers put the problem in its most pressing and direct form.
His work shaped the dialectic in the years that followed in a manner that the other works did not.
1
everything else.
(MR) Metaphysical Rationalism: There are important and close connec-
tions between metaphysical notions such as necessity, fundamentality, ground,
and metaphysical generation on the one hand, and epistemic notions like a
priority, conceptual truth, knowability, and explanation, on the other.
The tension is easy to see. Epistemic Gap claims an epistemic explanatory
gap between the physical and consciousness. Physicalism denies a metaphysical
gap. Metaphysical Rationalism connects epistemic and metaphysical gaps, and
licenses an inference from the epistemic explanatory gap between the physical
and conscious experience to a metaphysical gap. In order to make the tension
clear, one must precisify the nature of the epistemic and metaphysical gaps, and
the status of the connection between the two that metaphysical rationalism posits.
The form of metaphysical rationalism most salient in this dissertation is Modal
Rationalism, according to which there are important, potentially constitutive, con-
nections between metaphysical modality and the a priori. Modal Rationalism
underwrites the key premise in the master argument against physicalism, which I
discuss in chapter 2 (“Modal Rationalism and the Demonstrative Reply to the
Master Argument Against Physicalism”).
One can reply to the tension, and to the master argument (which precisifies
the tension), in a variety of ways. Of course, one can give up physicalism and
opt for dualism (Chalmers (1996a)). One can deny the epistemic gap between
the physical and conscious experience, perhaps maintaining that it is closable “in
principle” (Braddon-Mitchell (2003), Jackson (2005)). But by far the most pop-
ular response is the rejection of metaphysical, or modal, rationalism (Block &
Stalnaker (1999), Hill (1997), Levine (1983, 2004), Loar (1990), Papineau (1993),
2
many others). One, and perhaps the, overarching theme of this dissertation is
the search for a resolution of the tension that does not give up metaphysical or
modal rationalism. I prefer a rationalistically respectable form of physicalism.
Chapters 2 and 3 both offer rationalistically respectable responses to prominent
arguments against physicalism (the master and knowledge arguments, respec-
tively) that have often been met with a rejection of rationalism altogether.
0.2 Chapter 1: Fundamentality Physicalism
Chapter 1, “Fundamentality Physicalism”, seeks to clarify the thesis of physical-
ism (or the many theses that might go under that name). I flesh out my favored
conception of physicalism, fundamentality physicalis, which is based on the no-
tions of fundamentality and metaphysical generation, and argue that physicalism so
defined is what is at stake in many of the contemporary discussions of physical-
ism. I contrast and compare fundamentality physicalism with modal physicalism,
which defines physicalism using modal tools. I argue that fundamentality phys-
icalism is superior to modal physicalism and better captures what manyphiloso-
phers have had in mind.
Fundamentality physicalism entails modal physicalism, but not vice versa.
This makes fundamentality physicalism vulnerable to the various arguments that
have been launched against modal physicalism, such as the conceivability ar-
gument (Chalmers (1996a, 2010) and the knowledge argument (Jackson (1982,
1986)), and links up fundamentality physicalism to the large body of literature
on the metaphysical and particularly modal difficulties for physicalism resulting
from the epistemic gap between the physical and consciousness.
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0.3 Chapter 2: Modal Rationalism and the Demonstrative Reply
to the Master Argument Against Physicalism
Chapter 2, “Modal Rationalism and the Demonstrative Reply to the Master Argu-
ment Against Physicalism”, is the longest of the chapters. I lay out the master ar-
gument against physicalism, which goes roughly as follows. First premise: There
is no a priori route from the physical truths to the truths about conscious expe-
rience. Second premise: If there is no a priori route from the physical truths to
the truths about conscious experience, there is no necessitation from the physical
truths to consciousness truths. Third premise (minor): If there is no necessitation
from the physical to consciousness, physicalism is false. Conclusion: Physicalism
is false.
I demonstrate how many of the contemporary argument against physical-
ism, including conceivability arguments based on zombies and inverted qualia
(Chalmers (1996a, 2010, 2003a)) the knowledge argument (Jackson (1982, 1986)),
the explanatory gap argument (Levine (1983)), and Kripke’s modal argument
(Kripke (1972)), can be viewed as variations on or implementations of the master
argument. I believe that unifying the arguments in this way sheds light on key
issues.
The crucial premise of the master argument is the second, which links the
epistemic a priori gap between the physical and consciousness to a metaphysical
modal gap between the two. I focus most of my attention there. Modal ratio-
nalism underwrites inferences from an a priori gap to a modal gap, of which the
second premise is an instance. I discuss at length the motivations behind modal
rationalism and the connection between modal rationalism and the master argu-
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ment.
I argue that rationalists should prefer a different, and weaker, form of modal
rationalism, which I call “weak modal rationalism”. Importantly, weak modal
rationalism does not license the second premise of the master argument. In ad-
dition, weak modal rationalism offers a physicalistically and rationalistically ac-
ceptable story about the source of the epistemic gap between the physical and
consciousness.
One of my key ideas is that demonstratives, and particularly demonstrative
applications of representational tokens (such as pointing at a lake and stating,
“That is water”), play a vital role in determining reference. Demonstratives are, in
a certain sense, representationally fundamental. In particular, demonstratives are
essential for locking our representations onto conscious experience. To describe
to someone which type of experience we intend to designate, eventually we must
point: “That’s the sensation I’m talking about!”
In the end, I suggest that the epistemic gap between the physical and con-
sciousness (including difficulties in finding an a priori route from the physical
to consciousness) stems from this special connection between consciousness and
demonstratives, rather than in a metaphysical gap indicative of dualism. Return-
ing to a recurring theme, I note that this reply to the master argument preserves,
rather than abandons, the rationalist motivations with which I have sympathy.
We resolve the tension between modal physicalism, metaphysical/modal ratio-
nalism, and the epistemic gap by a well-motivated relaxing of the rationalist con-
nection between modality and the a priori.
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0.4 Chapter 3: Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argu-
ment
Precisifying Epistemic Gap, Metaphysical Gap, and Metaphysical Rationalism in-
volves fixing an epistemic notion of entailment, a metaphysical notion of entail-
ment, and a rationalist story about the connection between the two. “Conceptual
Mastery and the Knowledge Argument” uses “in a position to know” as its epis-
temic notion and necessitation as its metaphysical notion. The relevant form of
metaphysical rationalism claims that if the physical facts necessitate all the facts,
then the physical facts put one in a position to know all the facts. But Jackson
(1982, 1986)’s famous thought experiment involving Mary, a color-deprived neu-
roscientist raised in a black and white room, seems to show that knowledge of
the complete physical facts does not put one in a position to know all the facts. In
particular, it does not put one in a position to know the facts about conscious ex-
perience. Mary lacks knowledge of important facts about conscious experience,
including what it’s like to see red. By the active form of metaphysical rationalism,
this epistemic gap entail that the complete microphysical facts do not necessitate
all the facts. Modal physicalism claims (more or less) that a complete microphysi-
cal truth does necessitate all the facts. Therefore, modal physicalism is false. This
is the knowledge argument against physicalism.
The chapter proceeds by agreeing to play the metaphysical rationalist’s game.
We admit that, in general, one can get results about which facts necessitate which
other facts from testing what idealized epistemic agents such as Mary can and
can’t know on the basis of those facts. However, if we’re going to play this game,
we must lay down some basic ground rules. Otherwise we’ll rapidly be led into
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trivial errors. I argue that the knowledge argument can’t succeed within the con-
fines of these basic ground rules.
The most important “ground rule” is that we should only draw conclusions
about necessitation from the cases of epistemic agents that have conceptual mas-
tery of all the relevant concepts. Conceptual mastery is something like full under-
standing of a concept.2 I then argue that the knowledge argument founders on
a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know the relevant truths about consciousness
because she lacks conceptual mastery of phenomenal concepts, in which case no
metaphysical conclusions about necessitation or physicalism can be drawn, or
(ii) once Mary does have conceptual mastery, she will be able know the missing
truths. (A phenomenal concept categorizes experiences according to what it is like
to be the subject of that experience.)
Two features of this chapter are worth pointing out. First, there are a variety of
available responses to the knowledge argument.3 One common move is to reject
the rationalist inference from an epistemic to a metaphysical gap. My solution to
the knowledge argument stands out for its compatibility with metaphysical ratio-
nalism. Second, this chapter connects to the dissertation chapter titled “Toward a
Theory of Conceptual Mastery” (to be discussed shortly). There I offer the begin-
nings of a theory of the conditions under which a thinker has conceptual mastery
of a concept.
2I explore the notion of conceptual mastery more fully in Chapter 4: “Toward a Theory of
Conceptual Mastery”.
3The ability response appears in Lewis (1988) and Nemirow (1990), the acquaintance response
in Conee (1994), and the “old fact new mode” response in Byrne (2002) and Tye (1995). These are
not the only available responses. Cf. Stoljar (2005) or Nida-Rumelin (2009) for an overview.
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0.5 Chapter 4: Toward a Theory of Conceptual Mastery
The 4th chapter, “Toward a Theory of Conceptual Mastery”, is the black sheep
of the four chapters. It does not address directly any of the metaphysical issues
stemming from the hard problem of consciousness. “Toward a Theory of Con-
ceptual Mastery” is more of a spin-off, or a further exploration of issues first
introduced in, Chapter 2,“Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument”.
In that paper, I introduce the notion of “mastery” or “full understanding” of a
concept. This chapter seeks to further explore that notion, and specifically to an-
swer the question, “Under what conditions does a thinker have mastery of her
concept?”
Concepts are the basic units of thought. The thought OSTRICHES LIKE CHOCO-
LATE is composed of the concepts OSTRICHES, LIKE, and CHOCOLATE. An agent
possesses a concept when he or she can think thoughts of which the concept is a
component. An agent has conceptual mastery of a concept when he or she fully
understands that concept. One can possess a concept without having mastery.
Many people use technical concepts that have worked their way into public con-
sciousness without fully understanding them (examples include DARK MATTER,
CHAOS THEORY, CLOUD COMPUTING, TRANSISTOR, ID, FRACKING, and HEDGE
FUND). Any theory of conceptual mastery must answer the following fundamen-
tal question: “Under what conditions does an agent have conceptual mastery?”
This is the question I attempt to answer in the 4th chapter.
I argue for what I call “the meaning postulate view” of conceptual mastery,
according to which mastery of a concept is a matter of taking certain core rules to
govern the use of the concept. These rules operate in a manner similar to meaning
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postulates in semantics. The rules contribute to giving the concept its meaning.4
I argue against “the belief view”, “the inference view”, and “the intuition view”,
according to which mastery of a concept involves believing, inferring, or intuiting
in accordance with certain propositions or inferences.
4I use ‘meaning’ in the generous sense, to cover any variety of representational quality, not just
the representational features of language. On this approach, non-linguistic mental states, such as
(some) conceptual thoughts and perceptual states, have meaning.
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Chapter 1
Fundamentality Physicalism
Chapter Abstract
This essay has three goals. The first is to introduce the notions of fundamentality
and metaphysical generation and to argue that physicalism can usefully be con-
ceived of as a thesis about fundamentality. Toward this end, I argue (i) that fun-
damentality physicalism has advantages over currently popular modal formula-
tions of physicalism and (ii) that fundamentality physicalism is what many who
endorse modal formulations of physicalism had in mind all along. The second
goal is to explore several other potential formulations of physicalism, including
as a thesis about identity, realization, natures, explanation, language, and con-
cepts. The third goal is to contrast fundamentality physicalism with these other
theses and offer reasons to prefer fundamentality physicalism over these other
formulations.
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1.1 Fundamentality
1.1.1 The Building Blocks of Reality
The world has more and less fundamental aspects. Quarks, leptons, bosons, and
their masses, charges, and spins, are likely among the fundamental aspects. Cof-
fees, cars, and koalas are not. The world’s fundamental layer is the bedrock
of reality. It metaphysically generates the rest of the world’s contents. The non-
fundamental metaphysically depends on the fundamental. The coffees, cars, and
koalas are the way they are because of the way the fundamentalia are. With the
distinction between the fundamental and the non-fundamental in place, an ob-
vious and intuitive question arises: ”What is fundamental?” I find this question
one of the most natural questions in all of human inquiry. For the most part,
physics (tinged with some philosophy) is in the business of answering it.
Fundamentalia come in several (perhaps many) varieties. At the least, there
are objects, properties, relations, and laws. (From here, it should be understood
that ’properties’ includes relations of any adicity). There may be other varieties
of fundamentalia as well, but the types I’ve mentioned seem like a good start.1
It was once thought that atoms were fundamental. This has turned out not
to be so. Atoms are constructed from combinations of electrons, protons, and
neutrons, along with some forces keeping them together. Neither protons nor
1Two other types of potential fundamentalia include events and boundary conditions. Certain
physical equations, such as the field equations of general relativity, are not well-behaved, in the
sense of having unique solutions, in the absence of certain assumptions. These assumptions are
called ‘boundary conditions’. One can reasonably ask why, and if, these boundary conditions
hold. For example, the assumption of an asymptotically flat space-time in general relavitiy en-
sures that the field equations of general relativity are well-behaved. One might claim that these
boundary conditions, or boundary conditions in other domains, are themselves fundamental fea-
tures of the universe. Cf. Smeenk (2014) for more on the status of boundary conditions. Thanks
to Sheldon Smith here.
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neutrons are fundamental - they are composed of still smaller particles. The best
science at this moment - the standard model - still suggests that electrons are
fundamental, though there are open questions about whether each electron is
merely a vibration in a string, or a point assigned property values in a field. The
details of these proposals needn’t concern us here.
Fundamentalia are the basic building blocks of reality.2 We need to separate
two questions about the fundamental. The first - the roster question - is: “What
types of fundamentalia are there?” What types of building blocks are there? The
second - the layout question - is: “What tokens of fundamentalia are there, and how
are they?” How are the building blocks actually arranged? The layout questions
asks how many fundamentalia there are, what properties they have, and how
they arranged across (for example) space-time. Once we’ve decided that electrons
and their spins are fundamental (thereby partly answering the roster question),
there remain layout questions about how many electron there are, where they
are, what spins they have, and the like.
I think there is a perfectly good notion of “metaphysical building block”.
These building blocks metaphysically generate other items. Those items in turn
metaphysically depend, for their existence and properties, on the building blocks
that generate them. My notion of “metaphysical building block” is something
like a generalization of the normal notion of “building block”. Consider a lego
model of the Space Shuttle Endeavour. The model is constructed from the indi-
vidual legos that form its wings, tail, fuselage, and cockpit. These legos, in turn,
2In this paper, I assume that there are ultimate building blocks that constitute a maximally
fundamental layer. One might instead think that there is no bottom level. On such a picture, each
metaphysical level of reality has further, more fundamental structure underpinning it. One might
call such a scenario “infinite descent”. Not much turns on this issue. However, it’s easier to speak
as if there is a maximally fundamental level, so I’ll continue to make the assumption.
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are constructed from molecular plastic compounds. The lego spaceship is the
way it is in virtue of the way the individual legos are, which are the way they
are because of the way the plastics are, which, eventually, are the way they are in
virtue of how the sub-atomic particles in the vicinity of the spaceship are. How-
ever, the state of the lego spaceship is not merely determined by the pieces, the
objects, that make it up. It’s also determined by how those pieces are, i.e. by what
properties they have. The sub-atomic particles and their properties generate the
molecules, compounds, lego pieces, and eventually the Endeavour model itself.
The metaphysical generators of the model include both objects and properties.
However, talk of fundamentalia as “building blocks” should be not be taken
overly literally. Fundamentalia need not be, in any reasonable sense, part of the
non-fundamentalia they generate. There is a clear sense in which an electron
in the koala’s nose is part of the koala. This electron and its properties partly
generate the koala. But those particles, in order to make a koala, must have a
certain cohesiveness across time. If they momentarily coalesce into a koala shape
and then disperse, there is no koala. The koala’s existence is partly generated
by the cohesiveness of the particles, and this cohesiveness is partly generated
by the laws that govern the interaction of those particles. With a different set
of laws, that very same koala-shaped arrangement of particles would not be a
koala. It might instead be a koala-shaped bomb, about to explode. Thus the law
that ensures that the koala-shaped particles remain a cohesive unit also partly
generates the koala. The law is one of the metaphysical building blocks of the
koala. But there is no reasonable sense in which the law is a part of the koala.
One can get a grip on the notions of fundamentality and metaphysical gener-
ation by imagining oneself tasked with the job of creating the universe. One must
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create all the various fundamental particles, assign those particles fundamental
properties, and set out the laws that govern their interaction. In so doing, one
also creates the non-fundamentalia: the coffees, cars, and koalas. The creation of
the koala is not an additional act. Compare to the creation of the lego model of
Endeavour. Once you arrange all the legos appropriately, you’re done. There’s no
additional separate task of creating the lego model itself. Let’s call the test for
fundamentality embodied in this thought experiment the creation test. Something
is fundamental at world w if and only if it would need to be directly created by
a being creating w. A creator can indirectly create koalas by creating appropri-
ately arranged fundamentalia. But the fundamentalia must be created directly,
because they are not metaphysically generated by anything else.
The search for the roster of fundamentals is similar to Aristotle’s search for the
primary substances. In Metaphysics, Aristotle writes that “Substance is the subject
of our inquiry; for the principles and the causes we are seeking are those of sub-
stances. For if the universe is of the nature of a whole, substance is its first part...”
(1984: 1688; Meta.1069a18âA˘S¸20). Aristotle is clear that the substances are onto-
logically or metaphysically prior to the non-substances. Gill (1989) summarizes
Aristotle’s test for substance-hood as follows: “the main criterion [for selecting
the primary substances] is ontological priority. An entity is ontologically primary
if other things depend for its existence on it, while it does not depend in a compa-
rable way on them.” Similarly, the fundamentalia are that on which everything
else metaphysically depends, and which depend on nothing further.
1.1.2 Two kinds of creation
The generation of a non-fundamental from the fundamental is importantly dif-
ferent than Kyle’s generation of a cake from 2 cups of flour, a half-stick of butter,
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two eggs, a cup of sugar, baking powder, 1/2 cup of cocoa, and a teaspoon of
vanilla extract. Consider the cake, cooling on the kitchen counter, replete in all
its chocolaty glory. One can tell two stories about the cake. The first story is
causal. It describes Kyle’s toils in the kitchen, his stirring of milk and flour, pre-
cise placement on the center oven rack at 175 degrees, and the chemical reactions
that occur while it bakes. The second story is metaphysical. This story starts from
the electrons and bosons inside the cake, proceeds up through the hydrogen, oxy-
gen, and sodium carbonate molecules, and then finally up to the cake itself. The
cake itself, with its chocolatey-ness, shape, and texture, metaphysically depends
on these smaller and more fundamental elements. When I speak of metaphysi-
cal dependence, and generation, I’m talking about the type of dependence and
generation in the second story. Clearly, there is a sense of ‘dependence’ and ‘gen-
eration’ according to which the cake depends on and is generated by Kyle’s work
and the chemical reactions of baking. But that’s not the sense of generation or
dependence I’m trying to latch on to.
The picture is somewhat complicated by the fact that its not unreasonable
to think that the cake metaphysically depends on some items on which it also
causally depends. Perhaps the sugar and flour provide examples. One might
claim that the metaphysical generation I’m after is always synchronic, whereas
causal generation is always diachronic. But I don’t think this is quite right. It
seems to me that some present item could metaphysically depend, for being what
it is, on past events or items. If one endorses an essentiality of origin thesis for
cakes, then the cake metaphysically depends on past events, such as the particu-
lar process of cooking that yielded that cake. Thus, I think we should leave open
the possibility that there are diachronic relations of metaphysical dependence and
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generation. However, the synchronic vs. diachronic distinction nonetheless pro-
vides a useful heuristic for distinguishing between causal and metaphysical gen-
eration.
1.1.3 The Relata of Metaphysical Generation
What are the relata of metaphysical generation? We might remain agnostic, adopt-
ing a strategy similar to Fine (2012)’s approach to ground, a relation similar to
metaphysical generation. According to Fine, we can make true statements of the
form ‘sentence1, sentence2, ... grounds sentence3’, without making commitments
about what the genuine relata of grounding are, or reifying the grounding rela-
tion itself. We need claim only that statements of the above form are true.
However, I’m offering a metaphysical picture and an approach to fundamen-
tality. Such pictures are better fleshed out and more informative when they are
more committal, even if these commitments come with warts. At the least, I take
there to be relations of metaphysical grounding between something like states of
affairs. A state of affairs is a specific way the world is. States of affairs can include
the having of properties by objects or the holding of laws. The state of affairs of
some electrons and protons being organized thus and so, with these charges and
masses, metaphysically generates the state of the atom’s having the mass it does.
Some states of affairs are more fundamental than others. The states of affairs that
are generated by no further states of affairs are the fundamental states of affairs.
We also count as fundamental whatever is involved in those states of affairs, be
they objects, properties, events, laws, or what have you.
Metaphysical generation relates a collection of states of affairs to a single state
of affairs. (This does not preclude the possibility that the collection contains only
one element). The states of affairs, together, generate another state of affairs.
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For example, the electrons having such and such mass, the protons having such
and such mass, etc., metaphysical generates the atom’s having its mass. A given
collection can generate many other states of affairs. But it generates each one
individually, rather than them all as a collection.
One might also wish to posit relations of metaphysical generation between ob-
jects, events, properties, property instances, or items of other categories. Perhaps
the electrons and protons metaphysically generate the atom. I have no opposition
to such claims. But on them I remain officially agnostic.
In this paper, I will discuss a wide variety of stuff: objects, property types,
property tokens, laws, events, and other material as well. It will be helpful to
have a neutral term that can include items from any category. I choose the term
‘phenomenon’. This seems appropriate. The world contains a tremendous va-
riety of phenomena. Some are straightforwardly physical (leptons and mass);
some are not (experiences of red, laws of a nation). Fundamentality physicalism
says that all of these phenomena, of whatever type, ultimately depend on and
are generated from the physical.
1.1.4 The Covering Constraint
The layout question asks, “What tokens of fundamentalia are there, and how
are they?” It asks how the building blocks of reality are arranged. A complete
answer to the layout question will tell us how every particular fundamental is.
The complete layout of fundamentalia has an important feature, expressed in the
covering constraint:
• The Covering Constraint: The complete layout of fundamentalia meta-
physically generates all the world’s contents.3
3Schaffer (2010): 38-9 discusses a similar constraint, which he titles “the tiling constraint”.
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The covering constraint entails that everything is either a fundamental or gener-
ated by some fundamental(s). The fundamentalia cover all of reality. I take the
covering constraint to be constitutive of the notion of fundamentality.
I take claims about the fundamental to have modal import. This is an extra
claim that is, strictly speaking, separable from the bare notion of fundamentality
itself. But I endorse the modal import of fundamentality, and discussing it will
both help the reader grip the notion of fundamentality and to make connections
to extant philosophical theorizing about fundamentality, which has often been
couched in the language of modality. The modality of which I speak is metaphys-
ical modality, which I take to represent all the different ways a (possible) world
could be. I take metaphysical possibility to be more permissive than physical
possibility, mostly because I think that there are metaphysical possibilities (e.g. a
different gravitational constant) that are not physically possible.
I said above that the layout of the world’s fundamental constituents meta-
physically generates the rest of the world’s contents. Suppose that the world’s
fundamental level is composed of three types of particles - quarks, leptons, and
bosons, some fundamental properties and relations, and laws that govern those
particles, properties, and relations. On this assumption, once you fix the distri-
bution of quarks, bosons, and leptons across space-time, assign them all their
fundamental properties and relations, set in place the laws that govern their in-
Schaffer’s tiling constraint involves two components. The first is equivalent to my covering con-
straint. The second is a “no overlap” clause. Schaffer claims that there are enough fundamentalia
to cover all of reality, and no extras. Schaffer’s “no overlap” clause makes more sense within
the mereological framework within which he operates. However, I’m disinclined toward a no
overlap constraint on the fundamental. I don’t see why two fundamentalia couldn’t do “unnec-
essary work”, in the sense of one fundamental generating some non-fundamental that another
fundamental also generates. A creator who builds a world with two fundamentals that overlap
by doing the same metaphysical job creates a less elegant world than his rival creator who builds
a similar world with less fundamentalia and no overlap. But sometimes the world is not elegant.
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teraction, you thereby fix the entire contents of the world.
This talk of “fixing” can be made more specific using modal tools. The modal
version of the covering constraint can be expressed as follows:
• Modal Covering Constraint: No two possible worlds differ without differ-
ing fundamentally.
Contrapositively, any two worlds that are fundamentally identical are com-
pletely identical. You can’t get an extra koala without adding some extra quarks,
leptons, and bosons. Two worlds “differ fundamentally” when they differ in the
layout, not necessarily the roster, of fundamentalia. Clearly, two worlds could
differ with respect to the layout of fundamentalia (one world contains enough
extra quarks, leptons, and bosons to generate an extra koala), without differing
in their roster of fundamentalia. I will return to connections between fundamen-
tality and modality in section 1.3 (“Modal Physicalism”).
1.1.5 Generation and Ground
I use the term ‘metaphysical generation’ (often just ‘generation’) to stand for the
relation that holds between the fundamental and the non-fundamental. Funda-
mentalia generate non-fundamentalia. One might also use the term ‘ground’,
declaring that the fundamental grounds the non-fundamental. The notion of
ground has received much philosophical attention lately.4 The metaphysical gen-
eration between the fundamental and the non-fundamental is similar to what
many call ‘ground’. Both are transitive, asymmetric, and irreflexive relations of
metaphysical dependence in which one relatum holds in virtue of the other. Some
4For a start, cf. Fine (2012, 2001), Schaffer (2010, 2009), Rosen (2010), and the essays in Correia
& Schneider (2012).
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may have in mind what I’ve called ‘generation’ when they talk of ground. How-
ever, I am open to the thought that there may be important differences between
the two. I believe that generation is one type, or species, of ground. I avoid the
term ‘ground’ partly to prevent unwanted associations the reader may have with
the term.
Philosophers introduce the notion of ground using examples of philosophical
“in virtue of” claims. Here are some examples:5,6
1. A thing has its dispositions in virtue of its categorical features.
2. An action is wrong in virtue of the action’s failure to maximize utility.
3. The legal facts hold in virtue of (non-legal) social facts.
4. A set exists in virtue of its members.
5. A conjunction is true in virtue of the truth of its conjuncts.
For now, ignore the truth or falsity of these claims. Each of these claims has
been endorsed by more than a few philosophers. These “in virtue of” claims
come from a wide variety of philosophical areas. Yet (most) theorists of ground
take all these claims to deal with the same thing: ground. A criticism often levied
against fans of ground is that the disparate relations expressed in (1)-(5) and
elsewhere are actually not all instances of the same relation. Research on some
generic relation of “ground” is thus a waste of time. I think this dialectic expresses
a false dichotomy. Philosophical research on ground is useful if the relations
5Examples (1)-(3) occur in Rosen (2010). Instances of (4) and (5) appear in Fine (2012). (4) also
appears in Schaffer (2009).
6These claims are all universal in form. We can make similar specific statements, about what
it is in virtue of which this particular wine glass if fragile, a given murder is wrong, a particular
law holds, tHu exists, or ‘It’s raining and it’s sunny’ is true.
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in (1)-(5) and elsewhere are similar enough, and share enough formal features,
that studying them together makes sense. The merit of philosophical research
on ground is mostly independent of whether the relations in (1)-(5) are the same
relation (ground), different species of the ground genera, or unrelated relations
that share the property of being relations of metaphysical dependence. However,
when lumping together different but formally and metaphysically similar rela-
tions from disparate areas of philosophical inquiry, we must keep in mind the
dissimilarities between them. I believe that metaphysical generation is similar
enough to these other relations it can fruitfully be studied under the banner of
‘ground’. However, in doing so we must keep track of the peculiar features of
metaphysical generation, features that may not have application in every arena
in which the term ‘ground’ has been brought to bear. Since I am interested only
in metaphysical generation, I choose not to risk such mis-application by using the
generic term ‘ground’.
Here’s an example in which metaphysical generation may come apart from
ground. Consider the following claim: “Knowledge entails justification”. This is
an important (and perhaps deep) truth of epistemology. In virtue of what is this
claim true? What are its grounds? I’d like to tell two stories. One involves meta-
physical generation; the other does not. Both involve “ground”, in some sense of
that term. Here’s the story about metaphysical generation. “Knowledge entails
justification” is a universal claim. The world contains many states of knowing
that P. All of those are also states of having justification for P. My state of know-
ing that the food truck on La Brea Avenue has the best tortas is metaphysically
generated by some incredibly complicated arrangement of neural states in combi-
nation with causal relations to the world. Those neural states and causal relations
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are, somewhere down the line, generated by a more complicated arrangement of
fundamental sub-atomic particles, properties, relations, and laws. I’m also in a
state of begin justified in believing that the food truck on La Brea Avenue has
the best tortas. This state is also generated, via a long and complicated chain,
by some arrangement of fundamentalia. Knowledge entails justification is gener-
ated by the fact that every time the fundamentalia get arranged in a manner that
generates knowledge, the fundamentalia also get arranged in a manner that gen-
erates justification. This is the sense in which “knowledge entails justification” is
generated from the fundamental.
But there’s another story about what is in virtue of which knowledge entails
justification. Knowledge entails justification in virtue of the nature of knowledge.
That’s how knowledge is. It always requires justification. In fact, one might
even think that every knowledge-generating arrangement of fundamentalia is
also a justification-generating arrangement because of this truth about the nature
of knowledge. If the arrangement weren’t justification-generating, it would not
be knowledge-generating.
I think that both stories offer legitimate answers to the question, “In virtue
of what does knowledge entail justification?” But they are different kinds of an-
swers. One is a generative answer that looks for the fundamentalia in virtue of
which the claim is true. The other embodies a different kind of answer. (I’m not
sure how exactly to categorize the type). Both answers seem to represent some
type of metaphysical in virtue of, and some variety of grounding relation. Im-
portantly, in this paper I’m interested in the type of ground that goes with the
generation of the non-fundamental from the fundamental: metaphysical genera-
tion.
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1.2 Fundamentality Physicalism
1.2.1 Fundamentality Physicalism
The roster question asks, “What types of fundamentalia are there?” What kinds
of building blocks generate our world? This is a tremendously natural and intu-
itive question. Philosophers and scientists have offered various answers. One is
fundamentality deism: there is one fundamental: God. Another is fundamentality
idealism: all the fundamentalia are mental. Physicalism is another popular thesis,
and the current frontrunner for the true theory of the world’s fundamental level.
Fundamentality physicalism says that all the world’s fundamentalia are, in some
sense or other, physical. I’ll take fundamentality dualism to be the thesis that the
world’s roster of fundamentalia contains at least two types of things: physical
and mental. (For brevity, I’ll sometimes omit the qualifier ‘fundamentality’ when
context allows.)
Fundamentality dualism can take many forms. Potential mental fundamen-
talia include consciousness particles, mental properties (“represents that P”, “ex-
periences pain”), or a fundamental law of the universe that characterizes relations
between the mental and the non-mental.7 For the most part, the discovery of re-
ality’s fundamentalia falls to physics, especially theoretical and particle physics.
Physics seems to suggest something like physicalism (though this claim is not
uncontroversial). It has not postulated any consciousness particles yet.
Of course, there are issues about deciding whether or not some candidate
fundamental counts as “physical” (cf. Dowell (2006a,b), Stoljar (2009a,b), Wilson
(2006), Worley (2006)). It’s difficult to give necessary and sufficient conditions for
7Such laws are called “psycho-physical” by Chalmers (2003a, 1996a).
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physicality in other terms. (See Stoljar (2009b) for a variety of attempts). Some,
e.g. Stoljar (2009b), claim that this result robs physicalism of its interest as a philo-
sophical thesis. I disagree.8 I think we have a good, if rough and ready, grasp
on what kinds of fundamentalia jeapordize fundamentality physicalism. Funda-
mental quarks, mass, and photons do not count against fundamentality physical-
ism. Fundamental experiences of red, representations that P, and consciousness
particles do. We know the physical, and the non-physical, when we see it, even
if we can’t give conditions for (fundamental) physicality in other terms. I don’t
take the situation to be much different with our grasp of most concepts, including
‘koala’, ‘automobile’, and ‘table’.
It’s notoriously hard to give necessary and sufficient conditions for being a C
for almost any concept C. The concept “physical fundamental” is no different.9
This approach might lead to borderline cases of physicality, and of the truth of
physicalism itself. Suppose it’s borderline whether some property F counts as
physical. If F is fundamental, then it will be borderline whether fundamentality
physicalism is true. I don’t take this to be a problem. Of course, what matters in
the end is what the roster of fundamentalia is - what the fundamentalia are - and
not whether those fundamentalia count as physical, mental or what-have-you.
However, labels such as (fundamentality) ‘physicalism’, ‘dualism’, and ‘idealism’
are useful for characterizing broad classes of theories about the fundamental na-
ture of our world, categorized by the roster of fundamentalia each theory posits.
Fundamentality physicalism says that all the actual world’s fundamentalia are
physical. I take fundamentality physicalism to constitute at least one reasonable
8For more on this disagreement between Stoljar and I, cf. Rabin (2011b).
9Cf. my Rabin (2011b) for more on this type of approach to defining ‘physicalism’ and ‘physi-
cal’.
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interpretation of the thesis that has gone by the names ‘physicalism’ and ‘mate-
rialism’ throughout philosophy’s long history. We’ll see some evidence for this
claim in section 1.3 (“Modal Physicalism”), in which I’ll argue that the modal def-
initions of physicalism that have been popular over the last thirty years derive
their plausibility as a conception of physicalism from fundamentality physical-
ism.
1.2.2 Fundamentality Physicalism and the Mathematical
What is the relation between the physical fundamentalia and the realm of math-
ematics? The covering constraint says that everything is either fundamental or
generated from the fundamental. Thus mathematical states of affairs, objects,
and properties must be either fundamental or generated from the fundamental.
If fundamentality physicalism is true, then mathematics must be either physical
and fundamental or generated from physical fundamentalia. Both options are
implausible.
Consider the mathematical state of affairs of 3 being prime. If mathematics
is generated from physical fundamentalia like quarks and leptons, they must be
generated in quite a different manner than my desk is generated. We can al-
ter my desk by modifying the underlying fundamentalia that generate it. But
no amount of re-arranging physical fundamentalia will alter the primeness of 3.
This is evidence that the number 3 does not metaphysically depend on physical
fundamentalia. In fact, given that the number 3 has its mathematical properties
necessarily, it appears to be completely modally independent of the physical. Of
course, these modal tests are defeasible evidence for metaphysical dependence
and generation. But these tests tell against the dependence of the mathematical
on the physical. The best candidate for the metaphysical generators of 3’s prime-
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ness are the axioms of arithmetic. But physical fundamentalia do no better in
generating these axioms than they did in generating 3’s primeness.
The nominalistically inclined may readily accept that the mathematical is gen-
erated from the physical. However, I wish to set aside that view for now.
Suppose that the mathematical is fundamental. Does this challenge funda-
mentality physicalism? This depends on whether fundamental mathematics should
count as “physical”. I wish to make two points against mathematical fundamen-
talia counting as “physical”. First, fundamental mathematics would be quite dif-
ferent from the clearly physical quarks, leptons, and bosons, or masses, charges,
and spins. It’s also different from fundamental physical laws. Second, counting
fundamental mathematics as physical has an odd result. Since mathematics is
necessary, every possible world will contain physical fundamentalia.
Fundamentality physicalism is a contingent thesis about the fundamental struc-
ture of the actual world. While all physicalists should accept that fundamentality
physicalism is true, few will accept that it is necessarily true. Physicalists tend to
believe that (fundamentality) dualism is not actually true, but not that dualism
is impossible. Fundamentality physicalism is compatible with the possibility, but
not the actuality, of non-physical fundamentals. Fundamentality physicalism can
accept the possibility of fundamental non-physical ether, spirits, ESP, mind sub-
stances, and all manner of physical anathema, as long as they are not actual.
Consider a possible world Casper whose fundamental level is purely spirit
substance. Arrangements of spirit substance metaphysically generate the ghosts,
ghouls, angels, and demons that inhabit Casper. Casper appears to contain no
physical stuff whatsoever. But the truths of mathematics also hold at this world,
and any theorist of this world’s fundamental level will need to say something
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about the mathematical. Suppose, as before, that the mathematical is fundamen-
tal. If we declare the mathematical fundamentals of the actual world to be phys-
ical, then it will turn out that Casper, an apparently purely spiritual world, con-
tains physical elements at the fundamental level. This is an odd result. Further-
more, the same line of reasoning that led to declaring fundamental mathematics
as “physical” can be run at Casper. The spirit philosophers of Casper have just
as much reason to declare the mathematical as “spiritual”. If they’re correct, then
the actual world contains fundamental spiritual elements! Perhaps these mathe-
matical fundamentalia are both physical and spiritual? I’m not sure what to say.
If the mathematical is fundamental, it is fundamental at every world. I think
that the best thing to say about the mathematical fundamentalia is that they are,
in a certain sense, neutral in relation to debates over fundamentality physicalism,
spiritualism, deism, or dualism. There are at least two ways to get this neutral-
ity. First, we might admit that there are mathematical fundamentalia, and that
these fundamentalia are neither physical, nor spiritual, nor etc. They are math-
ematical. Second, we might maintain that mathematics lies outside the scope
of inquiry about the fundamental. Mathematics is a necessary tool for describing
the world’s fundamental level and in some sense governs the behavior of the uni-
verse. But metaphysical generation does not apply to the mathematical. In either
case, mathematics will not be physical, or spiritual, but it will be physicalistically
acceptable, and spritualistically acceptable, in the sense of not challenging either
fundamentality physicalism or fundamentality spiritualism.
Suppose we take the first option and declare mathematics fundamental and
non-physical. In a certain sense, fundamentality physicalism is thereby falsified.
But this result tells against the letter of fundamentality physicalism, not the spirit.
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In the domains in which the nature of the fundamental is debated, such as the
physicalism-dualism debate, it’s clear that mathematics has been, and should be,
set to the side. (Schiffer (1989) and Stoljar (1996) agree). Let’s dub the thesis that
all the fundamentalia are physical, no exceptions, strong fundamentality physical-
ism. This view requires either (i) that there are no mathematical facts (some type
of nihilism or nominalism), (ii) that the mathematical facts are generated from
the physical, or (iii) that there are mathematical fundamentalia which are phys-
ical. Let weak fundamentality physicalism be the thesis that all the fundamentalia
are physical, bracketing all issues about mathematics.10
Weak fundamentality physicalism better captures the debate over the nature
of the fundamental that has taken place under the title ‘the physicalism-dualism
debate’. Henceforth, when I use the term ‘fundamentality physicalism’ I will be
speaking of weak fundamentality physicalism.
1.3 Modal Physicalism
In recent times, physicalism/materialism has often been categorized in modal
terms. Modal definitions appear in Chalmers (1996a), Leuenberger (2008), Lewis
(1983), Jackson (1993), Stoljar (2009b,a), Papineau (2002), and elsewhere. For our
purposes, the differences between these formulations are minimal. We’ll use Jack-
son’s here.
Modal Physicalism: Every possible world that is a minimal physical dupli-
cate of the actual world is a duplicate simpliciter.
The idea behind modal physicalism is simple: if you copy the actual world in
all its physical respects, and don’t add any extras, you copy the actual world in
10It’s possible that additional issues must be set aside, including the place of abstracta and
moral properties. I won’t address these issues here.
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all its respects. The physical is sufficient to yield the rest. A key idea here is that
if two worlds were physically identical, but differed mentally (e.g. the first world
contained a red experience where the second contained a blue experience), then it
wouldn’t be true that the physical was sufficient to generate the rest. More would
be needed to fix the world’s entire contents (e.g. the experiential contents). And
physicalism, at least in some sense, would be falsified.
Two features of Modal Physicalism require clarification. The first is the notion
of a physical duplicate. The second is the notion of a minimal duplicate. What does
it take for a world to count as a physical duplicate of the actual world? Physical-
ists think that, in some sense or other, everything is physical, including mental
states. But surely Jackson can’t have meant to include mental states among the
physicals that must appear at every physical duplicate of the actual world. That
would prejudice the issue against the dualist and trivialize the definition. Modal
physicalism says that copying all the physical stuff, in some restricted sense of
‘physical’, is sufficient to copy all the other stuff, including the mental (in the ab-
sence of extras). If we start by the counting all the “other stuff” as physical, the
issue of physicalism vs. dualism is decided from the start.
It’s clear enough what Jackson intends. If we copy all the actual world’s elec-
trons, leptons, bosons, molecules, masses, charges, spins, physical laws, and the
like, we create a physical duplicate of the actual world. Let’s call the material
that must be duplicated in order to yield a physical duplicate of the actual world
strictly physical. The physical duplicates of the actual world are the strictly physi-
cal duplicates.
We must also clarify the notion of a minimal duplicate. Before exploring the
technicalia surrounding what it is to be a “minimal duplicate”, it will be helpful to
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describe the motivation behind appeal to the notion. Modal physicalism attempts
to capture the test described above. Copy the world in all its physical respects.
Add no extras. Modal physicalism is true if and only if in doing so you copy the
world in all its respects.
Consider the following simpler definition of modal physicalism. Simple modal
physicalism is true if and only if every (strictly) physical duplicate of the actual
world is a duplicate simpliciter. Unfortunately, simple modal physicalism is in-
compatible with metaphysical possibilities with which many philosophers have
thought physicalism should be compatible. Simple modal physicalism fails to
capture to “copy the physical and add no extras” test.
Consider the world Actual-plus-Ghost. Actual-plus-Ghost is a physical dupli-
cate of the actual world that has an additional element: a ghost that travels
through space-time observing, but never interacting with, the physical. Physi-
calism about Actual-plus-Ghost is clearly false. That world contains non-physical
ghosts. But, intuitively, the possibility of Actual-plus-Ghost should not challenge
physicalism. (Or, at least, one coherent and substantive conception of physicalim,
which modal physicalism aims to capture, is compatible with the possibility of
Actual-plus-Ghost).
The metaphysical possibility of Actual-plus-Ghost falsifies simple modal phys-
icalism. Actual-plus-Ghost is a physical duplicate of the actual world but not a
complete duplicate. But Actual-plus-Ghost is not a minimal physical duplicate of
the actual world, because it contains a non-physical extra: the ghost. Thus the
possibility of Actual-plus-Ghost does not challenge modal physicalism defined us-
ing the “minimal duplicates” clause.
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Physicalism is a claim about the metaphysical structure of the actual world.
It claims that dualism is false, but not that dualism is metaphysically impossi-
ble. Physicalists believe Descartes was wrong about the existence of mental sub-
stances. But they need not think that Descartes imagined a metaphysical possibil-
ity. Some world might be the way Descartes thought the actual world to be. The
possibility of worlds at which dualism is true, such as Actual-plus-Astral, does
not challenge the physicalism that modal physicalists sought to capture. (Though
some stronger forms of physicalism might deny such possibilities).
While the implications of modal physicalism about the actual world do not
reach as far as Actual-plus-Ghost, they do reach other regions of modal space. For
example, modal physicalism is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of
zombie worlds. A zombie world is a physical duplicate of the actual world (with
no extras) that lacks all conscious experiences. Zombie worlds contains zombie
doppelgangers of every actual person. These doppelgangers stroll the waterfront
and utter sentences such as,“My, what a brilliant shade of blue.” But they do not
have conscious experiences of blue. The possibility of zombie worlds entails that
the actual physicalia are modally insufficient to yield the actual conscious expe-
riences. Physicalism would be, in at some important sense, false. Or at least this
is one of the principle motivations behind modal formulations of physicalism.
Let’s summarize. Philosophers searching for a modal definition of physical-
ism wanted a modal thesis compatible with the possibility (but not actuality) of
Actual-plus-Ghost, but incompatible with the possibility of zombie worlds. They
wanted a modal thesis that captured the “copy the physical and add no extras”
test. Modal physicalism, defined using the “minimal physical duplicates” clause,
accomplishes these goals. However, Jackson’s use of minimal physical duplicates
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is not the only method that will meet this desiderata. Chalmers (1996a) uses the
notion of a positive fact, Leuenberger (2008) uses ceteris absentibus modal sufficiency,
Lewis (1983) uses alien properties, and Stoljar (2009a) mentions a variety of pos-
sible strategies. The differences between these methods won’t concern us here.
We’re primarily interested in the general strategy of using modality to define
physicalism. Jackson’s definition provides a useful paradigm.
We now move on to consider some of the technicalia associated with precisi-
fying the notion of a minimal physical duplicate. Jackson’s modal definition of
physicalism presupposes a partial ordering ď among the physical duplicates of
the actual world. ď must be reflexive, antisymmetric (i.e. x ď y and y ď x entail
x “ y), and transitive. Modal physicalism requires that all the minimal physical
duplicates be duplicates simipliciter. Jackson does not say much about how the
ordering should be established. Following Leuenberger (2008), there are at least
two options.11
ďF: w ďF w0 =df every fundamental fact of w holds in w0.
ďP: w ďP w0 =df every positive fact (fundamental or not) of w holds in w0.
Both orderings appeal to the notion of a fact. I plan to leave the notion intu-
itive. One might precisify using states of affairs or propositions. wďF w0 requires
that the fundamental facts of w also hold at w0, but does not require the converse.
w0 might have more fundamentalia than w. ďP relies on the notion of a positive
fact. Chalmers (1996a) defines a positive fact of world w as a fact that holds in every
world that contains w as a proper part (40). This approach requires an under-
standing of what it is for one world to contain another as a proper part. Positive
11My discussion of modal physicalism is indebted to Leuenberger (2008) and Chalmers (1996a):
38-42.
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facts include the fact that my desk has the dimensions that it does, the fact that
traffic in downtown Los Angeles is horrendous, and the fact that the Marianas
Trench is more than 2 miles deep. Negative facts include explicitly negative facts
as well as universally quantified facts. Examples include the fact that there are
no ghosts and the fact that all humans were born on Earth.
All this talk about minimal duplicates and complete duplicates sounds more
complicated than it is. Let’s assume, quite plausibly, that there are no two dis-
tinct possible worlds that are complete clones. If modal physicalism is true, then
there is one and only one minimal physical duplicate of the actual world: the
actual world itself. If modal physicalism is false, there is either more than one
such duplicate, or there is a physical duplicate of the actual world that is more
minimal than the actual world. How might each of these occur? First, a zombie
world - a physical duplicate of the actual world with no experiences whatsoever
- would be a physical duplicate of the actual world that is more minimal than
the actual world. Thus all the minimal physical duplicates of the actual world
(i.e. the zombie world) would not be complete duplicates. Second, suppose that
zombie worlds are impossible, but inverted qualia worlds are. An inverted qualia
world is a physical duplicate of the actual world in which the experiences are
switched around. When you experience blue, your inverted twin experiences
red. When you experience a pain your twin experiences a tickle. In such a situa-
tion there would be multiple minimal physical duplicates of the actual world (all
the various inverted worlds, including the actual world), but they would not all
be complete duplicates of the actual world.
Modal physicalism is compatible with the metaphysical possibility of Actual-
plus-Ghost because Actual-plus-Ghost is not a minimal physical duplicate of the ac-
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tual world. On either interpretation of the ordering ď on which modal physical-
ism relies, w-actual ď Actual-plus-Ghost. Actual-plus-Ghost clearly contains more
fundamentals than the actual world. Thus w-actual ďF Actual-plus-Ghost. Actual-
plus-Ghost also contains positive facts that the actual world does not, such as the
fact that ghosts exist. Thus w-actual ďP Actual-plus-Ghost.
Modal physicalism is a useful definition of physicalism. It gets a lot of things
right. It is compatible with the possibility of Actual-plus-Ghost. It is incompatible
with the possibility of zombie worlds and inverted qualia worlds. And, impor-
tantly, modal physicalism uses the familiar and well-understood tools of modal-
ity.
1.3.1 Two Criticisms of Modal Formulations of Physicalism
I have two major criticisms of modal physicalism as a definition of physicalism.
First, the truth of modal physicalism guarantees only a modal covariation be-
tween the physical and everything else (including the mental). One might think
that mere covariation is not strong enough for physicalism itself. Physicalism re-
quires at least a dependence relation of the mental on the physical.12 13 Second,
modal physicalism appears to yield the wrong verdict in certain cases.
I’ll sketch a situation in which modal physicalism is true but intuitively physi-
calism is not. Russell (1927) imagined a situation in which the fundamental phys-
ical properties had underlying categorical bases. Deeper properties or entities
make the electrons, bosons, and leptons have the charges and masses they do.
Suppose that the underlying basis of the electron is a consciousness particle: a
12Modal covariation marks a type of modal “dependence”. I claim that physicalism requires
something stronger than the mere modal covarational form of “dependence”.
13A similar criticism appears in Wilson (2005).
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miniature experience. Assume also that, necessarily, the state of the conscious-
ness particles necessitates the state of the electrons and vice versa. Each necessi-
tates the other. Otherwise the fundamental level is purely physical. Under these
assumptions, modal physicalism is true. Any world with the same physical state
as the actual world will have the same electron state, which guarantees the same
state of the consciousness particles. But in such a situation physicalism is clearly
false. Physicalism, however one conceives it, is incompatible with consciousness
particles in the bedrock of reality.
1.3.2 Fundamentality Physicalism and Modal Physicalism
Modal physicalism’s miscategorization of the consciousness particle case points
the way to a better definition of physicalism: fundamentality physicalism. What
modal physicalism lacks is a dependence of the mental on the physical. In fact,
I think that much of modal physicalism’s plausibility derives from its affinity
to fundamentality physicalism. Modal physicalism is as close as you can get
to fundamentality physicalism without mentioning the words ‘fundamentality’,
‘generation’, ‘dependence’, or ‘ground’. (In fact, if we presicify modal physical-
ism usingďF as the ordering that determines minimality, then modal physicalism
already relies on a notion of fundamentality). I’d like to make three points in sup-
port of the claim that modal physicalism derives its plausbility from fundamen-
tality physicalism. First, fundamentality physicalism entails modal physicalism.
Second, modal physicalism is often motivated using the metaphor of God creat-
ing the world. This metaphor is just the creation test from section 1.1.1, which is a
test for fundamentality. Third, when philosophers discuss cases in which modal
physicalism is falsified, without fail discuss cases in which there are non-physical
fundamentalia.
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First, fundamentality physicalism entails modal physicalism. Modal physi-
calism requires that all the minimal physical duplicates be complete duplicates.
Any world that is a physical duplicate of the actual world will have the same
physical fundamentalia. Any world that is a minimal duplicate will contain no
extra fundamentalia. Suppose fundamentality physicalism is true: all the actual
fundamentalia are physical. Thus all the minimal physical duplicates of the ac-
tual world will be fundamental duplicates. By the covering constraint, all the
fundamental duplicates are complete duplicates. Thus all the minimal physical
duplicates are complete duplicates, i.e. modal physicalism is true. In fact, modal
physicalism’s clause about “minimal duplicates” is actually a very clever way of
capturing the covering constraint using only modal tools.14
Second, modal definitions are often motivated as construals of physicalism
using the metaphor of God constructing the world. The metaphor is borderline
ubiquitous in the literature on defining physicalism modally. This type of rea-
soning appears in Leuenberger (2008): 1, Jackson (1993), and Chalmers (1996a):
38-41. These philosophers ask us to imagine God creating the world. If God need
only create physical stuff to generate all of reality, then physicalism is true. If the
physical (in the absence of extras) necessitates the rest, then “all God needs to
create” is the physical. Of course, the God creation metaphor is exactly the cre-
ation test from section 1.1.1 (“The Building Blocks of Reality”). This test is most
naturally construed as a test for what is fundamental. If God need only create
the Xs to create the entire world, then that’s good evidence that the fundamental
building blocks of reality lie among the Xs.
14In fact, I believe that modal definitions of physicalism must appeal to the notion of fundamen-
tality in order to solve the problem of being compatible with possibilities like Actual-plus-Astral
but incompatible with the possibility of zombies and inverted qualia. I hope to argue this point
in further work.
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Third, when philosophers discuss situations in which modal physicalism is
false, they discuss, almost without fail, scenarios in which fundamentality phys-
icalism is false. Chalmers (1996a) considers two main hypotheses that would
explain the failure of modal physicalism. First, he considers the possibility that
there is a psycho-physical law of the universe that relate the mental and the phys-
ical (or the functional). This law is intended to be on a par with the fundamental
laws of physics, such as the law of gravity. Second, he considers the possibility
of a further non-physical layer of entities underlying the fundamental physical
particles. These are clearly both scenarios in which fundamentality physicalism
is false.
All of these considerations point toward the conclusion that modal physical-
ism, and philosopher’s use of modal physicalism, is really just an attempt to get at
the real McCoy: fundamentality physicalism. I don’t take this point to be original.
Others have made it recently, though they tend to use the lexicon of “ground”).
For example, Schaffer (2009, 2003) writes that ground is the notion needed to de-
fine physicalism. Kim (1982) writes that modal covariation might be explained
by a relation of metaphysical dependence such as metaphysical generation or
ground:
Supervenience itself is not an explanatory relation. It is not a “deep”
metaphysical relation; rather, it is a “surface” relation that reports a
pattern of property covariation, suggesting the presence of an inter-
esting dependency relation that might explain it. (Kim (1982): 167)
Modal physicalism is a claim about a certain type of supervenience on the
physical. It’s unsurprising that philosophers would reach for modal tools when
attempting to characterize fundamentality physicalism. Modality is a familiar
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notion with a well-understood formal framework. Metaphysical generation and
ground are not.15 In fact, Lewis (1983): 29 lauds supervenience as “a stripped-
down form of reductionism, unencumbered by dubious denials of existence, claims
of ontological priority, or claims of translatability”. Modal formulations of phys-
icalism do have some advantages. First, unlike fundamentality centered concep-
tions, modal formulations completely avoid the issues I addressed in section 1.2.2
about the relation between physical fundamentalia and mathematics. My strat-
egy was to set these issues aside as irrelevant to the main locus of debate: the
relation between the mental and the physical. But modal physicalism does not
require any strategy at all. It neatly sidesteps the issue because these necessary
existents and truths are trivially necessitated by anything. As Lewis points out,
modal formulations are less committal because they don’t entail any dependence
of the mental on the physical. Unfortunately, this lack of commitment means
that modal definitions can fail to capture the intuitive notion of physicalism they
sought to capture in the first place.
Lewis would praise modal formulations for their lack of “dubious” claim of
ontological priority. I contest the“dubious” status of such claims. They are per-
fectly respectable. This essay does some work to explain what is meant by them.
Fundamentality and metaphysical dependence is what we were after all along.
As a definition of physicalism, fundamentality physicalism is preferable to modal
physicalism. Fundamentality provides a better lens through which to view the
physicalism-dualism debate. Even if a fundamentality-centered conception of
physicalism is more risky than its modal brethren, the risks are worth the re-
ward. (In Chapter 2: “Modal Rationalism and Two Replies to the Master Argu-
15The situation is changing as the formal and logical properties of ground receive more atten-
tion. Cf. Fine (2011), Rabin & Rabern (ms), deRosset (ms).
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ment Against Physicalism”, I’ll argue that a fundamentality-oriented conception
of physicalism allows us to see more clearly the key issues around which many
arguments in the contemporary physicalism-dualism debate revolve.)
1.4 Other Physicalisms
1.4.1 Everything is Narrowly or Broadly Physical: A Schema
In its most general form, physicalism says that everything is physical. The thesis
then requires clarification in two ways. First, what does the ‘everything’ range
over? Second, what does it take for something to count as “physical”? Versions
of physicalism will vary over their answers to these two clarificatory questions.16
If physicalism is true, then a wide variety of prima facie non-physical phenom-
ena, including consciousness, representation, laws, and morality, must either be
placed outside the scope of ‘everything’ or be counted as “physical” on some
reasonable interpretation of that term. Often, a phenomenon will be counted as
physical if it bears some chosen relation to more straightforwardly physical phe-
nomena such as electrons, gravity, and the laws of thermodynamics. It is helpful
to introduce the distinction between the broadly physical and the narrowly physi-
cal. The narrowly physical are physical in the more restricted sense of the term.
Often, a conception of physicalism will count as narrowly physical all and only
the phenomena studied by physics. Something is broadly physical if it bears the
chosen relation R to the narrowly physical. Examples of such relations include
metaphysical dependence and definability. A phenomenon can be broadly phys-
ical without being narrowly physical. If physicalism is true, the mental falls into
this category.
16This framework is used by Stoljar (2009b).
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Physicalism claims that everything is either broadly or narrowly physical. Dif-
ferent versions of physicalism will vary on (i) the range of ‘everything’ (ii) what
counts as narrowly physical and (ii) the relation R something must bear to the
narrowly physical to count as broadly physical. This framework will help us cat-
egorize a wide variety of formulations of physicalism, including fundamentality
physicalism (section 1.4.2), modal physicalism (1.4.3), type identity physicalism
(1.4.4), realization physicalism (1.4.5), nature physicalism (1.4.6), definition phys-
icalism (1.4.8), and concept physicalism (1.4.8).
1.4.2 Applying the Schema to Fundamentality Physicalism
Strong fundamentality physicalism says that the quantifier ‘everything’ is unre-
stricted. It ranges over absolutely everything. Weak fundamentality physicalism
places certain items outside its scope, including mathematics. Fundamentality
physicalism counts something as narrowly physicalfundamentality if it is a physical
fundamental. Something is broadly physicalfundamentality if it is metaphysically gen-
erated by narrowly physical fundamentalia. Fundamentality physicalism says
that everything is physical, i.e. everything is either an narrowly physical funda-
mental or metaphysically generated from those fundamentals.17
Fundamentality physicalism has little bite without an understanding of what
it takes for something to be “narrowly physical”. First, it must be fundamental.
This much is clear. But what does it take for an alleged fundamental to count as
“physical”? I won’t offer any independent criterion for the physicality of an al-
leged fundamental. We don’t need one. We know them when we see them. I find
17For completeness’s sake, I mention two other options. First, one might abandon my notion
of “metaphysical generation” and use ground, or metaphysical/ontological dependence, instead.
I’m not sure much turns on this. I use ‘metaphysical generation’ as label for whatever the meta-
physical “making so” relation between the fundamental and the non-fundamental is. I take this
relation to be a relation of metaphysical dependence.
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the following heuristic useful: “If x were fundamental, would fundamentality
physicalism be in trouble?” If the answer is ‘no’, then x is narrowly physical (if
fundamental). If the answer is ‘yes’, x is not. Quarks, leptons, gravity, electrical
fields, carbon, and weak nuclear forces all yield a ‘no’ answer. Not all of these are
fundamental. But if they were, fundamentality physicalism would not thereby
be challenged. Consciousness and representations yield a ‘yes’ answer. If either
of these were fundamental then fundamentality physicalism would be in trouble.
Fundamentality is, in a certain sense, stingier than other forms of physicalism
when it comes to the narrowly physical. Most other forms would count ther-
modynamical phenomena, such as an ideal gas law, as narrowly physical. Such
phenomena provide paradigmatic subjects of physical inquiry. They appear in al-
most all introductory physics textbooks. But fundamentality physicalism counts
thermodynamics as broadly, and not narrowly, physical, because thermodynam-
ical phenomena are not fundamental. From fundamentality physicalism’s stand-
point, thermodynamical and psychological phenomena are on a par. Both are
generated from the narrowly physical fundamental level. However, fundamen-
tality physical does recognize a difference between the two. If thermodynamical
phenomena were fundamental, fundamentality physicalism would remain un-
scathed. If psychological phenomena were fundamental, fundamentality physi-
calism would be false.
1.4.3 Applying the Schema to Modal Physicalism
Modal physicalism can also be understood using the everything / broad / nar-
row schema. There is likely more than one way to fit modal physicalism into
this schema. I’ll explain one such way. First we introduce the notion of a fact,
which I will leave intuitive. A fact is simply some way the world is. ‘Everything’
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ranges over all facts. Two worlds are complete duplicates if the same facts are
true at both of them. The narrowly physical facts are the strictly physical facts I
introduced in section 1.3 (“Modal Physicalism”). These are the facts about nar-
rowly physical stuff: electrons, spins, weak nuclear forces, and the like. A fact is
broadly physicalmodal if it is minimally necessitated by all the actual narrowly phys-
ical facts. A fact is minimally necessitated by the actual narrowly physical facts if
it holds at all the minimal physical duplicates of the actual world. Translated
into this vocabulary, modal physicalism says that all the facts are broadly physi-
cal facts. (Modal physicalism, unlike fundamentality physicalism, counts all the
narrowly physical facts as broadly physical, because every fact necessitates itself.
Fundamentality physicalism uses metaphysical generation or dependence over
necessitation, and nothing metaphysically generates or depends on itself.)
1.4.4 Type Identity Physicalism
Type identity physicalism is a version of the classic materialist identity theory in
the philosophy of mind. Type identity physicalism is a claim about properties.
‘Everything’ ranges over properties. The narrowly physical properties are the
properties studied in the physical sciences: charge, mass, being a lepton, having
such-and-such spin, having such-and-such velocity in xyz direction, etc. A prop-
erty is broadly physical if it is identical to some narrowly physical property. Thus
the broadly physical properties are all and only the narrowly physical properties.
Type identity physicalism says that every property is identical to some narrowly
physical property.
According to type identity physicalism, despite appearances to the contrary,
properties like experiencing red, having a good credit rating, and having a younger
sibling are, in fact, narrowly physical properties studied by the physical sciences.
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The physical sciences do not study those properties under those names, but they
study them nonetheless. Perhaps the property of having a good credit rating is
identical to the property that is the disjunction of all the various microphysical
arrangements that yield the result that one has a good credit rating.
Type identity physicalism has often been objected to on the grounds that it is
incompatible with the multiple realizability of the mental. The idea behind mul-
tiple realizability is that a mental state, such as a state of being in pain, might be
realized by c-fiber firings in humans and by o-fiber firings in octopi. Identifica-
tion of the property of being in pain with either the property of having c-fibers
firing or the property of having o-fiber firings yields yields an intuitively incor-
rect result. Either humans or octopi don’t experience pain.
One potential identity theorist reply has already been previewed. The type
identity theorist could appeal to disjunctive properties. Identifying being in pain
with the disjunction of having c-fiber and o-fiber firings avoids the problem. For
this move to work, the type identity theorist will need to further identify proper-
ties such as having c-fibers firings with further (probably infinite) disjunctions of
narrowly physical properties.
There are many moves to be made here, I won’t go through the details. Per-
haps the shift to disjunctions robs the type identity theory of some of its initial
appeal. Or perhaps the disjunctive identity theory is too weak a form of physi-
calism for some. Or perhaps that fact that the physical sciences study property F
and property G does not entail that it studies the property F-or-G.
1.4.5 Realization Physicalism
Melnyk (2003) proposes Realization Physicalism. Realization physicalism is a claim
about token objects, properties, and events. According to realization physicalism,
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a token object, property, or event is narrowly physicalrealization if it of a type studied
by physics. A token object, property, event is broadly physicalrealization if it is realized
by some narrowly physical object, property, or event. Realization physicalism
says that every token object, property, and event is either narrowly or broadly
physical.
Roughly, x realizes y just in case y is a token of a functional type characterized
by some condition C (such as playing a certain causal role) and x is a token of a
type that satisfies that condition. A token electronic state of a laptop computer
realizes a computational state because the latter is definable by reference to a
functional role and the electronic state plays that role. Melnyk imagines a chain of
realization from macroscopic objects, properties, and events we encounter every
day, through medium-sized phenomena and eventually down to the ultimate
realizers of fundamental physics.
Because of its focus on particular objects, properties, and events, realization
physicalism is compatible with multiple realizability. This token of human pain
can be realized by c-fiber firings (which are in turn realized by narrowly physical
property P1), while this token of octopus pain can be realized by o-fiber firings
(in turn realized by narrowly physical property P2).
Realization physicalism is similar to fundamentality physicalism. Both en-
vision a layered picture of reality with an ultimate bedrock of physical funda-
mentalia. Melnyk (2003) even uses the term ‘fundamental’, and claims that the
ultimate realizers of everything are physical fundamentalia. Realization physi-
calism, like fundamentality physicalism, entails modal physicalism (because re-
alizers necessitate that which they realize). And realization physicalism, like fun-
damentality physicalism, and unlike modal physicalism, gets the intuitively cor-
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rect verdict (physicalism is false) in the case from section ?? of the consciousness
particle underlying and necessitating electrons.
There are two main differences between fundamentality physicalism and re-
alization physicalism. First, they offer differing pictures of the relation between
the physical bedrock and the higher-level world. My relation of metaphysical
generation entails metaphysical or ontological dependence. Realization needn’t
have this commitment (though one might choose to add it or to argue that re-
alization entails some type of dependence). Second, if the higher-level features
of our world are realized by narrowly physical features, then these higher-level
features must be in some sense functional. x realizes y entails that y is a token
of a functional type. If realization physicalism is true, then all the non-narrowly
physical objects, events, and properties are functional. This claim is, at the least,
controversial. Fundamentality physicalism has no such commitment.
1.4.6 Nature Physicalism
Arguably, every thing in the world has a nature, or essence. The nature of a thing
is revealed in the deep explanation of what that thing is. The nature of a thing
can be captured by something like an Aristotelian real definition. A real definition
of x explains what it is to be x. For example, the nature of water is to consist of
molecules combining two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen. That’s what it is to
be water.
Nature physicalism, like other physicalisms, says that everything is physical.
Mass, spin, and quantum entanglement are narrowly physical. x is partly broadly
physicalnature if the nature of x involves narrowly physical phenomena. x is wholly
broadly physicalnature if the nature of x involves only narrowly physical phenom-
ena. Wholly broad physicalitynature entails partly broad physicalitynature. Whether
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the nature of x involves y can be determined by whether y must be mentioned in
the real definition, or deep explanation, of what it is to be x. For example, suppose
conscious experience occurs because of a certain type of collapse of the quantum
wave function. This type of collapse is key to understanding consciousness. If so,
then the nature of conscious experience would be at least partly broadly physical.
Nature physicalists can say a variety of thing about the quantifier ‘every-
thing’. They might choose to exclude mathematics, or morality, or abstracta. Or
they might not. Less exclusion yields a stronger physicalism.
We get (at least) two versions of nature physicalism. Whole nature physicalism
says that everything has a wholly physical nature. Part nature physicalism says
that everything has a partly physical nature.
Examples of things with at least partly (and perhaps wholly) physical natures
include electrons, black holes, the elements of the periodic table, and water. The
truth of nature physicalism will turn on whether various macroscopic phenom-
ena have (wholly or partly) physical natures. Items such as representations, con-
sciousness, morality, and nations all pose challenges.
1.4.7 Explanatory Physicalism
Explanatory physicalism says that all the varieties of phenomena we encounter in
the world can be understood using the tools and methods required to understand
narrowly physical phenomena. ‘Everything’ ranges over phenomena that require
explanation. Narrowly physicalexplanatory phenomena are the phenomena studied
by some specified range of physical sciences. Clearly physics is one such science.
But the explanatory physicalist might choose to include chemistry, geology, or
astronomy. For now, let’s interpret “narrowly physicalexplanatory” generously, to
include as much as seems reasonable. Certain phenomena should not be counted
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narrowly physical, including the fluctuations of the stock market, the changing
colors of cuttlefish, and the meaning of the word ‘scrumptious’. But explanatory
physicalism counts these phenomena broadly physical if they can be understand
using the tools, methods, and concepts used in physics, chemistry, and the other
physical sciences (whatever they may be). If they can all be so understood, ex-
planatory physicalism is true.
Explanatory physicalism is similar to nature physicalism. Explanatory physi-
calism is an epistemic claim about explanation and understanding, while nature
physicalism is a metaphysical claim about natures. However, the nature of x is
revealed by the deep explanation of what it is to be x. Thus for both nature phys-
icalism and explanatory physicalism, the (broad) physicality of a thing turns on
what is needed to understand that thing. The entailment relations between the
two will turn on the relation between (a) understanding/explaining in the sense
required by explanatory physicalism and (b) capturing the nature in the sense
required by nature physicalism. I can imagine views with every permutation of
entailment between (a) and (b).
Explanatory physicalism, in its strongest form, maintains that all genuine ex-
planations must be couched in the terms or concepts of physics. Explanation in
other terms, while sometimes useful or pragmatic, will or should eventually be
discarded as the explanatory scope of physics grows and engulfs the phenom-
ena the non-physical sciences sought to explain. The deepest insight comes from
explanations expressed in narrowly physical vocabulary.
While explanatory physicalism is similar in some ways to nature physicalism,
explanatory physicalism has an advantage over nature physicalism. Explana-
tory physicalism can be endorsed as a definition of physicalism by those who are
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skeptical that things have natures at all.
1.4.8 Definition Physicalism
Definition physicalism is a linguistic, rather than metaphysical, thesis. Accord-
ing to definition physicalism, ‘everything’ ranges over some specified class of
expressions: singular terms, predicates, terms of the special sciences, complete
sentences, etc. A term is narrowly physicaldefinition if and only if it appears in the
physical sciences.18 A term is broadly physicaldefinition if and only if it can be trans-
lated into narrowly physical terms. Different versions of definition physicalism
offer different criteria for when a translation or definition is successful. At the
least, one should require that the extension of the definiens be the same as the
definiendum. This entails that the definiens provide necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for the definiendum. One might also maintain that that definiens have the
same meaning as the definiendum. In what follows, I will not insist on this re-
quirement.
Definition physicalism is a very bold thesis. I think it highly implausible, even
when ‘everything’ is limited to a very narrow class of terms, such as biological, or
even geographical, terms. It’s tremendously difficult to correctly define any term
using others. Dictionary definitions rarely accomplish this feat. Instead they fa-
cilitate understanding of the term, by pointing one in correct direction. Rarely do
dictionaries give necessary and sufficient conditions. Furthermore, even when
a definition succeeds (in the sense of providing necessary and sufficient condi-
tions), it usually does so by utilizing cognate expressions that in turn can only be
defined using the originally defined term. Given how how hard it is to success-
18This definition will count many mathematical terms as narrowly physicaldefinition. I’m not sure
whether proponents of a definition oriented conception of physicalism will welcome or resist this
result. One could re-work narrowly physicaldefinition to count only non-mathematical terms.
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fully define any term, I think that it highly implausible that any large or interest-
ing class of terms can be defined using only the limited vocabulary of physics.
1.4.9 Concept Physicalism
Like definition physicalism, concept physicalism is more epistemic than meta-
physical. Concept physicalism is a claim about the conditions under which an
agent can possess, or master / fully understand, a concept. Before stating what
concept physicalism is, we must introduce the distinction between concept pos-
session and mastery. Concepts are the basic units of thought. The thought OS-
TRICHES LIKE CHOCOLATE is composed of the concepts OSTRICHES, LIKE, and
CHOCOLATE. (Note on terminology: I use small capitals to express items at the
conceptual level, e.g. the concept CHOCOLATE or the thought OSTRICHES LIKE
CHOCOLATE.) An agent possesses a concept when he or she can think or consider
thoughts of which the concept is a component. A thinker has conceptual mastery
of a concept when he or she fully understands that concept.
Thinkers can possess concepts without having mastery. Burge (1979)’s ARTHRI-
TIS case provides a classic example. Burge imagines Alf, who approaches his doc-
tor complaining of arthritis in his thigh. Alf’s doctor corrects him, pointing out
that one cannot have arthritis in the thigh. Arthritis, by definition, affects only
joints. Alf accepts the correction, admits that he was mistaken to believe that
he had arthritis in his thigh, and modifies his usage of ‘arthritis’ and ARTHRITIS
accordingly. The important point here is that Alf was able to think the thought
I HAVE ARTHRITIS IN MY THIGH, and thereby possessed the concept ARTHRI-
TIS, without fully understanding, i.e. mastering, that concept. Examples of this
nature can be cooked up for almost any concept whatsoever. Many people use
technical concepts that have worked their way into public consciousness with-
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out mastering them. Examples include DARK MATTER, CHAOS THEORY, CLOUD
COMPUTING, TRANSISTOR, ID, FRACKING, and HEDGE FUND.
Concept physicalism comes in four versions. It says that an agent who pos-
sesses/masters all the physical concepts is in a position to, through thinking
alone, possess/master all concepts. Technically, concept physicalism comes in
four varieties (possession-possession, possession-mastery, mastery-possession,
master-mastery). We consider only two, primarily because these are the two most
interesting theses.
• Concept Possession Physicalism: An agent who masters all physical con-
cepts will be in a position to, through thinking alone, possess all concepts.
• Concept Mastery Physicalism: An agent who masters all physical concepts
will be in a position to, through thinking alone, master all concepts.
The idea behind concept physicalism, of either variety, is simple. Take some-
one who fully understands all physical concepts. Allow her to think for as long
as she wishes. Idealize past features including the thinker’s fatigue, boredom,
lifespan, and computational limits. For each concept, if she can come to possess
that concept, then concept possession physicalism is true. If she can mastery each
concept, then concept mastery physicalism is true.
Physical concepts are the concepts used in physics, or expressed by the terms
of physics. These includes concepts such as ELECTRON, MASS, FORCE, and GRAV-
ITY. One might also let mathematical and functional concepts count as physical.
The following thought, which I take to be fairly common, supports both forms
of concept physicalism: All concepts are possessable and fully understandable from the
armchair. If this is correct, then the truth of concept physicalism has nothing in
50
particular to do with the physical. If we start with a thinker who has no concepts
at all, or perhaps some minimal stock of concepts required to get thought off
the ground in the first place, she’ll be able to possess and master all concepts.
Another line of thought that supports concept physicalism is that all concepts
are somehow formed, or constructed from, physical concepts. This thought lies
along the same track as definition physicalism. It is in some ways stronger than
definition physicalism, which makes no claims about “construction of concepts”.
I think that both forms of concept physicalism are false. A variation on Jack-
son (1982)’s Mary thought experiment defeats them. Imagine Mary, a brilliant,
but blind, scientist raised in a black and white room. Mary learns all the physical
concepts and fully understands them. She publishes important results in solid-
state physics. But Mary’s colleagues, for whatever reason, never reveal to Mary
that she is blind or in any way different than other people. Mary learns all about
light-waves and their properties. But she never learns that humans have a capac-
ity to perceive those light-waves using the sense of sight. Mary never experiences
the sensation of seeing red. Consider the concept REDph. REDph is the phenome-
nal, experiential, concept of red. It applies to experiences or a certain type (you
know the ones), and not to light-waves or to the surfaces of objects. Mary does
not possess the concept REDph. If we place her in an armchair and allow to think
until the end of time, she will not come to either possess of master the concept
REDph. Therefore, both conception possession and concept mastery physicalism
are false.
I have argued elsewhere (Rabin (2011a), Chapter 3) that Jackson’s “knowledge
argument” does not defeat modal physicalism. I am similarly doubtful that it
defeats fundamentality physicalism (the shift from modality to fundamentality
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does not significantly alter the dialectic). However, Jackson’s thought experiment
does defeat concept physicalism.
1.4.10 Summary
Each form of physicalism discussed says that everything is either broadly or nar-
rowly physical. With the exception of type identity physicalism, each recognizes
a difference between the narrowly and the broadly physical. Each form offers a
different account of the relation R something must bear to the narrowly physical
to count as broadly physical.
• Fundamentality Physicalism: x is broadly physical iff x is metaphysically
generated from and dependent on the narrowly physical (which must be
fundamental).
• Modal Physicalism: x is a broadly physical fact iff x is minimally necessi-
tated by the narrowly physical facts.
• Type Identity Physicalism: x is a broadly physical type (property) if and
only if x is a narrowly physical type (property).
• Realization Physicalism: x is a broadly physical token object, property, or
event iff x is realized by some narrowly physical object, property, or event.
• Nature Physicalism: x is broadly physical iff the nature of x is partly/wholly
narrowly physical.
• Explanatory Physicalism: x is a broadly physical phenomenon iff x can be
understood using the tools and methods needed to understand narrowly
physical phenomena.
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• Definition Physicalism: A term x is broadly physical iff x is definable in
narrowly physical terms.
• Concept Physicalism: A concept x is broadly physical iff x is possessable/masterable,
through thinking alone, by someone who has mastered all narrowly physi-
cal concepts.
Lastly, it’s worth mentioning that what I’ve offered is surely not a complete
catalogue of the claims that have gone or will go under the names ‘physicalism’
or ‘materialism’. Various other criteria might be offered for whether something
counts as “physical”, in the broad sense.
1.5 Fundamentality Physicalism and Other Physicalisms
1.5.1 Against Nature and Explanatory Physicalism
I think that whole nature physicalism and explanatory physicalism are both false.
Many non-narrowly physical phenomena resist explanation, and understanding,
without the use of concepts and tools specific to the subject of inquiry. Often,
the science of that subject begins to flourish only once the appropriate concepts
are introduced. These concepts allow for proper framing of the subject under
investigation. For example, economic fluctuations can’t be understood without
the concepts of supply and demand. Representations can’t be understood without
some concept of verdicality or accuracy. Truth is one such concept.
The most basic function of a representation is to represent the world as being
certain way. The sentence ‘The taco truck on La Brea Avenue has the best tortas’
says that the world is a place where the best tortas can be found at the taco truck
on La Brea Avenue. When a representation succeeds at this function it is accurate.
When it does not, it is inaccurate. Any account of representation that ignores
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these features will be woefully incomplete. Furthermore, the notions of accuracy
and inaccuracy cannot, in turn, be explained using the tools and methods of the
physical sciences.
Thus, the nature of representation is, at least partly, not narrowly physical.
That nature involves accuracy. This entails that whole nature physicalism is
false. Similarly, the explanatory tools needed to understand representation in-
clude tools and concepts not found in the study of the narrowly physical. These
include the concepts of accuracy and the tools of semantics. Thus explanatory
physicalism is false as well.
I recognize that these claims are somewhat controversial. For example, teleose-
mantic approaches to meaning (Millikan (1989, 1993, 1984)) claim that represen-
tation can be understood using the tools and concepts of biology, specifically the
notion of biological function. If biology can in turn be understood using the tools
and concepts of physics, then representation can be similarly understood. I find
all the steps in this alleged reduction of representation to physics dubious. But
this is not the place to push the point. My goal is to sketch why I think these
forms of physicalism too strong, and demonstrate that the points that tell against
these stronger physicalism do not harm fundamentality physicalism.
1.5.2 The Relevance of Fundamentally Non-Physical Worlds
Recall the world Casper from section 1.2.2. Casper is a world whose fundamen-
tal layer consists of spirit stuff, including spirit particles called “ghostons” and
“ectoplasmons” which float in an ether are governed by a force called “kismet”.
At the non-fundamental level, Casper is by inhabited ghosts, ghouls, demons,
and angels, all of whom have mental states. The fundamental bedrock of Casper
consists entirely of spirit stuff. No quarks, no mass, no charge, no nuclear forces,
54
no gravity. I believe that worlds like Casper are metaphysically possible. I’d like
to first argue for this claim and then draw out some of the lessons such worlds
offer regarding physicalism.
When I speak of “worlds like Casper”, I mean worlds that contain non-physical
fundamentalia, and in which those non-physical fundamentalia metaphysically
generate a rich variety of non-fundamentalia, including thinking agents.
1.5.3 Fundamentally Non-Physical Worlds are Metaphysically Possible
My main argument for the possibility of possible worlds with non-physical fun-
damentalia is that the denial of their possibility involves a type of parochialism
about modality. Modality is not the place for parochialism. We should be liberal
about what is metaphysically possible. If we can conceive it, we should take it to
be possible unless we have evidence to the contrary. We can conceive worlds like
Casper. There is no evidence for the impossibility. Therefore they are possible.
I will consider three possibilities for the denial of the metaphysical possibility
of Casper. First, one could deny that there can be fundamental particles, prop-
erties, or forces, other than those instantiated at the actual world. Second, one
could accept non-physical fundamentalia, but deny that these fundamental can
generate macroscopic such as ghosts, ghouls, angels, and demons with mental
states. Third, one could claim that the fundamentalia of Casper are physical.
Consider the objector who denies that there can be fundamental particles,
properties, or forces, other than those instantiated at the actual world. This view
entails that every possible variety of fundamental is actually instantiated. Here’s
an argument against the view. There are sub-regions of the actual world with-
out electrons. Some of these sub-regions are identical to entire possible worlds.
Therefore there are possible worlds without electrons, and not all worlds contain
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every variety of fundamental stuff. Given that some worlds do not contain ev-
ery variety of fundamental stuff, it is unmotivated and parochial to think that
we happened (by dumb luck!) to inhabit one of the few worlds that contains ev-
ery variety. Therefore, the actual world does not contain every possible type of
fundamental.
Consider now the objector who admits the possibility of non-actual funda-
mentalia, but denies that these fundamentalia can metaphysically generate macro-
scopic phenomena like people, or angels, or experiences. This form of modal
parochialism is just as bad as the previous. It maintains that there could be alien
non-actual fundamental stuff, but that the actual world just happens to contain
all the interesting fundamental stuff - the stuff capable of forming macroscopic
phenomena like people and experiences.
Lastly, consider the objector who admits the possibility of Casper, but claims
that Casper is entirely physical. I’m not sure exactly what to say against this view.
It seems crazy to me. Descartes believed in non-physical mental substances. Let
Casper have some of that in its fundamental bedrock. Does this objector also
maintain that if Descartes were correct about the existence of mental substances,
fundamentality physicalism would remain true? I begin to wonder what this
objector means by ‘physical’.
The preceding arguments are not likely to convince the dedicated opponent.
She might readily accept the modal parochialism to which I’ve argued denial of
the possibility of Casper commits one. However, from here on I’ll take the meta-
physical possibility of worlds like Casper, in which non-physical fundamentalia
generate a rich variety of non-fundamentalia, as given.
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1.5.4 Space and Time
It’s not unreasonable to think that even Casper, a world whose fundamental
building blocks are mental substances and ghoston particles, contains at least
one physical fundamental: space-time. After all, I said earlier (section 1.2.2) that
the inhabitants of Casper move from one area of the universe to another. If they
do so Casper must have some type of space. If they make these movements over
time, Casper has something like time.
There is something to the idea that any possible world, or perhaps any pos-
sible world with thinking agents, must have something like space and/or time.
In this sense such worlds may never be completely non-physical. However, it
may be possible for space and/or time to be non-fundamental, and metaphysi-
cally generated from non-physical fundamentalia.19 But if even if space and time
are fundamental, even fundamental at every possible world, they seem to play a
different role than, say, quarks, leptons, and mass. Space and time provide some-
thing like the canvas on which the fundamentalia can be placed. Quarks, lep-
tons, and weak nuclear forces are the paint on the canvas. Perhaps every possible
world requires a canvas on which the fundamentalia are placed. If so, perhaps
every possible world contains something space-time-like. But this does not chal-
lenge the idea that non-physical fundamentalia can be placed on this canvas, or
that the canvas can be mostly devoid of physical fundamentalia.
When I imagine strange possible worlds such as Casper, I imagine them con-
taining something like space-time. I find it easy to imagine worlds without quarks
19Theoretical physicists seem to entertain the possibility that space-time itself is not funda-
mental, and is instead generated from something deeper. If so, space-time, like many non-
fundamentalia, may be generatable from a wide variety of fundamentalia, including non-physical
fundamentalia. Cf. Seiberg (1996).
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or mass, but difficult to imagine worlds without space-time. Lewis (1986) thought
similarly, claiming that each possible world was a spatio-temporally connected
unit. I’m not sure whether this is the result of a genuine metaphysical restriction
on the nature of possibilia, or a limitation due to the fact that my understanding
and experience of the world is so strongly shaped by space-time itself.
Further muddying the waters is the difficulty of determining when some ar-
bitrary 4-dimensional manifold should count as “a space-time”. Need it have a
directedness, in the way actual time does? It seems easy enough to assign non-
physical fundamentalia to “locations” in the four dimensional manifold, and then
establish laws for how those fundamentalia evolve in a phase space, of which the
four-dimensional manifold provides four coordinates. This type of move can
yield many of the same behaviors and complexity we’d want from a space-time
“canvas” on which fundamentalia lie. But it’s not clear to me what needs to
be added, if anything, to make this four-dimensional manifold a genuine space-
time.
Moving on, I’m willing to provisionally accept the idea that any possible
world with interesting non-fundamentalia of the kinds we’re accustomed to, in-
cluding thinking agents, might also need to include at least one physical phe-
nomenon: space-time.
1.5.5 Lessons from the Possibility of Fundamentally Non-Physical Worlds
The non-physical fundamentalia of Casper metaphysically generate ghosts, ghouls,
angels, and demons with mental states. Casper contains many (non-fundamental)
phenomena with which we are intimately familiar. The creatures of Casper form
friendships, play games, establish nations, go to school, manipulate the stock
market, and create works of art. They do all of this without quarks, leptons,
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bosons, or any physical forces whatsoever.
The possibility of non-fundamental phenomena such as friendships and games
that are metaphysically generated from non-physical fundamentalia should make
us wary of strongly reductive theses such as type identity, nature, and defini-
tion physicalism. If ‘friendship’ can be defined in the narrowly physical terms of
physics, then friendship cannot exist where the referents of those physical terms
do not exist. But friendship does exist in such situations, including in Casper.
Thus definition physicalism is false. A similar point applies to nature physi-
calism. If the nature of friendship involves quarks, or gravity, then friendship
cannot exist without quarks, or gravity. But friendship can exist without any
physical fundamentalia whatsoever (with the possible exception of space-time).
This should make us suspicious that friendship has a physical nature at all. If
friendship is identical to some narrowly physical type, friendship cannot occur
at Casper. But it does. Thus friendship is not identical to any physical type. Type
identity physicalism is false.
Similar points to a huge variety of non-fundamental phenomena. The exam-
ples I’ve given all require mentality, or representational capacities, in some way.
But the point can be made using phenomena such as life, or computers, that don’t
depend on mentality and associated representational capacities. Casper could
contain the ectoplasmic equivalent of amoeba: living creatures with no repre-
sentational capacities. Or Casper could contain naturally occurring ectoplasmic
computers.
I’d like to offer an alternative picture. A wide variety of the world’s macro-
scopic phenomena are neutral regarding their underlying metaphysical gener-
ators. In order for friendship, games, representation, computers, spherically-
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shaped objects, or life to occur, there must be some underlying substrate that
metaphysically generates the phenomenon in question. But games, computer,
and life care very little about the nature of the fundamentals that underly them.
Furthermore, (this is an additional claim), many different types of fundamentalia,
some physical, some non-physical, can do the job. To be a computer just is to be
something with a variety of states in the appropriate very complicated relations.
These relations can be instantiated by appropriate arrangements of quarks, lep-
tons, and bosons. But they can also be instantiated by arrangements of ghostons
and ectoplasm. The nature of a computer makes no reference to quarks or lep-
tons. One can fully understand computers without knowing anything about the
fundamental physical structure of the world. The explanation of computation
uses a special vocabulary appropriate to that subject matter, a vocabulary that
includes terms like ‘program’ and ‘transistor’.
Not all the world’s non-fundamental phenomena are neutral in this way. Wooden
tables require wood, which requires carbon, which requires a certain combina-
tion of electrons and protons. Wooden tables are not neutral in the same way that
mentality, life, and computers are. Water and steel provide similar examples.
These points are reminiscient of the idea of “multiple realizability” in the
philosophy of mind. Minds, and other mental phenomena such as pain, are al-
legedly multiply realizable by a wide variety of underlying substrates, including
brains and computers. I’m claiming that many non-fundamental phenomena,
including minds and pains, are “multiply generatable”. They can be generated
by a wide variety of arrangements of fundamentalia, including completely non-
physical fundamentalia. Most conceptions of multiple realizability require that
the multiply realizable phenomenon have some type of topic-neutral functional
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analysis or account. The phenomenon is then realized by whatever underlying
stuff satisfies the functional analysis or account. Multiple generatability requires
no such commitment to any type of functionalism.
Even if one denies the metaphysical possibility of worlds such as Casper, one
can still accept the idea of multiple generatability.
1.5.6 Fundamentality Physicalism and the Fundamentally Non-Physical
Fundamentality physicalism is compatible with worlds such as Casper. Realiza-
tion physicalism is as well. Each claims only that the all the actual fundamentalia
or ultimate realizers are narrowly physical. Neither denies the possibility of non-
physical fundamentalia or ultimate realizers.
Fundamentality physicalism, unlike stronger physicalisms, can accept the mul-
tiple generatability of many non-fundamental phenomena. Fundamentality phys-
icalism says only that, of the actual instances of these phenomena, they are all
generated from and metaphysically depend on narrowly physical fundamentalia.
Unlike nature physicalism, fundamentality physicalism does not require that the
nature of the mental be in some way related to or dependent the physical. Unlike
explanatory physicalism, fundamentality physicalism can accept that the mental,
the economic, and the living can be understood using a set of tools and concepts
that are specific and idiosyncratic to the subject of inquiry, and which can’t some-
how be reduced to concepts or methods of the physical sciences. Fundamental-
ity physicalism, unlike some other physicalisms, offers psychology, economics,
and biology, a variety of explanatory autonomy from the physical sciences and
physics itself.
Fundamentality physicalism does have mild reductive ambitions. It claims
that everything metaphysically depends on the narrowly physical fundamen-
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talia. All the actual psychological, economic, and biological phenomena and
states of affairs are they way they are virtue of the way the physical fundamen-
talia are distributed. But this type of reductive approach stops far short of the
stronger reductive aims of nature physicalism, explanatory physicalism, defini-
tion physicalism, or even functionalism in the philosophy of mind.
1.6 Conclusion
My main goal in this essay was to introduce fundamentality physicalism and its
key concepts of fundamentality and metaphysical generation. A secondary goal was
to introduce several other theses that could reasonably go under the names ‘phys-
icalism’ and ‘materialism’, and to systematize them using the ideas of the broadly
and the narrowly physical. Fundamentality physicalism is weaker than most
of these other theses, including type identity, nature, explanatory, and defini-
tion physicalism. Fundamentality physicalism allows many of the non-narrowly
physical features of our world a type of explanatory and metaphysical autonomy
from the narrowly physical that these others forms of physicalism do not. This is
a positive feature of fundamentality physicalism. It makes the thesis more likely
to be true.
Foremost among these other conceptions of physicalism was modal physical-
ism. Modal physicalism certainly has been called ‘physicalism’ many times. It is
the form of physicalism that has dominated the massive literature on physical-
ism, the physicalism-dualism debate, and the metaphysics of consciousness over
the past 20 years.20 However, I argued (section 1.3.2 “Fundamentality Physical-
20The literature in this area is massive and I cannot possibly list it all or even the highlights. Use-
ful resources include Braddon-Mitchell (2003), Chalmers (1996a, 2010, 1999, 2003a), Leuenberger
(2008), Stoljar (2009b,a, 2001), Block & Stalnaker (1999), Chalmers & Jackson (2001), McGinn
(1989), Papineau (2002), Loar (1990), Melnyk (2003), Hawthorne (2002), Levine (2004), Jackson
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ism and Modal Physicalism”) that fundamentality physicalism more accurately
describes what has actually been debated in that literature: whether some non-
physical features, in particular mental features, are fundamental constituents of
reality.
Fundamentality physicalism is a substantive thesis that is worthy of wearing
the title ‘physicalism’. There are other physicalisms, but this form of physicalism
is the relevant one for much of the contemporary debate.
(1982, 1986), Lewis (1988), Nida-Rumelin (2009, 1996),
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Chapter 2
Modal Rationalism and the Demonstrative Re-
ply to the Master Argument Against Physical-
ism
Chapter Abstract
According to the Master Argument Against Physicalism, an a priori gap between
the physical and conscious experience entails a lack of necessitation and with
it the falsity of physicalism. This paper investigates the crucial premise of the
master argument: the inference from an a priori gap to a lack of necessitation.
This premise gets its support from modal rationalism, according to which there are
important, potentially constitutive, connections between a priori justification and
metaphysical modality. I argue against the strong form of modal rationalism that
underwrites the master argument, and suggest a more moderate rationalist view.
I offer a novel demonstrative reply to the master argument, according to which
demonstratives play a vital role in the generation of meaning for our linguistic
and conceptual representations of conscious experience (such as ‘pain’). I suggest
that this connection between conscious experience and demonstratives, rather
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than a metaphysical gap generated by the truth of dualism, is the source of the
epistemic gap between consciousness and the physical.
2.1 Introduction
I believe that our world is, at its most fundamental level, physical. Call this the-
sis fundamentality physicalism (to which I will often refer using the simpler term
‘physicalism’). The entire world is the way it is in virtue of the way the world
is at the microphysical level. All the cameras, cantaloupes, coffees, and koalas
are the way they are in virtue of the way the leptons, bosons, and weak nuclear
forces are. The basic building blocks of our world are purely physical. The rest of
our world, including cameras, cantaloupes, and koalas, are generated from, and
metaphysically depend on, the arrangement of the fundamental microphysical
stuff.1
In this paper I wish to address a certain contemporary challenge to physical-
ism as just described. I call this challenge the master argument against physicalism.
The master argument starts from an epistemic a priori gap between the physical
truths and the truths about phenomenal conscious experience.2 The argument
1Two points deserve clarification. First, physicalism defined in terms of fundamentality does
not require that there be a maximally fundamental level. In a situation of “infinite descent” of fun-
damentality, physicalism requires only that, after a certain “depth”, everything is physical. Sec-
ond, physicalism does not require that the physical fundamentalia be microscopic. Physicalism is
compatible with fundamental particles the size of bowling balls and with fundamental properties
that apply only to entire systems such as the whole universe. But contemporary physics seems
to suggest that the fundamental physical features of our world are microscopic. If physicalism is
true about the actual world, the most likely form is microphysicalism. For ease of exposition I’ll
treat the two as equivalent. For more on this conception of physicalism, which makes essential
use of the notion of fundamentality, cf. chapter 1 of this dissertation.
2Phenomenally conscious experiences are associated with raw experiences or sensations.
Some examples include the sensation associated with a pain, the color-experience associated with
seeing the sky (a “blue experience”), or the sensation one has when the back of one’s neck itches.
In the words of Nagel (1974), there is something “it is like” for the subject of conscious experi-
ence. Whenever I speak of ‘consciousness’ or ‘the phenomenal’ or ‘the experiential’, I speak of
phenomenal consciousness. For clarification cf. Block (1995).
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then links these facts about the a priori to claims about metaphysical modality,
and finishes with the startling claim that physicalism is false. (Cf. section 2
for discussion of the master argument). Many contemporary arguments against
physicalism share the basic form of the master argument. These arguments in-
clude the knowledge argument of Jackson (1982, 1986), the conceivability argu-
ments of Chalmers (1996a, 2003a, 2010), the modal arguments of Kripke (1972),
and the explanatory gap argument against physicalism (Levine (1983)). One can
view all these arguments as variations on one master argument: The Master Ar-
gument Against Physicalism.3
In this paper, my goal will be to present the master argument and investigate,
more deeply than has been done before, the rationale behind it. An important
motivation behind the master argument, in particular behind the key move from
an epistemic to a metaphysical gap, is modal rationalism. Modal rationalism, in its
most general form, is the view that there are important, potentially constitutive,
connections between metaphysical modality and a priori justification. The master
argument relies on ambitious theses in the philosophy of modality. In particular,
it relies on a strong form of modal rationalism.
I have sympathies with modal rationalism. However, I deny the strong ver-
sion of modal rationalism that underwrites the master argument against physi-
calism. I deny partly because I am a physicalist. But thankfully, I have an expla-
nation, a diagnosis, of where strong modal rationalism goes wrong. The mistake
of strong modal rationalism is a meta-semantic one. Strong modal rationalism
relies on a mistaken, and overly optimistic, view of how our representations ac-
3Each argument has more to it than the master argument contains. Each argument latches onto
its own particular features of the mind/body problem. But I think it helpful to consider the ways
in which the arguments are similar. This kernel of similarity may tell us something central about
the relationship between consciousness and the physical.
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quire the meanings they do. In the end, I’ll use the meta-semantic lessons drawn
from the paper to offer a suggestion for how to fix the modal rationalist agenda.
An important idea will be there is an important link between demonstratives and
our access to and representations of conscious experience. This connection, and
not a metaphysical gap stemming from the truth of dualism, is the source of the
epistemic gap between the physical and conscious experience.
2.2 The Master Argument Against Physicalism
2.2.1 From Fundamentality to Modality to A Priori Implication
I take it as a datum that our world has more and less fundamental features.
Quarks, leptons, and the weak nuclear force are likely fundamental. Cameras,
cantaloupes, coffees, and koalas are not. The cameras, cantaloupes, coffees and
koalas are the way they are in virtue of the way the quarks, leptons, and weak
nuclear forces are. The non-fundamentalia are generated by, and metaphysically
depend on, the fundamentalia. I use ‘fundamental’ as a label for the basic build-
ing blocks of the world and ‘generation’ as a label for the “making so” relation be-
tween those fundamental building blocks and the fundamentalia on which they
metaphysically depend. (For more on the notions of fundamentality, generation,
and their use in defining physicalism cf. Chapter 1.2).
Fundamentalia need not be part (mereological or otherwise) of the things they
generate. For example, I think it likely that the world’s fundamental building
blocks include physical laws. These laws help to metaphysically generate the
non-fundamentalia, including the cameras, cantaloupes, coffees, and koalas. But
these laws are in no sense part of the cantaloupes or koalas.
The fundamental constituents of reality must, taken together, generate all of
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reality. Everything is either fundamental or generated from the fundamental.4
There are modal constraints on the fundamental. The fundamental state of the
world must metaphysically necessitate the complete state of the world. In other
words, no two possible worlds can differ without differing fundamentally.
Physicalism has received a variety of (surprisingly similar) modal definitions
over the years. Modal definitions appear in Lewis (1983), Jackson (1993), Chalmers
(1996a), Leuenberger (2008), and Stoljar (2009b). All of these definitions boil
down to some variation on the claim that no two worlds can differ without dif-
fering physically. Notice that the modal contraint on the fundamental, in combi-
nation with physicalism as a claim about the nature of the fundamental, entails
the modal definitions offered by these authors. I believe that modal definitions
of physicalism are actually attempts to get at the core notion: fundamentality.
The use of modality instead of fundamentality is understandable. Modality is a
much better understood and more respectable philosophical notion with a well-
understood formal framework underpinning it.
Modality thus provides a useful tool for testing theories of the fundamental.
For example, if physicalism is true, the physical state of the world necessitates
the complete state of the world. If it does not, physicalism is false. If idealism is
true, then the mental state of the world necessitates the complete state. And so
on.
But how are we to know whether the physical state of the world necessitates
the complete state? Could a world be identical to the actual world with respect
to its physical fundamentalia, but differ in some other way, perhaps with respect
to how the consciousness is distributed? Considerations of conceivability are one
4Elsewhere (chapter 1), I’ve called this requirement on fundamentality “the covering con-
straint”. Schaffer (2010): 38-9 has a similar “tiling constraint”.
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way to get a grip on what is and is not metaphysically possible. Unfortunately,
conceivability considerations seem to tell against physicalism. Situations that
are physical duplicates of the actual world, but not duplicates simpliciter, are
widely taken to be conceivable.5 Such situations include philosophical zombies
and inverted qualia. (For further discussion cf. section ??: “Premise (P1): The
Epistemic Gap”.)
One can also get a grip on necessitation via the relation of a priori implication.
For any two propositions φ, ψ, φ a priori implicates ψ if and only if the material
conditional φ −Ñ ψ is knowable a priori. The relation can also hold between
sets of propositions (defined in the obvious way), or between sentences (with
meaning attached).6 All truths knowable a priori (such as “2`2 “ 4”) are trivially
a priori implicated by any truth or set of truths, including the null set.
Let Fund be a proposition that completely described the layout of the world’s
fundamentalia. Fund describes how all the fundamental particles, properties,
and laws are distributed. If Fund completely describes the fundamental, then
Fund will necessitate all truths. Here’s the additional claim: If Fund necessitates
all truths, it must also a priori implicate all truths. If one knew that Fund were
the case, then one could, using purely a priori reasoning, come to know each and
every truth (in principle).
This claim about the a priori implications of Fund is bold, but not outlandish.
The state of the cameras, cantaloupes, coffees, and koalas, is generated by and
5Physicalists and anti-physicalists alike seem to acknowledge the conceivability of such situ-
ations. Cf. Balog (1999), Chalmers (1996a, 2003a, 2010), Block & Stalnaker (1999), Leuenberger
(2008), Hill (1997), lots of others.
6For any two sets of propositions Γ ,∆, Γ a priori implicates∆ iff the proposition formed by con-
joining the members of Γ a priori implicates the propositions formed by conjoining the members
of ∆.
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metaphysically depends on the state of the fundamentalia, which is complete
described in Fund. In some sense, the information about the cameras and koalas
is already present in Fund.
In this paper, a priori implication will play the role I’ve just described. A pri-
ori implication will serve as a test for necessitation, which in turn serves as a test
for fundamentality. Of course, one might wonder whether a priori implication
provides a good test for necessitation in the first place. After all, a priori implica-
tion is a purely epistemic relation whereas necessitation is soundly metaphysical.
Furthermore, we’ll see that the master argument against physicalism relies in a
crucial way on a connection between a priori implication and necessitation. One
might reject tout-court all connections between a priori implication and necessita-
tion and in so doing sidestep the master argument.
I do not think that this dismissive move is the way to go, but I cannot fully
explain my reasons here. First, epistemic relations such as a priori implication
are our main philosophical anchor in the metaphysics of fundamentality. With-
out epistemic considerations to guide us, we’d be lost in the search for the nature
of the fundamental. Second, the connection between a priori implication and ne-
cessitation gets support from modal rationalism. I have sympathies with modal
rationalism, and I hope that after reading section 5 (“Motivations for Modal Ra-
tionalism”), the reader will too. Modal rationalism is an attractive philosophical
doctrine. We should preserve some form of the view if we can. Rejecting outright
the master argument and its posited connections between a priori implication
and necessity fails to achieve this goal. If possible, it’s preferable to reply to the
master argument while retaining some form of modal rationalism and avoiding
the dismissive reply. In this paper, I’ll try to do exactly that.
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2.2.2 The Master Argument
The Master Argument is basically the following. We start from the premise that
there is no a priori route from a complete description of the microphysical world
to a complete description of the world simpliciter. This is so partly because there
is no a priori route from the facts about microphysics to the facts about phenom-
enal conscious experience. The second premise is that if there is no such a priori
route there is no metaphysical necessitation from the microphysical state of the
world to the complete state of the world. The third premise is that if there is no
such necessitation, fundamentality physicalism is false. Conclusion: fundamen-
tality physicalism is false.
Let P express the complete fundamental physical state of the world.7 (If fun-
damentality physicalism is true, P expresses the complete fundamental state.) Let
I be an indexical truth. The indexical truth identifies a specific individual, loca-
tion, and time as I/me, here, and now. I turns the physical description P into a
centered description. The indexical truth will be discussed in section 3.5 (“Strong
Modal Rationalism”), but for now I’ll ignore complications surrounding I. Let
Q be a conjunction of all the truths about conscious phenomenal experience. Q
7P should be understood to contain what Chalmers & Jackson (2001) call a “that’s all” clause,
which effectively states that P is a complete description of the fundamental state of the world.
Without a “that’s all” clause, a descripton of the fundamental level won’t put one in a position
to rule out certain possibilities for how the world is, and thus won’t permit a priori reasoning to
all truths. For example, a fundamental physical description without a “that’s all” clause won’t
enable one to rule out the existence of ghostly non-physical angels.
There are interesting questions about whether the “that’s all” clause expresses a fundamen-
tal feature of the world, or whether it is merely an enabling condition that allows the genuine
fundamentalia to make everything the case (including the non-existence of angels). Similar ques-
tions arise about whether the “that’s all” clause should be counted as a “physical”. At the least, it
seems like a topic-neutral truth whose occurence in a description of the world’s fundamental level
should not thereby jeapordize physicalism. (In the same way, the need to use mathematics and
logic, which are not strictly “physical”, in a description of the world’s fundamental level does not
jeapordize physicalism.) For more on this cf. Chapter 1 (“Fundamentality Physicalism”). From
here, I’ll suppress issues about the “that’s all” clause. They do not alter the dialectic.
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states who had what type of experience and when. ‘AP(φ)’ says that φ is know-
able a priori. ‘˝pφq’ says that φ is metaphysically necessary. ‘φ −Ñ ψ’ expresses
the material conditional “If φ then ψ”. With this notation, we express the master
argument as follows.
(P1) not-AP(PI −Ñ Q)
(P2) ˝pP −Ñ Qq −Ñ AP(PI −Ñ Qq
(P3) If fundamentality physicalism is true, then ˝pP −Ñ Qq.
(C) Fundamentality physicalism is false.
The argument is valid. We investigate each premise.
2.2.3 Premise (P3): From Fundamentality to Modality
Premise (P3) is not controversial. Part of what it means to say that our world
is, at the most fundamental level, purely physical, is to say that fixing how the
world is at the purely physical level fixes (i.e. necessitates) how the world is
simpliciter, including how the conscious states are.8 The fundamental state of the
world metaphysically necessitates the complete state of the world, including the
facts about consciousness. If P fails to metaphysically necessitate the facts about
consciousness, it fails to necessitate the complete state of the world. Thus P fails
to tell the complete story about the fundamental state of the world. There is more
to the fundamental than the physical. Fundamentality physicalism is false.
2.2.4 Premise (P1): The Epistemic Gap
Premise (P1), not-AP(PI −Ñ Q), says that there is no a priori route from the
physical truths (supplemented with an indexical truth) to the truths about con-
8See Chapter 1.
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sciousness. You can know all you like about the physical, but this won’t tell you
what it’s like to see red, or whether some creature is experiencing blue, green,
pain, or nothing at all.
Many sources support (P1). I’ll discuss three such sources here: (i) the ex-
planatory gap between the physical and consciousness (ii) the knowledge argu-
ment thought experiment of Jackson (1982, 1986) and (iii) the conceivability of
inverted qualia and philosophical zombies.
Consider the famous explanatory gap between the physical truths and the
truths about conscious experience (cf. Levine (1983), Chalmers (2003a)). If there
is an explanatory gap between the physical and consciousness then there is, ipso
facto, an a priori explanatory gap. The famous Mary thought experiment of Jack-
son (1982, 1986) provides additional support. Jackson asks us to envisage Mary,
“a brilliant scientist who is... forced to investigate the world from a black and
white room via a black and white television monitor. She... acquires... all the
physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe
tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on.” Jackson asks
us to consider whether Mary learns anything new when she is released from the
black and white room. Jackson maintains that it just seems obvious that she will
“learn something about the world and our visual experience of it.” Mary knows
all the physical truths in P. But she can’t come to know all the truths, primarily
because she can’t come to know truths about conscious experience. If Mary can’t
figure it out on the basis of P, no one can. There’s no epistemic route from P to
consciousness. If there’s no epistemic route, there’s no a priori route. Therefore:
(P1) is true.
Conceivability arguments also support (P1). I’ll consider two: the inverted
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qualia argument and the zombie argument. Both appear in Chalmers (1996a).
The inverted qualia argument starts from the claim that we can conceive of a
physical duplicate of the actual world in which the conscious experiences are
switched. When you have a blue experience, your inverted twin has a red expe-
rience. When you have a painful sensation, your twin has a tickle. Et cetera. The
zombie argument asks us to conceive of a world in which your twin is a philo-
sophical zombie, and has no conscious experiences whatsoever. These zombies
walk the walk, and talk the talk, and even utter sounds like, “My, that’s a beau-
tiful shade of green.” But these zombies have no experience on the inside. The
next stage of the argument infers from the conceivability of these situations to
their metaphysical possibility. If they are metaphysically possible, physicalism
is false. (The move from conceivability to possibility in these arguments is the
analogue of the master argument’s premise (P2)).
Chalmers (and most others) are clear that conceivability is an epistemic no-
tion. It has to do with what one can coherently imagine. The “coherently” bit
is important, as is the idealization of conceivability. One might think that one
could, in the relevant sense, conceive that 2 ` 2 “ 5, or that there are finitely
many prime numbers, or even that a microphysical duplicate of the actual world
lacked chairs. But once the notion of conceivability has been idealized to make
the conceivers highly intelligent, maximally consistent, and hyper rational, these
scenarios will not be conceivable in the relevant sense.
For Chalmers in particular, conceivability is tied to the a priori.9 φ is conceiv-
able if and only if it’s not a priori that not-φ.10 On this construal, to say that the
9Chalmers (1996a, 2002).
10Chalmers (2002) calls this ‘ideal negative conceivability’.
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zombie world is conceivable is to say that a proposition Z which conjoins all the
physical truths and denies the existence of conscious experience is conceivable,
i.e. can’t be ruled out a priori.11
We can express the proposition Z as “P and no-Q”, where P describes the
fundamental microphysical layout of the world, and no-Q says that there is no
conscious experience. Thus to say that zombies are conceivable, is, for Chalmers,
to say that “P and no-Q” can’t be ruled out a priori. If this is so, then there can
be no a priori implication between P and no-Q. If P did a priori implicate no-Q,
then “P and no-Q” could be ruled out a priori. On this construal of conceivability,
the conceivability of zombies deductively entails premise (P1): not-AP(PI −Ñ Qq
(suppressing issues surrounding I).12 The conceivability of inverted qualia has
the same ramification regarding a priori implication.
2.2.5 Premise (P2): From an epistemic to a metaphysical gap
The second premise (P2) is more controversial. It endorses a connection between
a priori justification and metaphysical modality. More precisely, it claims that
if all the facts cannot be known a priori on the basis of the physical facts, the
physical facts do not necessitate all the facts. (P2) is an instance of a more general
schema. The generalized schema says that if a set of truths necessitates all truths,
and meets certain further criteria (to be discussed later), then that set of truths
also a priori implicates all truths. The schema says that if physicalism were true,
then an idealized reasoner who knew everything there was to know about the
11In the terminology of Chalmers (2002), this notion corresponds to what he calls “ideal nega-
tive conceivability”.
12Strictly speaking, the argument claims that since P I and no-Q is conceivable, it is possible,
and physicalism is false. If P I and no-Q is conceivable, then there is no a priori implication from
P I to no-Q.
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fundamental particles, properties, and laws of our world would be in a position
to know everything. She could figure out all the facts about cameras, cantaloupes,
coffees, and koalas.
(P2) embodies a litmus test for fundamentality. Consider some alleged story,
X-ism, about the fundamental nature of the world: physicalism, dualism, ideal-
ism, deism, tomato-ism whatever. If X-ism is true, then the X-ical truths will tell
the complete story of the fundamental structure of the world. The X-ical truths
will necessitate all truths. If they necessitate all truths, they should a priori impli-
cate all truths (or so the schema maintains). The Master Argument maintains that
since the physical truths fail to a priori implicate all truths, the physical truths do
not provide a complete account of the fundamental. Physicalism is false.
This litmus test for fundamentality relies on a particular connection between
necessitation and a priori implication. Such connections tend to be endorsed, in
some form or other, by modal rationalists. This brings forth the obvious question:
“Why should metaphysical claims about necessitation and modality follow from
epistemic claims about what can be known a priori on the basis of something
else?” Answering this question requires exploration of deep waters in the phi-
losophy of modality and of meaning. It is into those waters that we now voyage.
We will spend most of the paper there.
2.3 Supplementation
2.3.1 Covering Your Bases
Let a fact be a true Fregean proposition. Fregean propositions are structured
composites of concepts.13 The truth conditions of the structured composite are
13Throughout this paper I use a Fregean approach to propositions, according to which proposi-
tions are structured composites of concepts. This contrasts with a Russellian approach, according
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determined by the references of the concepts contained in the proposition and
the manner in which they are composed. For example, the proposition CRICKET
IS A GAME contains the concepts CRICKET, IS, A, and GAME. (I use small cap-
itals to denote items at the conceptual level: concepts or propositions. For ex-
ample, CRICKET denotes the cricket concept.) Facts can enter into necessitation
relations. A necessitates B if and only if the material conditional A −Ñ B is neces-
sarily true. For any propositions φ, ψ, we write ˝p A −Ñ B q for “A necessitates
B”. In the parlance of possible worlds, φ necessitates ψ if and only if ψ is true in
every metaphysically possible world in which φ is true. For example, CRICKET
IS A GAME necessitates SOMETHING IS A GAME. SOME WATER IS WET necessitates
SOMETHING IS WET.
Facts also enter into relations of a priori implication. (Reminder: for any two
propositions φ, ψ, φ a priori implicates ψ if and only if the material conditional
φ −Ñ ψ is knowable a priori.) CRICKET IS A GAME a priori implicates SOME-
THING IS A GAME. One proposition can necessitate a second without a priori
implicating it. For example, SOME WATER IS WET necessitates SOME H2O IS WET.
to which propositions contain objects or properties themselves. This move is controversial, but I
don’t think much turns on this choice in the end. Our target phenomenon, the relations between
necessity and the a priori, provide the main reason for opting for a Fregean approach. Russellian
propositions are simply not well suited to such an investigation. To start, I’m unsure how to de-
scribe the phenomenon of a priori knowability on a Russellian approach. For the Russellian, the
sentences ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus is Phosphorous’ express the same proposition:
xÄ “Äy (whereÄ is Venus itself (i.e. Hesperus, i.e. Phosphorous)). But one can know a priori
that Hesperus is Hesperus, whereas that Hesperus is Phosphorous is a paradigm of knowability
only a posteriori. (Perhaps the Russellian will deny this?) On the Russellian approach, it looks like
propositions are not the bearers of a priori / a posteriori knowability. (At the least, they’re not the
complete bearers). To account for the differences between the a priority knowability of “Hespe-
rus is Hesperus” and “Hesperus is Phosphorous”, the Russellian must appeal to additional tools.
Following the suggestions of Salmon (1986), one might appeal to Russellian-propositions-under-
guises. Proposition P could be knowable under one guise but not under another. I hypothesize
that in the end, the Russellian account, appropriately supplemented to deal with the a priori (per-
haps via guises), will behave much like a Fregean account of propositions. I don’t care much
which of the available entities we dub ‘propositions’.
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But SOME WATER IS WET does not a priori implicate SOME H2O IS WET, because
the relationship water and H2O is knowable only a posteriori.
With these definitions in tow we define three more notions: (i) necessitation
base (ii) a priori implication base, and (iii) fundamentality base. A set of propo-
sitions S is a necessitation base if and only if the conjunction of all propositions in
S necessitates every true proposition. A necessitation base fixes all the facts. It
leaves the truth-value of no proposition undecided. Some examples of candidate
necessitation bases include the set of all microphysical truths (if microphysical-
ism is true), the set of all microphysical truths plus truths about phenomenal
experience (if some type of dualism is true), and the set of all truths believed by
God (if God is omniscient). Trivially, the set of all truths (if there is such a thing)
is a necessitation base, because every truth necessitates itself.
A set of truths S is an a priori implication base if and only if the conjunction
of all truths in S a priori implicates every truth. A useful heuristic for thinking
about a priori implication bases goes as follows. If one knew all the truths in an
a priori implication base, one could, in principle, use purely a priori reasoning
to come to know everything.14 Examples of candidate a priori implication bases
include the set of microphysical truths (if a priori physicalism is true) and the set
of microphysical plus phenomenal truths.
A set of truths is a fundamentality base if it fully describes the fundamental state
of the world. If physicalism is true, then some set of physical truths provides a
fundamentality base. If dualism is true, then some conjunction of physical and
14This heuristic may be only a heuristic, because of problems related to unknowable truths.
If a truth T is unknowable, then no amount of a priori reasoning will allow a reasoner to know
T. However, T’s unknowability does not conflict with the ability of a base of propositions B to
a priori implicate T. Even if T is unknowable, the conditional B −Ñ T might still be knowable a
priori. Cf. Chalmers (2012), chapter ??.
78
mental truths provides a fundamentality base. Any fundamentality base must
also be a necessitation base. This claim is partly constitutive of the notion of the
fundamentality.
2.3.2 The Interest of the Base
Why should one be interested in necessitation, or a priori implication, bases in the
first place? In general, necessitation is a useful test for constitutive connections.
If x is constitutively F, then, necessarily, x is F (the converse implication does not
always hold). Thus necessitation serves as a test for constitutivity.
One major task of both metaphysics and science is to determine the funda-
mental constituents of reality, the Aristotelian substances.15 One already men-
tioned restriction on the fundamental constituents of reality is that they, together,
generate or give rise to the rest of reality. This entails that the fundamental con-
stituents of reality must necessitate all truths. Any fundamentality base must be
a necessitation base.
In the physicalism-dualism debate, necessitation (or lack thereof) serves as an
indicator (or contra-indicator) of fundamentality. In the first paragraph of this
paper, I defined fundamentality physicalism as the thesis that our world is, at the
fundamental level, purely physical. This means that the fundamentatlity base for
our world is a set of purely physical facts. These propositions mention quarks,
gravity, and space-time, but not government, grass, or green sensations. This set
15In Metaphysics, Aristotle writes that “Substance is the subject of our inquiry; for the princi-
ples and the causes we are seeking are those of substances. For if the universe is of the nature of
a whole, substance is its first part...” (1984: 1688; Meta.1069a18âA˘S¸20). Gill (1989) summarizes
Aristotle’s test for substance-hood as follows: “the main criterion [for selecting the primary sub-
stances] is ontological priority. An entity is ontologically primary if other things depend for its
existence on it, while it does not depend in a comparable way on them.” I described the funda-
mental entities as those on which everything else metaphysically depends, and which depend on
nothing further.
79
of purely physical facts, the physicalist fundamentality base, must necessitate all
facts.
Fundamentality dualists argue that purely physical facts (pick any ones you
like) don’t necessitate all facts. In particular, they don’t necessitate all the mental
facts. Thus the purely physical facts are not a fundamentality base, and physical-
ism is false. We thus see that in the physicalism/dualism debate, a main point
of contention is whether some appropriate set of physical facts is a necessitation
base.
In sum, the notion of a necessitation base is a vital tool for evaluating claims
about the fundamental structure of the world. Fundamentality physicalism is
a claim about that structure, and determining whether or not the physical can
provide a necessitation base is a vital step in the investigation of physicalism.
The interest of an a priori implication base is less obvious. Modal rationalists
will tend to claim that a priori implication is a guide to necessitation, in the same
way that necessitation is a guide to fundamentality. Thus some of the interest in
necessitation bases will transfer to a priori implication bases.
The search for an a priori implication base falls within the philosophy of
scrutability. A set of truths is scrutable from a second set when the second set bears
some relation of epistemic entailment to the first. A priori implication provides
one type of epistemic entailment. A posteriori implication, logical entailment,
and derivability (of various types) provide others. Scrutability bases provide a
guide to the conceptual or epistemic structure of the truths about a given domain
(the largest domain being the domain of all truths). Here conceptual or episte-
mological structure is contrasted with metaphysical structure, and implication is
the epistemological analogue of metaphysical necessitation. A priori implication
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bases may also offer a guide to a certain type of conceptual fundamentality.16
(An excellent discussion of scrutability in general, as well as the applications and
interest of scrutability bases, can be found in Chalmers (2012)).
Foundationalist projects in mathematics start from a few basic principles (called
‘axioms’), introduce a system of proof, and attempt to derive (within that proof-
system) all the other truths about the domain. The search for an a priori implica-
tion base can be seen as a similar task, with a priori implication playing the role
of the method of “proof”. Here, we search for an a priori implication base for all
truths, not just mathematical truths. But the notion of an a priori implication base
can easily be restricted to any domain of truths.
Rudolf Carnap (1929)’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt (“The Logical Structure of
the World”) attempts to develop a minimal epistemological base for all truths.
For Carnap, the implication relation is logical implication, and the base consists
of truths expressible using logical expressions plus a primitive 2-place relation
of phenomenal similarity. This is a small base indeed; it would be an incredible
discovery if all the truths about the world were logically derivable from sentences
expressed using only logic plus phenomenal similarity.
The search for an a priori implication base lies in the same vein as Carnap’s
project. One replaces logical implication with a priori implication as the method
of getting from the base truths to other truths. But, like Carnap’s base, an a priori
implication base purports to be an epistemological source for all truths (not just,
e.g., mathematical truths). I find the following question fascinating: “What is the
minimal set of truths from which all truths are a priori implicated?” Questions
about the language or vocabulary that will be used to express the base truths are
16For more on conceptual fundamentality, and conceptual grounding, cf.Chalmers (2012), esp.
Excursis 16 (pages numbers here).
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equally compelling. Of course, such epistemological bases may not be unique.
But the variety of such bases may yet teach us about the conceptual structure of
the world.
2.3.3 The Supplementation Question
Once we’ve introduced the two types of bases we can ask some obvious ques-
tions. What is the smallest possible base (of any type)? How should we measure
the size of a base? Counting the number of propositions will not work. One can
always use conjunction to create one proposition out of two. In this paper, our
primary interest in a priori implication bases will be in their role as guides to
necessitation, which in turn are guides to fundamentality. Consider the supple-
mentation question:
The Supplementation Question: “What must be done to a necessitation
base to create an a priori implication base?”
There’s an important link between modal rationalism and the supplementa-
tion question. Modal rationalists believe that there are important, potentially
constitutive, connections between metaphysical modality and a priori justifica-
tion. Modal rationalists are likely to think that there are interesting answers to
the supplementation question. Anti-rationalists, on the other hand, will think
that there are no interesting answers to the supplementation question.
There is much more to modal rationalism, in any form, than its answer to
the supplementation question. In this paper, we are interested in modal rational-
ism because of its role in the physicalism-dualism debate as the chief sponsor of
premise (P2) of the master argument. As a result, we will use the supplemen-
tation question to measure the strength of a rationalist view. Stronger forms of
82
rationalism will claim that a necessitation base needs less supplementation to be-
come an a priori implication base.
2.3.4 Naive Modal Rationalism
According to naive modal rationalism, every necessitation base is already an a priori
implication base. No supplementation is required. This view, however, cannot be
sustained. The basic reason for this is that not all necessitation is a priori. Truths
containing HESPERUS necessitate but don’t a priori implicate truths containing
PHOSPHOROUS. It does not immediately follow that naive modal rationalism is
false. All we’ve established so far is that there are some propositions A, B such
that A necessitates B without a priori implicating B. It may yet be that, for the spe-
cial classes of propositions that form necessitation bases, the proposition formed
by conjoining all the members of the necessitation base does a priori implicate
all the truths it necessitates. If so, naive modal rationalism would be vindicated
despite the existence of a posteriori necessitation.
Unfortunately, there are trivial necessitation bases that are epistemically opaque,
in the sense of a prior implicating very little at all. As a result naive modal ra-
tionalism is false. The proposition EVERYTHING IS JUST AS IT ACTUALLY IS is a
necessitation base (henceforth, we call this proposition ‘@’).17 @ trivially neces-
sitates every necessary truth (because any proposition necessitates the necessary
truths). So it remains to be shown only that @ necessitates the contingent truths.
@ necessitates every contingent truth iff, for every contingent truth C, every pos-
sible world at which @ is true is a world at which C is true. Assume that @ is
true at arbitrary world w. Suppose, for reductio, that C is false at w. Because C is
false at w and true at the actual world, at w everything is not just as it actually is.
17I owe this example to Schwarz (2007).
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@ is false at w, which contradicts our assumption. We reject the supposition that
C is false at w. Therefore, @ necessitates all contingent truths in addition to all
necessary truths. @ is a trivial necessitation base that a priori implicates little to
nothing. Not all necessitation bases are a priori implication bases. Naive modal
rationalism is false.
Indexical truths provide another reason to reject naive modal rationalism. A
set of propositions that describes the world completely from a 3rd person or ob-
jective standpoint but does not include any indexical truths can succeed in neces-
sitating all truths but fail to a priori implicate them all. For example, such a set
of truths might explicitly declare that Gabriel Rabin has a sweet moustache, and
thereby necessitate that I have a sweet moustache. But such a set of truths will
fail to a priori implicate that I have a sweet moustache (here I assume that I AM
GABRIEL RABIN is not knowable a priori).
The problem with indexicals runs beyond failure to a priori implicate truths
containing indexicals. Suppose one has a necessitation base that describes the
entire universe. One can tell immediately that the universe contains two plan-
ets, similar in every way compatible with the following facts. On the first planet
the clear wet liquid that flows in the lakes, rivers, and streams is the chemical
compound H2O. On the second planet the clear wet liquid that flows in the lakes,
rivers, and streams is a superficially similar substance with a different underly-
ing chemical make-up: XYZ. One cannot tell a priori, from this description, which
planet contains water and which twin-water. In order to determine whether one’s
concept WATER refers to H2O or XYZ, one first needs to know which planet one
inhabits. If one inhabits the H2O planet, then one’s WATER representations re-
fer to H2O. If one inhabits the XYZ planet, one’s WATER representations refer to
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XYZ (more accurately, one’s seemingly WATER representations are actually TWIN-
WATER representations). One needs, in the a priori implication base, a truth that
locates oneself on one planet or the other.18 The basic point of the example is that
indexical truths are required for the a priori implication even of non-indexical
truths.
In sum, there are many reasons to reject the naive modal rationalist answer
to the supplementation question. Metaphysical modality and the a priori do not
have a tight enough link to support the naive reply. However, the failures of
naive modal rationalism offer lessons for how to improve one’s answer to the
supplementation question. A form of modal rationalism that incorporates these
lessons may yet succeed.
2.3.5 Strong Modal Rationalism
The lesson of @ is that some propositions are epistemically opaque. They necessi-
tate a lot but a priori implicate little. The lesson of I HAVE A SWEET MOUSTACHE
and WATER IS H2O is that any a priori implication base must include some in-
dexical truths. Strong modal rationalism heeds these two lessons in its answer
to the supplementation question. Strong modal rationalists think that, in order
to become an a priori implication base, a necessitation base must (i) be expressed
in a canonical semantically neutral vocabulary and (ii) be supplemented with an
indexical truth I.
The strong modal rationalist answer to the supplementation question yields
the following principle:
• (Strong Modal Rationalist Link): A canonically expressed semantically
18The locating must be done in a first-person way. The proposition GABRIEL IS ON THE H2O
PLANET will not suffice.
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neutral necessitation base, supplemented with an indexical truth, a priori
implicates every proposition it necessitates.
An indexical truth is a truth that selects a privileged location, time, and person as
here, now, and I, respectively. A necessitation base is semantically neutral when
it is expressed in a canonical vocabulary: a vocabulary that is semantically neu-
tral. Semantic neutrality is first and foremost a property of concepts (or terms).
Semantic neutrality is a difficult notion to pin down, but the idea is clear enough.
Intuitively, a concept is semantically neutral iff it is not “twin-earthable” (in the
sense of Putnam (1975)). 19 Famously, ‘water’ is twin-earthable. You can re-
fer to H2O while your twin-earth duplicate refers to XYZ. Some paradigms of
twin-earthable terms include ‘water’, ‘gold’, ‘Hesperus’, ‘actual’, and almost any
proper name or natural kind term. Some plausibly semantically neutral terms
include ‘friend’, ‘bachelor’, ‘justice’, ‘morally right’, ‘cause’, and the logical con-
nectives. (A more detailed discussion of semantic neutrality occurs in section
2.4.2: “Semantic Neutrality”).
A proposition is semantically neutral if all the concepts it contains are seman-
tically neutral. A set of propositions is semantically neutral if all the proposi-
tions it contains are semantically neutral. Semantically non-neutral propositions
tend to necessitate much that they do not a priori implicate. Non-neutral rep-
resentations are epistemically opaque. This is why lack of neutrality impedes a
necessitation base’s aspirations for a career as an a priori implication base.
Let’s sum up. The supplementation question asks, “What must one do to
a necessitation base to create an a priori implication base?” The strong modal
19For our purposes here, terms for which one can run a twin-earth thought experiment in the
vein of Burge (1979) do not count as “twin-earthable”. Any term is twin-earthable in that sense.
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rationalists answer, “If the necessitation base is canonically expressed, add an in-
dexical truth.” ( In section ??: “Semantic Neutrality and the Physical Truths”, I
address questions about how one might “neutralize” a non-neutral base.) Im-
portantly, if a necessitation base is (a) canonically expressed and (b) contains an
indexical truth, then strong modal rationalism says that the necessitation base is
also an a priori implication base. This is the key claim that leads to the tension
between strong modal rationalism and physicalism.
2.4 Return to the Master Argument
In this section I precisify the master argument and explain how it relies on the
strong modal rationalist’s answer to the supplementation question.
2.4.1 The Strong Modal Rationalist’s Test for Fundamentality
The strong modal rationalist’s answer to the supplementation question, embod-
ied in the strong modal rationalist link, offers a test for necessitation bases. The
test goes like this. First step: check whether the alleged necessitation base, a set
of propositions, is expressed in a canonical semantically neutral vocabulary. If
it is not, express it in a semantically neutral way. Once the base is semantically
neutral, move to the next step. Second step: check whether the base contains an
indexical truth I. If it does not, add one. Third step: check whether the result
of the first two steps is an a priori implication base. If it is not, the set of truths
from which we began is not a necessitation base. (This test will not always yield a
verdict. If the set of truths is not semantically neutral, and can’t be molded into a
semantically neutral form, then the strong modal rationalist test yields no verdict
on whether they form a necessitation base.)
The master argument applies the strong modal rationalist’s test to argue that
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fundamentality physicalism is false. The basic argument goes as follows. If phys-
icalism is true, then some set of physical truths P is a necessitation base. Such
a set of truths is either semantically neutral or can be canonically expressed in a
neutral fashion. An indexical truth can be added. But the result is not an a priori
implication base. Why not? Because there is no a priori route from the physical
truths to the truths about phenomenal conscious experience. The purely physical
truths won’t enable one to determine whether some thinker is experiencing red,
blue, or nothing at all. Therefore, the set of physical truths is not a necessitation
base. Fundamentality physicalism is false.
For clarity’s sake, I repeat the master argument from section 2.1:
(P1) not-AP(PI −Ñ Q)
(P2) ˝pP −Ñ Qq −Ñ AP(PI −Ñ Qq
(P3) If fundamentality physicalism is true, then ˝pP −Ñ Qq.
(C) Fundamentality physicalism is false.
These premises were already discussed in section 2. We won’t question (P1)
by denying the epistemic gap between the physical and conscious experience.
Nor will we question (P3), which is partly constitutive of physicalism. (P2) is
the main suspect. Two issues remain to be discussed. First, is the strong modal
rationalist’s answer to the supplementation question correct? I.e. is the litmus
test embodied in (P2) a good one? In section ?? (“Against Strong Modal Rational-
ism”), I’ll argue that it is not.
Second, is P semantically neutral or neutralizable? If it is not, then the strong
modal rationalist’s test does not apply. The next section (“Canonical Expression
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of the Base: Semantic Neutrality”) discusses semantic neutrality and P’s status
with respect to it.
2.4.2 Canonical Expression of the Base: Semantic Neutrality
Modal rationalists, as I have characterized them, want to use a priori implication
(or lack thereof) as a guide to necessitation and necessitation as a guide to funda-
mentality. Anyone who endorses such a strategy should insist that the classes of
truths tested be expressed in a canonical fashion. Allowing any mode of expres-
sion immediately robs the project of philosophical interest.
As an example, consider the proposition EVERYTHING FUNDAMENTAL IS JUST
AS IT ACTUALLY IS. This proposition is a necessitation base (assuming the fundamentality-
modality link discussed in section 2.2.120 ). But this proposition a priori implicates
almost nothing. If we allows propositions such as these, the project of finding an
a priori implication oriented test for necessitation is a non-starter. Terms like ‘ac-
tual’ make it too easy to necessitate a lot while a priori implicating very little.
Furthermore, despite the the proposition EVERYTHING FUNDAMENTAL IS JUST
AS IT ACTUALLY IS’s credentials as a necessitation base, it tells us almost nothing
about the nature of the fundamental. It provides no help adjudicating the dispute
between the fundamentality physicalist and the fundamentality dualist.
‘Actually’ is the problematic term. ‘Actually’ is epistemically opaque. It al-
lows reference to things to which it’s not clear reference is being made. For ex-
ample, ‘everything fundamental is just as it actually is’ makes reference to the
complete fundamental layer, and in some sense describes that layer. But from an
epistemic standpoint, it reveals nothing about what the fundamental is like.
20Premise (P3) of the master argument also requires the fundamentality-modality link. Cf.
also “The Modal Covering Constraint”, in section [[NOTE: Fix this citation]] ?? (“The Covering
Constraint”) of Chapter 1.
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The problem of opaque vocabulary occurs at both stages of the move from a
priori implication to fundamentality. It immediately makes trouble for the at-
tempt to us a priori implication as a test for necessitation. But it also makes
trouble for the attempt to use necessitation as a guide to fundamentality. For
both these reasons, we should require that the relevant descriptions of the fun-
damental layer be expressed in a canonical, epistemically transparent, fashion.
No ‘actually’s, no rigidifying operators, no ‘dthat’s (cf. Kaplan (1989)). However,
this much leaves much open in terms of what transparent canonical expression
requires.
Strong modal rationalists have their favored form of canonical expression: se-
mantic neutrality. The Strong Modal Rationalist test for fundamentality applies
only if the prospective necessitation base (an alleged description of the world’s
fundamental level) is expressed in a canonical semantically neutral vocabulary. I
will not take the time here to fully explore all the relevant issues about semantic
neutrality. I’ll briefly explicate the notion to give the reader the flavor of seman-
tic neutrality.21 Then I’ll explain the virtues the rationalist sees in expressing a
candidate necessitation base in a semantically neutral way.
Semantic neutrality is a special epistemic property that a term or concept can
have. A term or concept is semantically neutral if it has a particular link between
the a priori connections of the term/concept and the intension (function across
possible worlds) of the term/concept. Many terms and concepts yield a priori
truths about their extension. For example, ‘bachelor’ yields the a priori truths
“all bachelors are male” and “all bachelors are unmarried”. (For the sake of the
example, I’ll assume that the bachelors are all and only the unmarried males).
21Fuller accounts of semantic neutrality can be found in Chalmers (2006b) and Jackson (1998).
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Let’s call this set of a priori truths the a priori conceptual role, or just ap-role, of the
term/concept. The ap-role yields an intension: a function across worlds. The
ap-role-intension of ‘bachelor’ picks out the unmarried males across all possi-
ble worlds. Importantly, so does the familiar intension of ‘bachelor’ from possi-
ble worlds semantics. A term is semantically neutral when its ap-role-intension
matches its normal intension. The term ‘bachelor’ and the concept BACHELOR
are semantically neutral.
Many terms are not semantically neutral. For example, suppose that the a
priori conceptual role of ‘Hesperus’ is “the brightest celestial body visible in the
evening sky”. The ap-role-intension of ‘Hesperus’ picks out, at each world, the
brightest celestial body visible in the evening sky. At some worlds, this will be
Hesperus, i.e. Venus. At some worlds it won’t be. The ap-role-intension of ‘Hes-
perus’ does not match the normal intension, which picks out Venus at every pos-
sible world. Thus ‘Hesperus’ is not semantically neutral. To be clear: the a priori
conceptual role of a term generates one intension. The term itself has another.
The term is semantically neutral if and only if the two intensions are the same
function.22 Names and natural kinds terms tend not to be semantically neutral.23
For a semantically neutral term, the a priori role intension matches the custom-
22More precisely, the a priori conceptual role determines a function across centered worlds. But
the basic idea is the same.
23Semantic non-neutrality is not equivalent to what Kripke (1972) calls ‘rigid designation’. A
term is a rigid designator if it picks out the same individual at every world. First, some semanti-
cally neutral terms are rigid designators. ‘The number one’ and ‘the least prime number greater
than 10’ provide two examples. Second, the notion of rigid designation does not apply to non-
singular terms such as ‘water’ and ‘gold’, whereas semantic neutrality applies to all terms and
concepts. However, philosophers sometimes speak of mass and count nouns such as ‘water’
and ‘gold’ as rigid designators. They are easily understood when they speak in this technically
incorrect fashion. I hypothesize that when philosophers speak of ‘water’ and ‘gold’ as “rigid
designators”, they are using “rigid designation” as a label for the phenomenon of semantic non-
neutrality.
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ary intension. This allows a priori access to the modal profile of the term - what
it refers to at each possible world. This makes semantically neutral terms and
concepts epistemically transparent in a way that non-neutral terms and concepts
are not.
Semantic neutrality accomplishes the goals of a transparent canonical vocab-
ulary. It prevents trivial necessitation bases like EVERTYHING FUNDAMENTAL
IS JUST AS IT ACTUALLY IS by banning the term ‘actually’ as semantically non-
neutral. Second, it appears to accomplish the goal of allowing necessitation to
serve as a test for fundamentality. Semantically neutral necessitation bases do a
better job allowing one to read off the fundamentalia from the propositions in the
base.
Let me expand on this second point. We’ve already seen that EVERYTHING
FUNDAMENTAL IS JUST AS IT ACTUALLY IS succeeds as a necessitation base but
completely fails to aid inquiry into the nature of the fundamental. This might
seem like an abstruse or corner case. But the lesson can be extended to situa-
tions more directly germane to the issue of physicalism vs. dualism. A physical-
istically respectable description can necessitate all truths, giving the impression
that fundamentality physicalism passes the necessitation test, despite the fact that
fundamentality dualism is true. This can happen when the physical description
is expressed in semantically non-neutral vocabulary that makes illicit and secret
reference to non-physical extras.
Let me sketch an example of such a situation. Suppose that electrons are not
fundamental particles. The properties of electrons are grounded in a deeper more
fundamental level, consisting of an energetic fluid called ‘juice’. There is two-way
necessitation between the state of the juice and the state of the electron metaphys-
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ically generated by that juice. (Such two-way necessitation may be rare, but it’s
certainly possible). The state of the world’s electrons necessitates the state of
the juice and vice versa. Suppose also that ‘electron’ designates only negatively
charged particles that behave like electrons and are metaphysically generated by
juice.
Under these assumptions, ‘electron’ is not semantically neutral. The a priori
role intension of ‘electron’ picks out negatively charged particles at every possi-
ble world. But the intension of electron picks out only the electron-ish negatively
charged particles generated by juice. Comparison with ‘water’, a paradigm of
semantic non-neutrality, helps illustrate the lack of semantic neutrality of ‘elec-
tron’ in the envisioned scenario. ‘Water’ designates only H2O at each possible
world. At some world, a non-water substance (such as Putnam (1975)’s XYZ)
could act like water but not be water, because it failed to be H2O. Similarly, at
each world‘electron’ designates only the juice-generated negatively charged par-
ticles. At some world, a non-electron particle might act like an electron but not
be an electron, because it failed to be generated from juice.
Given these assumptions, it’s possible for a set of truths that does not mention
juice, but does mention electrons, to be a necessitation base. This base could be
expressed in the austere vocabulary of physics, using terms like ‘electron’, ‘grav-
ity’, and ‘strong nuclear force’, supplemented with some mathematics. Such a
situation will give the impression that fundamentality physicalism is true. But
for all we’ve said so far, juice could be a Cartesian mind-substance! If so, funda-
mentality physicalism is clearly false, despite the a physical set of truths success
as a necessitation base. Even if juice is a perfectly physical substance, and the en-
visioned scenario does not challenge fundamentality physicalism, the physicalist
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should still want to include juice on the roster of fundamentalia. The success
of the necessitation base above, which mentions electrons but not juice, masks
the vital role juice plays as one of the world’s most basic metaphysical building
blocks.
One important lesson is that epistemically opaque vocabulary facilitates hid-
den reference to extras (physical or non-physical). If a description of the fun-
damental layer contains opaque (perhaps semantically non-neutral) terms, one
can’t read off from that description the nature of the fundamental, and thereby
decide the issue of fundamentality physicalism vs. dualism. In my opinion, this
is the most important reason for the rationalist to insist on canonical expression
of the necessitation base. A non-canonically expressed necessitation base can fail
to vindicate fundamentality physicalism.
All parties to the debate should insist that a candidate necessitation base, or
description of the fundamental layer, be expressed canonically, in order to pre-
vent illicit reference to extras, such as Cartesian mind-substances or underly-
ing physical juices. One could hold a variety of views about the correct form
of canonical expression. Modal rationalists choose semantic neutrality.
I stop to consider a worry that may have occurred to the reader. I’ve com-
plained that a non-canonically expressed necessitation base fails to provide evi-
dence of fundamentality. But necessitation of all truths by the physical truths is, at
best, a necessary condition for fundamentality physicalism, not a sufficient con-
dition. If necessitation of all truths by physical truths is not a sufficient condition
for physicalism, then we should not be concerned that a physical necessitation
base could succeed while fundamentality physicalism remained false. The need
for canonical expression is moot.
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I offer two replies to the worry. First, much of the debate surrounding the
master argument operates not with fundamentality physicalism as its operative
conception of physicalism, but instead with modal physicalism. Modal physical-
ism says, more or less, that the physical truths necessitate all the truths.24 Neces-
sitation of all truths by the physical truths is thus sufficient, and not just neces-
sary, for modal physicalism (in contrast with fundamentality physicalism). When
operating with modal physicalism, the need for canonical expression of the ne-
cessitation base is especially pressing. Second, we can do better than using the
necessitation test as a mere check for fundamentality. If the base is canonically
expressed, then success in necessitating all truths permits the base to be used as a
guide to the nature of the fundamental and as strong evidence for a given theory
of the fundamental.
2.4.3 Semantic Neutrality and the Master Argument
The modal rationalist’s test for necessitation, embodied in premise (P2) of the
mastery argument, requires that the set of physical truths P be either semantically
neutral or formulable using semantically neutral vocabulary. One could resist the
master argument by rejecting that it is possible to express the physical truths in a
semantically neutral way. One might reject the notion of semantic neutrality alto-
gether.25 Or one might accept semantic neutrality and maintain that the physical
state of the world cannot be expressed in such a vocabulary. For now, I wish to
put both moves aside. One of my goals is to find a form of physicalism, and a re-
ply to the master argument, that respects and meshes with rationalist intuitions.
24For more on modal physicalism, cf. Chalmers (1996a, 2010), Jackson (1993), Stoljar (2009b,a),
Leuenberger (2008), Lewis (1983), and Chapter 1 of this document.
25Even if one rejects the notion of semantic neutrality, the demand for canonical expression
remains if the necessitation test is to serve as evidence of fundamentality.
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Rejecting semantic neutrality, an important cog in the philosophical system of ex-
isting modal rationalists (including Chalmers (1996a, 2010), Jackson (1998), and
Chalmers & Jackson (2001)) is a poor way to meet this goal.
From here, we assume that the physical truths can be expressed in a semanti-
cally neutral fashion, either because they are semantically neutral from the start
or can be re-expressed using semantically neutral vocabulary.
2.5 Motivations for Modal Rationalism
2.5.1 Overview
According to modal rationalism, there are important, potentially constitutive,
connections between metaphysical modality and a priori justificaiton. In this
section, I wish to address the following question: “Why believe strong modal
rationalism, or any form of modal rationalism, for that matter?” Answering this
question should both help the reader better understand what modal rationalism
is and why one should believe it. I’ll canvas five motivations behind modal ratio-
nalism (MR):
1. MR has a long and classic tradition.
2. MR sanctions a ban on brute necessity.
3. MR supports and gets support from a connection between conceivability
and possibility.
4. MR vindicates the factorization view of the necessary a posteriori.
5. The view from above supports MR.
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2.5.2 Some Ideas Behind Modal Rationalism
First, modal rationalism is a classic position. A whole host of philosophical gi-
ants, including Kant, Leibniz, and Descartes, believed in connections between
metaphysical necessity and the a priori. Of course, before Kripke (1972), many
tended to conflate the notions of metaphysical necessity and a priori knowabil-
ity. Kripke taught us to be more careful. But we should not throw out the baby
with the bathwater by severing all such connections. (Wright (draft): 1-2 seems
to agree.)
Second, the modal facts about what truths are contingent and necessary are
not brute. If some truth T is necessary rather than contingent, there is an expla-
nation for this fact. It can’t be that the space of all possible worlds just happened
to be such that T is true in all of them. [Quote Trogdon+Levine here?]. That’s not
how possible worlds work. Schwarz (2007) offers the following consideration for
why there can’t be brute necessities (which he calls “strong necessities”):
From a formal point of view, it is easy to see how there could be strong
necessities. We only need to decouple the space of possible worlds
from any links to epistemic or conceptual matters. Suppose, for in-
stance, that there are only 7 possible worlds, all of which contain pen-
guins. Then the existence of penguins is a strong necessity: no ordi-
nary investigations in the actual world, and no amount of conceptual
analysis, could reveal to us that penguins necessarily exist, and yet
they do. The main problem with this view is that it ignores the con-
straints that come with the name “possible worlds.” It is like saying
that for all we know, there might be only 7 natural numbers, all of
which are prime. This is nonsense: if some things don’t at least satisfy
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the Peano Axioms, they don’t deserve the name “natural numbers.”
Likewise, there may well be some space of world-like entities with
only 7 members; but as these things won’t do any of the jobs asso-
ciated with possible worlds (see Lewis [1986,ch. 1] for a start), they
don’t deserve the name “possible worlds.”
Schwarz’s key idea is that if one divorces one’s account of modality from all
matters conceptual and epistemic, then one’s claims are no longer an account
of metaphysical modality in the first place. They’re an account of something
else instead. Putting his point another way, if there is some space of world-like
entities that has no epistemological constraints, then we, as philosophers, should
have no interest in it. It won’t do the jobs we want possible worlds to do. Modal
rationalism, with its connections between modality and the a priori, offers one
method of providing the desired epistemic constraints.
Kripke (1972) resoundingly defeated the most obvious form of modal ratio-
nalism: naive rationalism. But, interestingly, Kripke also laid the groundwork for
a more nuanced form of modal rationalism via his discussion of the factorization
view of the necessary a posteriori, suggested in Kripke (1972). Kripke suggests (in
his usual cagey manner) that perhaps all necessary a posteriori truths are deriv-
able from two other truths: one contingent and a posteriori, the other necessary
and a priori. For example, consider the necessary a posteriori statement “Heat
is molecular motion”. Kripke suggests that this statement can be derived in the
following way.
(P1) Heat is whatever actually causes heat sensations.
(P2) Molecular motion causes heat sensation.
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(C) Therefore: Heat is molecular motion.
(P1) is necessary and (arguably) a priori. Kripke’s idea here is that the ref-
erence of ‘heat’ is determined by something like the reference-fixing description
“the actual cause of heat sensations”. (P2) is contingent and a posteriori. It’s con-
tingent because something other than heat might have caused heat sensations
(had our brains been wired differently). The conclusion (C) is necessary and a
posteriori. According to the factorization view, a derivation of this form can be
given for any necessary a posteriori truth.
An a priori implication base has the potential to vindicate the factorization
view. The base must implicate all truths, including all necessary a posteriori
truths. If (a) the base contains only contingent a posteriori truths and (b) there
is an epistemic route from the base to the necessary a posteriori truths that pro-
ceeds only through necessary a priori truths, then the factorization view will be
vindicated.
Modal rationalism also supports (and gets support from) a connection be-
tween conceivability and possibility. However one theorizes about conceivability,
it is clearly an epistemic notion. On one account (found in Chalmers (2002) and
elsewhere), a proposition P is conceivable if and only if it is not a priori knowable
that not-P. According to modal rationalism, the reason conceivability is a guide to
possibility is because of the constitutive ties between conceptual matters (and a
priori justification in particular) and metaphysical modality. The conceivability-
possibility link is a fundamental idea in the vicinity of modal rationalism.
Clearly, then, modal rationalism has its virtues. It prohibits brute or strong
necessity, vindicates the factorization view of the necessary a priori, supports a
link between conceivability and possibility, and ties together epistemic and meta-
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physical space. I think few philosophers would deny at least a weak form of
modal rationalism. No one eagerly accepts that penguins exist necessarily and
this truth is beyond our (or anyone’s) epistemic reach. The important question,
then, is how strong the link between metaphysical modality and the a priori is.
The master argument requires a particularly strong connection, embodied in the
Strong Modal Rationalist Link.
2.5.3 The View From Above
One idea that buttresses the strong modal rationalist picture goes as follows.
Imagine an incredibly intelligent and wildly imaginative idealized reasoner po-
sitioned outside all the possible worlds. Using her powers of a priori reasoning
alone, the reasoner could figure out the entire configuration of modal space. She
could describe every possible world down to the finest detail. There is a signifi-
cant lacuna here. Purely a priori reasoning will not reveal to the thinker whether
water is H2O or XYZ, or whether the concept WATER refers to H2O or XYZ. So, in
a certain sense, she cannot describe every detail of every possible world, or even
of our actual world. She can’t tell us that our very own Indian Ocean contains
water.
This thinker clearly knows a great deal about our world (far more than we
will ever know). Using some vocabulary of hers, she can tell us exactly what,
at a microphysical and chemical level, the Indian Ocean, or the oceans of Alpha
Centauri, contain.26 But she does not know how the ‘water’ vocabulary applies.
In order to know how the ‘water’ vocabulary applies, she needs to know more
about how her token ‘water’-representations are related to her environment - are
26The vocabulary in which the reasoner will be able to describe the world will be semantically
neutral, because such a vocabulary does not pose the obstacles that ‘water’ does.
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they causally or otherwise linked to H2O, to XYZ, or to something else?
The idealized thinker can, using her own canonical vocabulary, describe ev-
ery detail of every possible world.27 In this sense, all of modality is available to
a priori reflection. However, she does not know how to describe these worlds
using every possible form of representation. In order to know the reference of
representations (e.g. one’s ‘water’ representations), one first needs contingent, a
posteriori information about how one is situated in relation to one’s environment.
This is the information the idealized thinker lacks. It explains why she can’t tell
whether the Indian Ocean contains water. Let’s call this general idea, that a priori
reflection offers access to all the metaphysical possibilities, but does not always
tell one the correct terminology in which to describes those possibilities, the view
from above. “The view from above” is not just a vista from which one might look
out upon modality. It is a claim about the scope of a priori reflection. It captures
another element of the modal rationalist picture.
The view from above deflects the significance of the Kripkean necessary a
posteriori (and the contingent a priori). Kripke is sometimes thought to have
severed the Kantian rationalist connection between metaphysical modality and
the a priori. But according to strong modal rationalists, the import of Naming and
Necessity is more semantic than metaphysical. The entire space of metaphysical
possibility is available to a priori reflection. The idealized a priori reasoner can
describe all those possibilities using a specialized canonical vocabulary. But she
cannot describe those possibilities using any vocabulary whatsoever. This is so
because some terms (those that are not semantically neutral) depend for their
application on how the actual world turns out. Specifically, they depend on actual
27If there are inexpressible states of the world, then the idealized thinker might not be able to
describe those states. But she might be aware of, or know, those states nonetheless.
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facts that are knowable only a posteriori.
2.5.4 The Strong Modal Rationalist Link and the View From Above
One can supplement the view from above with additional claims about scrutabil-
ity, including an ambitious form of the factorization view of the necessary a poste-
riori. One might claim that the idealized reasoner, given knowledge of the strictly
a posteriori facts about the actual world and where she is situated in it, will be
able to use her powers of a priori reasoning to learn the truths about that world
that were previously beyond her reach: truths involving concepts like WATER,
HESPERUS, and CICERO. One might also claim that the idealized reasoner can
perform this task from a minimal base of truths - a (neutral) necessitation base,
or just the fundamental truths, will do. The strong modal rationalist starts with
the view from above and adds on these additional claims about scrutability. P
provides the minimal base of a posteriori facts about the fundamental structure
of the actual world (assuming physicalism is true). I tells the idealized reasoner
where, when, and who she is in that world. From there, the strong modal ratio-
nalist claims she should be able to figure out the rest.
2.6 Against Strong Modal Rationalism
2.6.1 The Recipe View
Strong modal rationalism posits a tight connection between a priori knowledge
and metaphysical modality. This connection entails the truth of the Strong Modal
Rationalist Link, which says that any canonically expressed semantically neutral
necessitation base, appropriately supplemented with an indexical truth, is also
an a priori implication base. Why does the strong modal rationalist answer the
supplementation question in this way, i.e. positing the strong rationalist link? In
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this section, I’ll argue that the strong modal rationalist’s answer to the supple-
mentation question is based on a certain meta-semantic view: the recipe view. By
“a meta-semantic view”, I mean a view about how representations come to acquire
their meanings.28
According to the recipe view, each term or concept is associated with an a
priori “recipe” that determines the reference of the term. For example, the a priori
recipe associated with ‘water’ is something like “the clear wet liquid that flows in
the lakes, rivers, and streams and falls from the sky as rain”. If H2O is this clear
wet liquid, then water is all and only the H2O.
The recipe view is not committed to the claim that the a priori referential
recipes are captureable via pithy descriptions such as ‘the clear wet liquid that
flows in the lakes, rivers, and streams and falls from the sky as rain’ or ‘the
teacher of Alexander’. We can model a term’s a priori recipe as an infinite set of
conditionals. The antecedent of each conditional expresses some possibility for
how the world might turn out to be. The consequent states what ‘water’ refers to
should that antecedent be the case. For example, we might model the recipe of
‘water’ as follows:
- If H2O is the clear wet liquid that falls from the sky as rain and fills the
lakes, rivers, and streams, then water is H2O.
- If XYZ is the clear wet liquid that falls from the sky as rain and fills the
lakes, rivers, and streams, then water is XYZ.
28I use ‘meaning’ in a generous sense, to cover representational qualities both at the level of
reference and at other levels (such as the level of “sense” (cf. Frege (1952/1892a))). I also use
‘meaning’ to include the representational qualities of any variety of contentful entity, not just
linguistic items. If there are non-linguistic representations (which I believe there are), such as
perceptual states, they have meaning as well, as I use the term.
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- If H2O is the clear wet liquid that falls from the sky as rain, emerges from
faucets, fills the oceans, lakes, and aquifers, and ..., but XYZ and not a drop
of H2O flows in the streams, then water is all and only the H2O. (In such
a case, we’d mistakenly believe, until corrected by chemists, that streams
contain water.)
- et cetera...
Because it does not employ descriptions, the recipe view is not obviously sus-
ceptible to the anti-descriptivist arguments of Kripke (1972). However, the recipe
view can be seen as a brand of “neo-descriptivism”. The recipe view is more
sophisticated than descriptivism but preserves its spirit. The two-dimensional
semantic theories of Chalmers (1996a, 2006a) and Jackson (1998) offer paradigms
of the recipe view. Unsurprisingly, Chalmers and Jackson are both proponents of
Strong Modal Rationalism as well.
According to descriptivism about proper names, each name is associated with
a description that determines the extension of the name. Of course, the descrip-
tion can’t determine extension all by itself. Facts about what actually satisfies the
description also play a role. But there is clearly a sense in which the description
determines reference. The description does the meta-semantic work.
In a similar vein, the recipe view posits a rich variety of a priori connections
associated with any term or concept. These a priori connections don’t determine
reference all by themselves. Instead, they operate as a function that, given a cen-
tered world input (“considered as actual”), yield an extension as output. But
there is a clear sense in which the a priori recipe determines reference. Hence-
forth, I’ll speak of these recipes as “determining reference”, leaving implicit the
role of the centered world considered as actual. These a priori connections pro-
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vide a type of conceptual role for the term. This conceptual role is in many ways
similar to Frege’s notion of “sense” (cf. Frege (1952/1892a)). From here, I’ll refer
to this conceptual role, understood as the concept or term’s a priori connections,
which can be modeled as an infinite set of conditionals, as the concept or term’s
sense.
2.6.2 The Trench View
In this section I offer a different meta-semantic picture, the trench view, accord-
ing to which sense, taken to be constituted by a priori conceptual role, does not
determine reference. In the next section (2.6.3: “The Recipe View and the Strong
Modal Rationalist Link”), I’ll use this picture to cast doubt on the strong modal
rationalist’s answer to the supplementation question. In section 2.7.5 (“Toward
a More Moderate Rationalism”), I’ll use this alternative meta-semantic model to
offer an alternative answer to the supplementation question.
On the alternative meta-semantic picture, the trench view, the determination of
meaning is a much messier affair than the recipe view supposes. According to
the trench view, there’s no neat and clean purely a priori reference-determining
function. Instead, our terms and concepts are inextricably bound up in the world.
They get their meaning in large part through a practice of using those terms, and
particularly by demonstratively applying those terms to items in the world. A
demonstrative application of a term (or concept) occurs when a representational
agent demonstrates some object in the world and applies the term (or concept)
to that object (e.g. “That is water”). The demonstration and/or application can
occur in explicit language (written or spoken), in thought, or in perception.
One can highlight the difference between the recipe view and the trench view
using the procedure of “considering worlds as actual”. When we normally con-
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sider what a word refers to at some imagined possible world, we consider that
world as counterfactual. For example, we might ask what ‘water’ refers to at the
possible world containing Putnam (1975)’s twin-earth, in which XYZ, not H2O,
fills the lakes, rivers, and streams. When we consider twin-earth as counterfac-
tual, we declare that ‘water’ picks out all and only the H2O at twin-earth. But
we can also consider what ‘water’ would have referred to, had twin-earth been
actual. Here, we consider twin-earth as counteractual. If the actual world had
turned out to be like twin-earth, then ‘water’ would have referred to all and only
the XYZ.
We’ve already seen that the a priori recipes posited by the recipe view can be
modeled by an infinite set of conditionals. The antecedent of each conditional
corresponds to some way the world might turn out to be. In other words, the
antecedent involves a world considered as actual. If the actual world turns out
to be thus-and-so, then ‘water’ refers to H2O. If the actual world turns out to be
this-and-that, then ‘water’ refers to XYZ.
We can highlight a key difference between the recipe view and the trench view
by considering counteractuals containing no representational agents. According
the recipe view, a term such as ‘water’ or a concept such as WATER can have a
determinate extension at a world considered as counteractual even if no one has
ever used the term ‘water’ or thought with the concept WATER. Once we have a
centered world considered as actual, we simply look for the appropriate line of
the a priori recipe. For example, to determine what ‘water’ refers to at a centered
world considered counteractually, we look in that world for the clear wet liquid
that flows in the lakes, rivers, and streams near the center. That liquid is the
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water. The world might contain no language users at all.29
In contrast, the trench view denies that, when we consider worlds as coun-
teractual, ‘water’ (or WATER) has any reference at all if ‘water’ has never been
used by an agent. The trench view maintains that the reference of ‘water’ and
of WATER is highly driven by particular concrete uses of language and other rep-
resentational states (such as thoughts). If no representation occurs at a world,
there is no use of representation to give ‘water’ a referent. On this picture, the
reference of ‘water’ is not determined by some complicated recipe a priori asso-
ciated with ‘water’. Instead, the fact that language users have labeled H2O and
not XYZ as ‘water’ makes ‘water’ refer to H2O rather than XYZ. Of course, how
an agent demonstratively applies their terms is partly determined by the a priori
associations that the term has. But it’s also determined by the agent’s (poten-
tially false) beliefs about the object of demonstration and about the term. Often
an agent’s demonstrative application is not guided by a strictly a priori recipe.
But the demonstration plays a role in securing reference nonetheless.
Demonstrative applications provide a sort of meta-semantic “glue” that func-
tions to tie the reference of a term to the demonstratum. When an agent labels
some object as a ‘cat’, that very act functions to make it more likely that the ‘cat’
representation type refers to objects of the demonstrated category. This is so even
if the labeled entity is not, given the current extension of ‘cat’, a cat. Each act
of demonstrative application has some meta-semantic force, however small, that
pushes the reference of the term toward the demonstratum. One mislabeling will
almost never alter the extension of ‘cat’. In certain circumstances, however, mas-
29Chalmers (2006a): 107-108 is quite clear that primary intensions (which are a form referential
“recipe”) remain defined, and have determinate extensions, at counteractually considered worlds
with no language users.
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sive mislabeling could shift the reference of the term.30
The trench view needn’t deny that something like an a priori recipe, concep-
tual role, sense, or even description plays a role in determining reference. But
I’m highly skeptical that each term is associated a priori with a sense or recipe
rich enough to determine reference. Furthermore, the meta-semantic glue that
demonstrative applications provide can’t be reduced to, or replaced by, a priori
recipes, dispositions to apply, or beliefs.
I’d like to offer two “just so stories” about reference determination. The sto-
ries represents the two meta-semantic approaches already described. The stories
admittedly caricature their targets in certain respects. But I think the stories illus-
trate quite effectively the differences between the two meta-semantic views.
The recipe view offers something the like the following picture of reference
determination. We start in a dark room, with no contingent knowledge of how
the world is. We come up with some term: ‘water’. We then think about all the
possible ways the world beyond the dark room might be, and decide what ‘water’
will refer to in each case. If the world is thus and so, water is H2O. If the world
is that and such, water is XYZ. Et cetera. Each line of the recipe corresponds to a
different way the world could turn out to be. Then we leave the dark room and
check how the world actually is. It turns out that H2O is the wet clear liquid in
the lakes, rivers, and streams. Voila! Water is H2O. (In fairness to proponents
of the recipe view, the recipes need not be completely decided in advance. The
30Evans (1973) discusses two cases that seem to demonstrate the phenomenon of continued
demonstrative application functioning to meta-semantically glue a term (a name) on to an object
to which the term did not originally refer. Evans (195-6) notes that the term ‘Madagascar’ origi-
nally referred to a portion of mainland Africa. But Marco Polo initiated a process of misapplica-
tion - demonstrative application - of the term to the large island we now know as ‘Madagascar’,
eventually causing the term to genuinely refer to that large island. Evans’ ‘Turnip’ case (206-7)
involves a similar shift in reference through demonstrative (mis)application.
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recipes can be implicit in the dispositions of language users. The main claim of
the recipe view is that the reference-determining work is done cognitively, via the
multi-line recipe. The job of the world is limited to determining which line of the
recipe to use.)
The trench view offers a much messier picture of reference determination. We
don’t start in a dark room outside the world and decide in advance what our
terms refer to, even in conditional form. Instead we start in the world, with all
its pressures and demands bearing down on us. A Tyrannosaurus Rex crashes
through the bushes, snorting and gnashing its teeth. We point, yell, ‘Danger!’
and run. After making our escape, we discover a stream of clear cool water to
slake our thirst. This substance is useful and important. We’ll need to identify it
again and communicate about it. We introduce a label: ‘water’. “This is water,”
we declare. Of course, we have various beliefs about water that guide our appli-
cation of the term. Perhaps we believe water to be the clear wet liquid that flows
in streams. But the reference of the term is driven both by these beliefs and our
dispositions to apply the term and by the history of using the term as a label for
certain stuff. Importantly, our continued use of the term ‘water’ as a label plays
a role in reference-determination that can’t be reduced to any recipe, beliefs, or
dispositions. And it can turn out that water is neither clear, nor wet, nor flows in
the streams.
On the trench view, demonstrative applications play a vital role in determin-
ing reference. Of course, we need other representational or intentional abilities to
lock our demonstrations on to objects in the world. But our ability to “lock on” to
some particular in the world is a somewhat primitive ability, usually facilitated
by the perceptual system. In order to demonstrate something, we don’t need
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a description satisfied uniquely by the demonstratum. The simpler lower-level
representational capacity to lock on or demonstrate items in our perceptual field
facilitates the generation of the higher-level representational capacities indicative
of linguistic and conceptual representation. The ability to represent something as
water using the term ‘water’ or the concept WATER is such a higher-level capacity.
This important role of demonstrative applications is discussed in Burge (1986):
716. He speaks of “applications” of terms: “ordinary, indexically aided, perception-
based uses”. ‘That is water / a cat / Madagascar’ are paradigm examples. Burge
states that “ordinary words (or notions) for ordinary entities are given their life
and meaning through such applications.” I whole-heartedly agree. The recipe
view’s main mistake is to ignore the important role of these demonstrative ap-
plications, and the degree to which the generation of meaning is a living and
dynamic affair, tied to representational activity and action on the ground, not
decided cognitively in advance via pre-planned recipes (however implicit in the
dispositions of agents these recipes may be).
Putnam (1962)’s robotic cat thought experiment seems to tell against the recipe
view and in favor of the trench view. Putnam imagined a scenario in which the
creatures we’d been calling ‘cats’, invited to warm our laps and made members of
our home, were robots all along. Putnam persuasively argued that if this turned
out to be so ‘cat’ would refer to a certain type of robot, and not to any animals.
If there is an a priori recipe associated with ‘cat’, it likely includes features like
“furry”, “animal”, and “purrs”. But Putnam showed that, through the demon-
strative application of ‘cat’ to a certain type of robot, ‘cat’ can come to refer to
something that is neither an animal, nor furry, nor purrs. In this case at least,
the work of reference determination appears to be done by demonstrative appli-
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cations, not recipes or a priori associated features. Demonstrative applications
can even overcome and outweigh a recipe that pulls reference in the opposite
direction (e.g. toward furry animals). The trench view takes the phenomenon
demonstrated by Putnam’s cat scenario to exemplify the generation of meaning
in a large class of cases. Demonstrative applications do much of the work in
securing both meaning and reference.
The recipe view overestimates the degree to which the generation of meaning
is an intellectual or cognitive affair. The recipe view claims that users’ intellects
determine a conditional recipe, decided away from the world, that determines
meaning. The role of the world is limited to telling us which conditional, which
line of the recipe, to use. The alternative trench view holds that the generation
of meaning occurs down in the trenches (hence “the trench view”). Agents use
representations in their attempts to survive and thrive in the muck and helter-
skelter of the world. Their assignment of meaning to representational tokens is
done in a haphazard manner that fits their integration into and interaction with
the world. In sum, the generation of meaning is messier and more world-bound
than the recipe view or the strong rationalist suppose.
2.6.3 The Recipe View and the Strong Modal Rationalist Link
The recipe view fits nicely with the strong modal rationalist’s answer to the sup-
plementation question. First, the recipes are centered. Water is not just the clear
wet liquid that flows in the lakes, rivers, and streams. It’s the clear wet liquid that
flows around here. The fact that XYZ flows in the lakes, rivers, and streams, on
the far side of the galaxy matters not to the extension of ‘water’. The fact that the
recipes are centered fits conveniently with the strong modal rationalist’s demand
for an indexical element in the a priori implication base. The indexical element
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indicates where “here” is, such that one should investigate the lakes, rivers, and
streams nearby.
The recipe view lends support to modal rationalism in another way. The
recipes aren’t just recipes for extension. They’re also recipes for intension. The
‘water’-recipe says that if H2O is the clear wet liquid in the lakes, rivers, and
streams around here, then the extension of ‘water’ includes all the actual H2O.
But the recipe also says if H2O is the clear wet liquid... , then ‘water’ picks out
H20 at every possible world. In other words, the recipe says that if the actual clear
wet liquid... is H2O, then water is necessarily H2O. ‘Water’ has an intension, a
function from worlds to extensions, that picks out the H2O at every world. The
actual world extension of ‘water’ is a special case.
The intension of ‘water’ tracks the reference of ‘water’ across all possible
worlds, and thus determines what is and is not metaphysically possible for wa-
ter. If a reasoner knows the intension of ‘water’, she knows what is and is not
metaphysically possible for water. On the recipe view, one can know a priori the
intension of ‘water’ conditional on how the actual world is. The information in
the necessitation base tells one how the actual world is. From this information,
one can determine a priori what the intension is, allowing the reasoner a priori
access to all of modal space - the rationalist dream.
Let’s now explore how a priori recipes facilitate the strong modal rational-
ist answer to the supplementation question, which we see in the strong modal
rationalist link.
• (Strong Modal Rationalist Link): A canonically expressed semantically
neutral necessitation base, supplemented with an indexical truth, a priori
implicates every proposition it necessitates.
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Imagine an ideal and powerful reasoner, who has been given an indexicalized
semantically neutral necessitation base F. F describes, in canonical neutral vo-
cabulary, the complete layout of the world’s fundamentalia: all the fundamental
particles (e.g. quarks, leptons, and bosons), their fundamental properties (e.g.
mass, spin, charge), and some fundamental laws that govern the development of
these fundamentalia over time. These fundamentalia might be physical, or they
might not. For example, they might include consciousness particles or a funda-
mental psycho-physical law. Let F be supplemented with an indexical truth I that
locates the ideal reasoner in space-time. According to the strong modal rationalist
link, FI is an a priori implication base - it a priori implicates every truth. Roughly,
this entails that the ideal reasoner, informed that FI is the case, can reason a priori
to knowledge of all truths.31 Can she do it?
There is some reason to be optimistic. After all, F describes the world’s funda-
mental layer. This layer is metaphysically responsible for the rest of the world’s
contents. It also necessitates the complete state of the world. The facts about
water, koalas, and Africa are necessitated and depend upon the truths about fun-
damentalia, the very truths to which the ideal reasoner has access. In some sense,
all the information is already there.
FI does not contain any concepts like WATER, KOALA, or AFRICA. F is ex-
pressed in fundamental vocabulary, using concepts like ELECTRON, LAW, FORCE,
31Following Fitch (1963), there are good reasons for thinking that in fact it is impossible to know
all truths. Let P be any truth that is not currently known. If P is not known, then “P and no one
knows that P” is true. Call this truth F. F seems to be unknowable. If it were known, it would
become false, and thereby not known (falsehoods can’t be known). However, the issue can be
side-stepped. What is really at issue is whether FI a priori implicates every truth, i.e. whether, for
every truth T, a material conditional of the form FI −Ñ T is knowable a priori. The conditional
can be knowable a priori even when T is not. I’ll usually leave issues about unknowable truths
suppressed and instead speak in the easier, if somewhat sloppier, mode, of “coming to know” all
truths. For further discussion of the Fitchian obstacles to a priori implication cf. Chalmers (2012):
Chapters 2 and 4.
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mathematical concepts, and perhaps some mental concepts (if fundamentality
dualism is true). But the a priori reasoner must be able to reason a priori from
FI to truths containing the concepts WATER, KOALA, and AFRICA. Consider the
proposition THE LARGEST BODY OF WATER IN AFRICA HAS A SURFACE AREA OF
MORE THAN 50,000 SQUARE KILOMETERS. This proposition is true. (Lake Victo-
ria has a surface area of 68,800 km.2).32 But how might the reasoner come to know
a priori from FI? First, she needs to determine what WATER and AFRICA refer to.
The a priori referential recipes associated with these concepts will help her.
For ease of exposition, we’ll assume that physicalism is true. F is expressed in
the vocabulary of fundamental physics, math, and logic. The idealized reasoner
starts from the centered description FI of the world at its most fundamental level.
The a priori implication of all truths starts from the very small fundamentalia
and proceeds up, piece-meal, to the macroscopic. The reasoner starts by using
the recipes a priori associated with the concepts of chemistry, which are either
written in the vocabulary of micro-physics or in some topic-neutral vocabulary, to
deduce a priori all the facts about chemistry. She then uses the information about
microphysics plus chemistry, along with the recipes of micro-biological concepts,
to deduce the micro-biological facts. Repeat this process, moving up the chain of
a priori implication from the micro to the macro.
The reasoner gradually fills in her picture of the world’s contents, proceeding
from small to big. Eventually, the idealized reasoner will discover that H2O, not
XYZ, is the clear wet liquid that flows in the lakes, rivers, and streams around
here and which falls from the sky as rain. The reasoner will conclude that H2O,
and not XYZ or some other substance, is water. She’ll similarly use the recipes
32Cf. Wikipedia (2013).
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associated with AFRICA and other concepts (or terms), to determine the reference
of those concepts (or terms). Once she knows the reference of all these concepts,
she can evaluate which propositions are true and which false. She’ll learn that
the largest body of water in Africa does have a surface area of more than 50,000
square kilometers.
One learns that ‘The largest body of water in Africa has a surface area of more
than 50,000 square kilometers’ is true by learning that the reference of ‘The largest
body of water in Africa’ is the largest body of H2O in the continent containing
the Sahara and the Congo, which one learns by determining what ‘water’ and
‘Africa’ refer to.
The basic connection between the strong modal rationalist link and the recipe
goes as follows. According to the recipe view, the reference (and intension) of a
term or concept can be read off from the a priori recipe in combination with a cen-
tered world. The centered world tells one which line of a priori recipe to use. The
strong rationalist link says that a semantically neutral indexically supplemented
necessitation base a priori implicates all truths. The semantically neutral indexi-
cally supplemented necessitation base provides a centered world.33 The reliance
on a priori implication gives one recourse to the a priori recipe. From these in-
gredients, one can determine the reference of all terms, and come to know all
truths.
Contrast the picture of a priori implication that flows from the recipe view
33The route from the recipe view to the strong rationalist link is not as simple as I have sug-
gested. There is no guarantee that the a priori recipes are written in the same (likely fundamental)
vocabulary as the necessitation base FI. In other words, the centered world description FI might
not work as input into the recipe view’s a priori reference-determination function. Thus, even if
the recipe view is true, the strong rationalist link might still fail. However, I wish to ignore this
further problem for the strong rationalist link. Instead I focus on denying the recipe view itself,
rather than the connection between it and strong modal rationalism.
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with the picture that flows from the trench view. According to the trench view,
terms might have a priori recipes, but they do not, in combination with a cen-
tered world, determine reference. A priori associations could play some role in
restricting the reference. For example, one might know a priori that water isn’t
a type of sandwich. But the a priori associations leave space for other reference-
determining factors.
According to the trench view, the slack in the project of reference-determination
is picked up by the process of language (and concept) users interacting (often
causally) with items in their environment. In particular, language users demon-
stratively apply their terms (and concepts) to things they encounter. Thus, a se-
mantically neutral description of the world, even supplemented with an indexical
truth, will often leave one unable to determine what terms such as ‘water’, ‘cat’,
and ‘red’ refer to. Before one can do so, one needs also to know what types of
things users have demonstratively applied ‘water’, ‘cat’, and ‘red’ to.
2.7 The Demonstrative Reply to the Master Argument Against
Physicalism
In this section, I describe the the demonstrative reply to the Master Argument Against
Physicalism. According to the demonstrative reply, the failure of a priori impli-
cation from the physical truths to the truths about consciousness stems from a
crucial and ineliminable meta-semantic link between phenomenal concepts and
terms (such as REDph/‘redph’ and PAINph/‘painph’)34 and demonstrative appli-
34A phenomenal concept applies to experiences and characterizes an experience according to
what it is like to be the subject of that experience. For example, REDph (the subscript ‘ph’ denotes
‘phenomenal’) is the phenomenal, experiential, concept of red. REDph applies to experiences with
a certain qualitative character (you know the one). Neither light-waves nor objects can be redph.
Tomatoes, fire trucks, and strawberries are red, but they cause redph sensations. Analogous com-
ments apply to phenomenal terms, such as ‘redph’ and ‘painph’. The English term ‘red’ is likely
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cation of those concepts and terms to conscious experiences. The failure of a
prior implication is an expected consequence of this meta-semantic link and is
not symptomatic of the presence of mentality in the fundamental bedrock of re-
ality.
2.7.1 The Demonstrative Reply
The crucial move in the Master Argument Against Physicalism is the inference
from an epistemic a priori gap between the physical and consciousness to a meta-
physical gap that entails dualism. The supplementation question asks, “What
must be done to a necessitation base to create an a priori implication base?”
An answer to the supplementation question creates the framework for squeez-
ing metaphysical results about necessitation and fundamentality from epistemic
claims about a priori implication.
The Master Argument relies on the strong rationalist answer to the supple-
mentation question, and its robust connection between modality and the a priori,
embodied in the strong modal rationalist link. According to the strong rationalist
link, a necessitation base expressed in semantically neutral vocabulary need only
be supplemented with an indexical truth to become an a priori implication base.
Because the physical truths, expressed in a neutral fashion and supplemented
with an indexical truth, do not a priori implicate the truths about consciousness,
the physical truths do not form a necessitation base. Thus they do not express the
fundamental state of the world. Fundamentality physicalism is false. Or so the
master argument goes.
We might ask why a necessitation base needs any help at all a priori implicat-
polysemous between, or a mongrel of, the red-terms that apply to light waves, to surfaces, and to
sensations.
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ing all truths. The basic reason is that necessitation (and fundamentality) is, first
and foremost, a property of states of affairs, not a property of representations.
Certain representations (BOB IS A BACHELOR) necessitate other representations
(BOB IS NOT MARRIED) because of relations between the objects, properties, and
states of affairs those representations denote. A priori implication, however, is
solely a relation between representations. The master argument seeks to use a
priori implication as a guide to necessitation and fundamentality. We must take
care when we shift the locus of inquiry from the things themselves to our repre-
sentations of them. The move to the representational level introduces complica-
tions. We’ve seen several of these complications: the need to express truths in a
canonical vocabulary and the need to include an indexical truth.
I argued earlier (section 2.3.4: “Naive Modal Rationalism”) that the indexical
truth must be included in any a priori implication base in order to implicate in-
dexical truths (such as I LIVE IN LOS ANGELES) and even certain third-personal
truths (such as WATER IS H2O). These are reasons associated with success. In
order to succeed as an a priori implication base, any such base must include an in-
dexical truth. But let us inquire more deeply into the need for the indexical truth.
Why does an a priori implication base need indexicals to succeed?
The reason a priori implication bases must include indexical truths is that in-
dexicality, our perspective on the world, is a representationally basic feature. A
priori implication bases must include representationally basic features. But the
inclusion of a representationally basic feature in an a priori implication base does
not entail that this feature is metaphysically basic (i.e. metaphysically fundamen-
tal). The need to include I AM IN LOS ANGELES in the a priori implication base
does not indicate that I, or Los Angeles, lie in the bedrock of reality.
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Before we can draw conclusions about fundamentality from claims about a
priori implication, we must first carefully investigate which features of a priori
implication bases are merely representationally basic. The indexical truth is one
such feature. The demonstrative reply to the master argument against physicalism
claims that demonstratives are similarly representationally basic. As a result,
any a priori implication base must include some demonstratives. Furthermore,
the demonstrative reply claims a vital connection between our representations
for conscious experience (phenomenal concepts and terms) and demonstratives.
This connection prohibits the physical truths (even when semantically neutral
and supplemented with an indexical truth), when not aided by demonstrative
truths, from a priori implicating the truths about consciousness.
According to the demonstrative reply, the connection between a priori impli-
cation and necessitation is not as tight as the strong modal rationalist claims. The
strong modal rationalist, relying on the recipe view of how our representations
acquire their meanings, ignores the crucial meta-semantic role of demonstratives
and underestimates how much assistance a necessitation base requires to become
an a priori implication base. Because of the vital role that demonstrative applica-
tions play in the determination of reference, the recipe view is false. As a result
the strong modal rationalist link, which underlies premise (P2) of the master ar-
gument, fails. Any a priori implication base must include some demonstrative
truths. The demonstrative reply denies premise (P2) of the master argument (this
premise says that if the physical truths, indexically supplemented, fail to a priori
implicate all truths, they fail to necessitate all truths).
Many views can deny the strong modal rationalist link. But the demonstrative
reply offers a diagnosis of where the link goes wrong. The link fails to acknowl-
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edge the vital meta-semantic role that demonstratives play. Without demonstra-
tive truths in the a priori implication base, we can’t determine the reference of
our terms (concepts) or the truth values of our sentences (propositions). This is
why a priori implication from a demonstrative-less base fails.
Furthermore, the demonstrative reply provides a physicalistically respectable
explanation of the epistemic gap between the physical and consciousness. The
epistemic gap arises from (i) the representationally basic nature of demonstra-
tives and (ii) the essential and ineliminable connection between demonstratives
and our representations of consciousness. (More on this “essential and inelim-
inable connection” in section 2.7.3: “The Ineliminable Connection Between Phe-
nomenal Concepts and Demonstratives”). The epistemic gap does not stem from
the fact that the fundamental features of our world include consciousness itself
(a form of dualism).
The demonstrative reply offers the tools to agree with much of the thinking
behind the Master Argument while resisting the final step to dualism. Propo-
nents of the demonstrative reply can admit that the strong rationalists are correct
about the failure of a priori implication between the physical and consciousness.
Strong rationalists claim that consciousness truths (or something of their ilk) must
be added to any a priori implicatioin base. Proponents of the demonstrative re-
ply can agree with this claim as well. Consciousness must be included because
(a) demonstratives must be included in any a priori implication base and (b) there
is a tight connection between demonstratives and consciousness.
Strong rationalists infer from the need to include consciousness in the a priori
implication base to a need to include consciousness on the roster of fundamen-
talia. The demonstrative reply resists this final step. The need to include con-
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sciousness stems from the need to include demonstratives, which are representa-
tionally basic, and not from the metaphysically basic (i.e. fundamental) nature of
consciousness itself.
Lastly, the demonstrative reply, unlike other anti-rationalist replies that deny
(P2), is amenable to modal rationalism (though not to Strong Modal Rationalism).
In fact, the demonstrative reply naturally points the way toward a weaker form
of modal rationalsim, to be discussed in section 2.7.5 (“Toward A More Moderate
Rationalism: the Moderate Rationalist Link”).
2.7.2 Comparison to other Demonstrative Oriented Replies
The demonstrative reply is a version of the phenomenal concept strategy. The phe-
nomenal concept strategy locates the explanatory gap between the physical and
consciousness in special features of our concepts for conscious experience (phe-
nomenal concepts) rather than in a metaphysical gap resulting from dualism.
There are a large variety of phenomenal concept strategies. I will not canvas
them all here.
Many phenomenal concept strategists have noted the special or direct way in
which our phenomenal concepts pick up on experience itself (Balog (2012), Loar
(1990), Papineau (1998)). Chalmers (2003b), while not a proponent of the phe-
nomenal concept strategy, writes of an “experience... that is being attended to or
taken up into the concept” (239). Others have suggested that phenomenal con-
cepts are, in some way or other, demonstrative (Loar (1990), Hawthorne (2002)).
My demonstrative reply follows in this track, but there are important differences
between my demonstrative reply and existing demonstrative accounts of phe-
nomenal concepts.
The most important difference between my demonstrative reply and exist-
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ing demonstrative accounts is that, on my account, the role of demonstratives is
strictly meta-semantic. The difference can be expressed using the Fregean notion
of sense (Frege (1952/1892a). Other accounts (e.g. Loar (1990): 87) suggest that
demonstratives enter into the sense of a phenomenal concept. In contrast, on my
view demonstratives play a vital role in making it the case that phenomenal con-
cepts have the sense and reference that they do, but demonstratives need not en-
ter into the sense itself. My story about phenomenal concepts is meta-semantically
demonstrative. In contrast, many other accounts are semantically demonstrative.
I’ll attempt to explain the difference between semantically and meta-semantically
demonstrative concepts. Suppose I introduce a term by stipulating that ‘whapow’
is to mean this sound (slapping my hands against my thighs). I thereby generate a
semantically demonstrative term ‘whapow’. ‘Whapow’ functions similarly to Ka-
plan (1970)’s ‘dthat’, which creates a term out of a demonstration. ‘Dthat[...]’ (di-
rectly) denotes whatever is demonstrated at the time of utterance. A description
of the demonstration appears inside the brackets [...]. My stipulation of the mean-
ing of ‘whapow’ is much like a use of ‘dhat’. I could have introduced the term
by saying, “Whapow = Dthat[slapping my hands against my thighs and gestur-
ing toward the noise]”. Most terms are not semantically demonstrative. ‘Water’,
‘cat’, ‘koala’, ‘friend’, and ‘Africa’ do not function like ‘whapow’ or ‘dthat[...]’.
But, according to the trench view, many non-semantically demonstrative terms
are meta-semantically demonstrative, including ‘water’, ‘cat’, and, most impor-
tantly, ‘redph’. They are meta-semantically demonstrative because demonstrative
application plays a vital role in the determination of reference for those terms.35
35Putnam (1975) discusses the phenomenon of using meta-linguistic/meta-semantic informa-
tion to introduce kind terms. Putnam, however, fails to distinguish between terms which are
semantically vs. meta-semantically demonstrative, indexical, or meta-linguistic. Burge (1982)
makes points similar to mine about kind terms in general (not just phenomenal terms) being
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Semantically demonstrative accounts of phenomenal concepts run into a fa-
miliar problem: it’s just implausible that phenomenal concepts (terms) are demon-
strative concepts (terms) (cf. Chalmers (2003b) for detailed criticism). ‘Redph’
seems quite unlike ‘whapow’. As an example, consider Hawthorne (2002)’s demon-
strative account of Mary’s epistemic progress upon leaving the black and white
room and experiencing phenomenal red for the first time. According to Hawthorne,
Mary knows before leaving the black and white room that a ripe strawberry will
give her a red experience. When she actually sees the strawberry, she comes
to know that a ripe strawberry will give her this experience. Mary’s epistemic
progress is constituted by her gaining of demonstrative knowledge of something
she already knew.
However, this account seems to grossly underestimate Mary’s epistemic progress.
There are no rhinoceroses in the black and white room, but we can suppose that
Mary knows all about them. Further, we can suppose that Mary has never seen
a rhinoceros or been in a position to demonstrate one. When she is released
from the black and white room into the safari enclosure at the San Diego Zoo,
she sees her first rhinoceros and comes to know that this is a rhinoceros. This
type of epistemic progress strikes most as unimpressive and vastly different from
Mary’s epistemic progress with respect to phenomenal red.36 But according to the
meta-semantically demonstrative in the sense explained.
36It is difficult to make out exactly what the difference between Mary’s epistemic progress in
the two cases is. In both cases, Mary can’t, from the black and white room, have the relevant
demonstrative knowledge (“this is redph” or “this is a rhinoceros”). But Mary, and proponents
of the knowledge argument, should know enough about demonstratives to expect this type of
epistemic gap. If that were all there was to what Mary didn’t know, the knowledge argument
would not have been as influential as it has been.
One way to make out the difference is by imagining Mary with a “phenomenal color palette”
containing the various shades of phenomenal color experience. Mary is tasked with painting the
world with this palette, painting each object with the type of color experience it tends to cause. It’s
plausible that she won’t know whether to paint the strawberry redph, blueph, or yellowph. (Let’s
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demonstrative account, they’re on a par. This strikes many, including myself, as
implausible.
Semantically demonstrative accounts have a nice story about the epistemic
gap between the physical and consciousness. In the philosophy of a priori im-
plication, it is well understood that exceptions must be made for demonstratives
(cf. Chalmers (2012): 285-7). In the same way that one can’t get first-person in-
dexical truths from third-person truths, one can’t get demonstrative truths either.
Demonstrative truths are representationally basic in the manner described in the
previous section. If the truths about consciousness employ phenomenal concepts,
and phenomenal concepts are demonstrative, then the truths about conscious-
ness are demonstrative. One should not expect a priori implication of demon-
strative truths from non-demonstrative truths (such as the physical truths P).
Chalmers (2012): 285-7 seems to agree with this point (though not with the claim
that phenomenal concepts and truths are semantically demonstrative). He places
demonstrative truths directly in his a priori implication base. But on Chalmers’
picture, the role of demonstrative truths appears to be limited to facilitating the a
priori implication of other demonstrative truths.
Semantically demonstrative accounts pay a steep price for their nice story
about the epistemic gap. They commit themselves to an implausible account of
the content of phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal concepts seem quite unlike the
concepts “that chair” or “dthat[man in a dark coat]”. Mary’s epistemic progress
seems more substantive than the move from “tomatoes will cause a redph experi-
imagine that Mary has the phenomenal palette containing the colors, but not names for the colors
on the palette. She can’t use those terms to facilitate her labeling). If this is correct, there is an
epistemic gap between the physical truths and the redph truths that goes beyond the inability to
demonstrate redph while in the black and white room. There is no analog of this more substantive
epistemic gap in the rhinoceros case.
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ence” to “tomatoes will cause this experience.”
My meta-semantically demonstrative account aims for the best of both worlds.
Because of the connection between phenomenal concepts and demonstratives,
we should expect an epistemic gap between the phenomenal truths and the phys-
ical truths and not draw anti-physicalist conclusions from it. But because the
connection to demonstratives is meta-semantic rather than semantic, my demon-
strative reply avoids the unsavory and implausible claims about the content, or
sense, of phenomenal concepts to which semantically demonstrative accounts are
committed.
To reap the benefits of semantically demonstrative accounts (i.e. a nice physi-
calistically respectable story about the epistemic gap), a meta-semantically demon-
strative account requires legwork above and beyond that required for the seman-
tic approach. Semantically demonstrative accounts get the simple explanation of
the epistemic gap: “Phenomenal truths are demonstrative. Demonstrative truths
are special. They aren’t a priori implicated by physical truths. Failure of a pri-
ori implication stems from this fact about demonstratives, not dualism. End of
story.” My demonstrative reply requires explaining why the meta-semantic de-
pendence of phenomenal concepts on demonstratives entails a failure of a priori
implication. The trench view provides this explanation. Demonstratives play a
vital role in the determination of reference. They play a particularly important
role with phenomenal concepts (more on this shortly in section 2.7.3). If you
don’t know what ‘redph’ has been applied to in the past, you can’t know what
‘redph’ refers to, and you can’t figure out the ‘redph’ truths. Because the demon-
strative applications upon which the reference of ‘redph’ depends do not appear
in the physical a priori implication base, that base fails to a priori implicate the
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truths about redph. This story about the epistemic gap between the physical and
consciousness falls directly out of the meta-semantically demonstrative account
of phenomenal concepts, and in no way supports metaphysical dualism.
2.7.3 The Ineliminable Connection Between Phenomenal Concepts and Demon-
stratives
In this section, I will explain the previously mentioned sense in which our repre-
sentations of consciousness, particularly phenomenal concepts, have an “essen-
tial and ineliminable connection” to demonstrative applications. The point is best
made by considering a rejoinder to the demonstrative reply to the Master Argu-
ment. (I’ve encountered this rejoinder many times in my discussions with strong
modal rationalists).37
The demonstrative reply relies on the trench view, according to which demon-
strative applications of concepts and terms plays a vital role in determining refer-
ence. The trench view is a plausible meta-semantic approach to natural language
and to our conceptual cognitive capacities. However, imagine the following re-
sponse on behalf of fans of the Master Argument. “Perhaps the trench view is
correct as a meta-semantic theory of natural language and of the concepts lim-
ited reasoners such as ourselves employ. But questions about a priori implication
are to be decided by considering all the types of reasoners, languages, and con-
cepts there could be. We must look beyond our cognitive limitations. The recipe
view is true for some language and conceptual scheme, emloyed by beings with
cognitive abilities far beyond ours. If so, then dependence on demonstrative ap-
plication is irrelevant, because this dependence is a contingent feature of natural
37Thanks are due to David Chalmers, Edward Elliott, Kelvin McQueen, and Wolfgang Schwarz
for helpful discussion.
126
language and of our conceptual abilities, rather than a necessary feature of repre-
sentational capacities more generally.”
This line of thought is intriguing. Let’s flesh it out a bit more. Let’s call the
envisioned language (and conceptual scheme) utilized by powerful God-like rea-
soners who don’t have a need for demonstrative applications to secure the refer-
ence of their terms the god language. The gods who use this language are tremen-
dously imaginative and have vast computational abilities. Their language con-
tains a term ‘waterg’. ‘waterg’ is the god-language version of ‘water’. It refers to
all and only the water.
The gods are meticulous in their creation of language. When they create a
term, they imagine every possible way the world could be, and state what the
term would refer to should each of those possibilities turn out to be actual. The a
priori recipes of the god-language aren’t implicit in their dispositions. The gods
explicitly lay out the recipes, perhaps inscribing them in a lawbook of meaning.
(There are questions about how even gods might carry out this infinite task. Let
us ignore such complications.) The dialectic here will operate mostly at the level
of language, but we could adopt a similar understanding of god-concepts.
How does the possibility of a god language, for which the recipe view seems
the correct meta-semantic theory, increase the plausibility of a priori implication
from a demonstrative-less base? Because the god-language seems not to meta-
semantically depend on demonstrative application, and its terms have explic-
itly laid out a priori referential recipes (perhaps even written in fundamental
vocabulary), a priori implication of the god-language truths won’t run into the
demonstrative-oriented problems we saw in section 2.6.3 (p116). For example,
the a priori recipe associated with ‘waterg’ has a line that explicitly says, “If FI
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is the case, then the water is all and only the H2O (and necessarily so)g.” With
this a priori recipe and FI in hand, one does not need to first know what one
has demonstratively applied ‘waterg’ to in the past in order to learn the reference
of ‘waterg’. Thus, it appears that the demonstrative obstacle to a priori impli-
cation of the god language truths has been removed. Truths such as ‘water is
H2Og’, ‘cats are animalsg’, and ‘The largest body of water in Africa has a surface
area of more than 50,000 square kilometersg’ seem to be a priori implicated by
the demonstrative-less base FI. However, the truths containing natural language
terms such as ‘water’, ‘cat’, and ‘Africa’, are not obviously a priori implicated in
this fashion.
Let’s suppose that the result of resort to the god-language is a priori impli-
cation of a god-language description of the world. The gods will know a great
deal about water, cats, and Africa. But their knowledge will not proceed via the
concepts WATER, CAT, and AFRICA. Instead it will involve the concepts WATERg,
CATg, and AFRICAg. In that sense, the resulting description is incomplete. It fails
to include truths involving WATER. But in another sense the description is com-
plete, or close enough. The gods can describe, in excrutiating detail, the state of
the world. They may even be able to describe the truths about consciousness,
using concepts such as REDphg and PAINphg.
I have two responses to the attempt by fans of the master argument to avoid
the problems for a priori implication arising from meta-semantic dependence on
demonstratives by resort to the god-language (or anything like it). First, I wish to
cast doubt on the idea that a god-language description of the world can function
as a genuine substitute for a description in ordinary language. There’s a sense
in which the god-language description is light-weight, and its a priori implica-
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tion from FI unimpressive. Second, and more importantly, one cannot avoid the
meta-semantic dependence of phenomenal concepts and terms on demonstrative
applications to conscious experience. The relationship between the two is inelim-
inable.
Let us evaluate how the possibility of this god-language affects the dialectic.
The a priori implication from FI of the WATERg, CATg, and AFRICAg truths seems
hard to deny. However, one should question whether the WATERg, CATg, and
AFRICAg truths are on equal standing with the WATER, CAT, and AFRICA truths.
There’s reason to be skeptical that a world-description in terms of WATERg, CATg,
and AFRICAg is genuinely complete, or as informative as a description that uses
WATER, CAT, and AFRICA.
Consider the following example, revolving around the glass jar currently sit-
ting on my desk. The gods introduce a term, ‘glass jarg’, and stipulate all the
conditions under which a glass jarg exists, and the conditions under which ‘there
is a glass jar on the deskg’ is true. As it turns out, glass jargs exist exactly when
glass jars exist, and there is a glass jarg on the deskg exactly when there is a glass
jar on the desk. Consider a god who has managed to deduce a priori from FI that
there is a glass jarg on the deskg. The god does not know the proposition THERE
IS A GLASS JAR ON THE DESK, but he knows a nearby proposition: THERE IS A
GLASS JAR ON THE DESKG.
I’m skeptical that knowledge that there is a glass jarg on the deskg is “just as
good” as knowledge that there is a glass jar on the desk. ‘There is a glass jar
on the desk’ is a macroscopic truth about the world. ‘There is a glass jar on the
deskg’ seems more like a complicated microscopic truth. Glass jarsg are stipulated
to exist whenever certain micro-arrangements of particles occurs. FI is such an
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arrangement. The transition from knowledge of FI to knowledge that there is
glass jar on the desk seems substantive, whereas the transition to there is a glassg
jar on the deskg seems not. If I stipulate ‘gleeb’ as a term for any glass jar located
on the desk, and then infer from the fact that there is a glass jar on the desk in my
office to the fact that there’s a gleeb in my office, I have not made much (any?)
epistemic progress. The gods who infer from FI to the fact that there is a glass
jarg on the deskg engage in a similarly weak form of epistemic progress. In sum,
I’m skeptical that a priori implication of a world-description in terms of WATERg,
CATg, and GLASS JARg is actually a different method of describing the water, cats,
and glass jars, rather than a re-hashing of FI.
While I am doubtful that a priori implication of truths in the god-language
yields genuine epistemic progress, my second, and primary, response to the god-
language strategy does not rely on this idea. Instead, I claim that it is impossi-
ble to have a phenomenal concept (or term) whose reference does not ultimately
track back, in some way, to demonstrative application. It might be possible to
get the truths about water, cats, and Africa, via the concepts WATERg, CATg, and
AFRICAg, all of which have explicitly laid out a priori referential recipes and don’t
rely on past demonstrative applications for their reference. But any genuinely
phenomenal term (concept) will rely on past demonstrative applications, either
of that term (concept) or another phenomenal term or concept.
It’s easy enough to create a term that refers to a type of experience without
resorting to demonstratives. I hereby introduce the term ‘gluub’, which I stipu-
late to refer Robert Zimmerman’s favorite type of color experience. But ‘gluub’ is
not a genuinely phenomenal term (like redph or painph), because it isn’t associated
with conscious experience in the right way. For starters, there’s no phenomenality
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- no redness or the like - in the term’s sense. Eventually, to lock one’s phenome-
nal term (concept) on to its referent, one must point and say, “That’s the type of
experience I’m talking about.”
Imagine the gods attempting to create a god-language term ‘redphg’, without
relying at all on demonstratives. They might describe redphg as the type of ex-
perience between orangephg and violetphg. It’s doubtful that this works, but even
if it did, it merely passes the buck. ‘Orangephg’ and ‘violetphg’ will either get
their reference secured (at least partly) through demonstrative application (“This
is orangephg!”) or rely on other terms whose reference was secured demonstra-
tively. Eventually, phenomenal terms must meta-semantically track back to, and
rely on, demonstrative application to a conscious experience.
If this is correct, then even in the god-language, a priori implication of the
phenomenal truths is only possible from a base that records the demonstrative
applications upon which phenomenal terms depend. One can’t avoid the need
for demonstratives by switching to the god-language or something like it.
The resulting picture yields a difference between representations for conscious
experience and other representational capacities. Our representations for water,
cats, and Africa, meta-semantically rely on demonstratives just as much as our
representations for consciousness (i.e. phenomenal terms and concepts) do. But
the meta-semantic link between our representations for conscious experience (i.e.
phenomenal terms and concepts) and demonstratives is ineliminable. We, or some
god-like creatures, might be able to get on to the cats, water, and Africa, without
using demonstratives. But the realm of conscious experience can’t be accessed in
the same way. Consciousness must be demonstrated.
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2.7.4 Phenomenal Concepts, Demonstration, and the Experiential Require-
ment
These comments on the ineliminable connection between phenomenal concepts
and demonstrative applications to conscious experience make some sense of an
existing issue surrounding possession of phenomenal concepts. Some have claimed
that one cannot possess a phenomenal concept unless one has had experiences of
the appropriate type (e.g. Papineau (1998): 5). According to this view, if you
have not experienced red, you cannot possess the concept REDph. Call this “the
experiential requirement” on possession of a phenomenal concept. This view has
the unpalatable implication that blind people, or even sighted people who have
experience orange and yellow but not red cannot think the thought STRAWBER-
RIES CAUSE REDPH EXPERIENCES. The experiential requirement denies the possi-
bility of acquiring a phenomenal concept through interaction with other agents,
perhaps with the aid of deference. I have explained elsewhere (Rabin (2011a),
Chapter 3: section 6) my objections to the experiential requirement.
There is a good idea in the vicinity of the “possession requires experience”
thesis. The possessor of the concept needn’t have experienced the phenomenal
quality the concept denotes. She can acquire the concept from someone else.
But somewhere down the line of concept acquisition, someone must have expe-
rienced that phenomenal quality or one like it.38 When an agent experiences a
given phenomenal quality, she is able to demonstrate it and demonstratively ap-
ply a (potentially new) phenomenal concept to it. This demonstrative application
38The qualification “or one like it” is intended to handle “missing shade of blue” type cases.
An agent could create a concept for a quality she anticipates the existence of, while having expe-
rienced only qualititavely similar qualities (e.g. the shades of blue on either side of the missing
shade). Or an agent might create a phenomenal concept for a conjunctive quality (purple and
smells-like-sulfur) for which she has experienced only the conjuncts.
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plays a vital role in giving the phenomenal concept its representational features,
including its reference.
These points about phenomenal concepts highlight why even the god-language
must rely on demonstrative application, and not just recipes, in the generation of
meaning for phenomenal concepts and terms. The gods who have never had
phenomenal experiences of, say, color, can’t come up with phenomenal color
concepts. Once the gods have experienced color phenomenal qualities, they’ll
demonstrate those qualities as part of the process of creating a concept (or term)
for those qualities.
Two features of the process of creating a phenomenal concept are worth men-
tioning. First, the agent must demonstrate the phenomenal quality. Second, she
must demonstrate the quality in the right way. (I won’t offer much to clarify “the
right way”). Demonstrating by declaring oneself as referring to “Robert Zimmer-
man’s favorite color” is an example of the wrong way. Having the experience in
question enables one to demonstrate the quality in the right way. That is why ex-
perience of a phenomenal quality is necessary for creating a phenomenal concept
or term.
2.7.5 Toward A More Moderate Rationalism: the Moderate Rationalist Link
I’ve argued that the scope of a priori reasoning is not as vast as the strong modal
rationalists and proponents of the recipe view have supposed. This might suggest
that there are no interesting answers to the supplementation question. Perhaps
we should abandon it. However, I’m hesitant to give up either modal rational-
ism or the supplementation question. The considerations of section 5 in favor of
modal rationalism remain.
In this section, I’d like to use the discussion so far to suggest an amendment
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to the strong modal rationalist’s proposal. I’ll suggest a weaker form of modal
rationalism that offers an answer to the supplementation question that is less
minimal than the strong rationalist’s response but remains strong enough to be
interesting. Importantly, this moderate form of modal rationalism won’t sanction
the anti-physicalist premise (P2) of the master argument.
The trench view stresses the importance of demonstrative applications in the
determination of meaning. The reference of ‘water’ is partly determined by what
kind of stuff we happen to have applied ‘water’ to in the past. Thus, to know
what ‘water’ refers to, to know that water is H2O, and to know that water covers
70% of the EarthâA˘Z´s surface, we need to know what stuff we’ve applied our
term ‘water’ to in the past. This point suggests an amendment to the strong
modal rationalist’s proposed answer to the supplementation question. We could
add a demonstrative truth to the a priori implication base.
A demonstrative truth D is a set of pairings of representational tokens with the
demonstrata to which those tokens were applied. For example, if I once called a
particular stream ‘water’, then the pair x‘water’, this streamy appears in D. For
every time an agent demonstrated some particular(s) and labeled it as an F, the
pair x F, the demonstrated particular(s)y appears inD. The demonstration and/or
labeling can occur in language, thought, or perception.
The moderate rationalist answer to the supplementation question says that
a necessitation base, in order to become an a priori implication base, must be
semantically neutral and supplemented with an indexical truth and a demon-
strative truth. This base, which we might call N, I, D (N for necessitation, I for
indexical, D for demonstrative), a priori implicates all truths. Because the scope
of a priori reasoning is not as vast as the strong rationalist presumes, a neces-
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sitation base needs additional help to become an a priori implication base. D
provides this help. We get the Moderate Modal Rationalist Link.
(Moderate Modal Rationalist Link): A semantically neutral necessitation
base, supplemented with an indexical truth and a demonstrative truth, a
priori implicates every truth.
The Moderate Rationalist Link remains an interesting form of modal rational-
ism. Let’s call any form of modal rationalism that endorses this link ‘Moderate
(Modal) Rationalism’. Moderate Rationalism satisfies many of section 2.5’s moti-
vations for modal rationalism. Moderate Modal Rationalism retains a prohibi-
tion on brute unexplained metaphysical necessity. All necessary truths can be
explained, on a priori grounds, from the necessitation base combined with the
indexical and demonstrative truths. Like Strong Modal Rationalism, Moderate
Rationalism retains the spirit of the view from above and the factorization view
of the necessary a priori. Moderate rationalists disagree with strong rationalists,
claiming the idealized a priori reasoner needs a little more information (provided
by the demonstrative truth) before she can figure out how to describe all of modal
space. And most importantly, moderate rationalists can claim a strong and im-
portant link between metaphysical necessity and a priori justification.
The Moderate Modal Rationalist Link is an ambitious thesis in the philosophy
of scrutability. NID is a sparse set of truths that falls far short of all truths. It
would be an interesting result and a vindication of the rationalist programme if
all truths could be known on the basis of NID.
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2.7.6 Objection: The Hard Problem of Cats
According to the demonstrative reply, the epistemic gap between the physical
truths (supplemented with the indexical truth I) and the experiential truths is at
least partly result of the meta-semantic importance of demonstratives in gener-
ating the reference of phenomenal terms such as ‘redph’, ‘blueph’, and ‘ticklishph’.
But I’ve claimed that demonstrative applications play a vital meta-semantic role
for non-phenomenal terms as well, including ‘cat’, ‘water’, and ‘Hesperus’. My
story seems to suggest that the importance of demonstratives in generating the
reference of ‘cat’, ‘water’, and ‘Hesperus’, along with the absence of demonstra-
tives in the indexically supplemented physical necessitation base, should lead to
the result that there is also a lack of a priori implication, and an epistemic gap, be-
tween the physical truths and the cat-truths, the water-truths, and the Hesperus-
truths. But there’s a hard problem of consciousness, and no hard problem of cats.
I seem to make the wrong prediction. What gives?
I make several points in response. First, it’s not clear that the “hard problem
of consciousness” should be spelled out as a claim about a priori implication.
There are lots of a posteriori difficulties associated with the scientific study of
consciousness and with placing consciousness in our scientific understanding of
the natural world. It’s doubtful that all the issues associated with “the hard prob-
lem” ultimately trace back to a lack of a priori implication between physics and
consciousness.
Second, I think it’s not so clear that there is a priori implication from the phys-
ical truths to the cat-truths. I think the absence of demonstratives places serious
obstacles to a priori implication of the cat-truths. Without a demonstrative truth
D to tell us what types of creatures we’ve been labeling ‘cat’, we may very well
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be unable to use a priori reasoning from PI to learn all the truths abouts cats.
Third, cats are less mysterious than consciousness for reasons that have noth-
ing to do with a priori implication. We know a lot, a posteriori, about cats and
their properties. We can see how cats and their properties could arise from, and
be metaphysically generated from, the behavior of physical fundamentalia. But
we can’t see, not even in rough sketch, how consciousness could similarly be gen-
erated from the physical. This is an a posteriori fact about our current epistemic
situation - a fact that incorporates all the a posteriori psychology, neuroscience,
and philosophy that has been done up until this point.
Fourth, and most importantly, the considerations of section 2.7.3 (“The Inelim-
inable Connection Between Phenomenal Concepts and Demonstratives”), on the
ineliminability of the connection between demonstratives and representations for
consciousness, offers the disanalogy between the problem of consciousness and
the problem of cats that the objection seeks. The connection between our repre-
sentations of consciousness and demonstrative application to experience is ine-
liminable. There’s no way to get on to consciousness without demonstrating it. In
contrast, some agent could, perhaps using the god-language and the term ‘catg’,
get on to the cats without using demonstratives (or without relying on them in as
heavily a manner as one must for consciousness). The particular hardness of the
problem of consciousness stems, at least in part, from this vital and ineliminable
connection between consciousness and demonstration of it.
2.8 Conclusion
The metaphysical difficulties surrounding the hard problem of consciousness re-
volve around a tension between three claims.
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(Physicalism) All the fundamental constituents of reality are physical.
(Epistemic Gap) There is an epistemic gap between the physical and con-
scious experience.
(Modal Rationalism) There are important connections between metaphys-
ical modality and a priori justification.
Physicalism is a purely metaphysical thesis about the nature of the fundamen-
tal constituents of reality. It has modal commitments as well. The Epistemic Gap,
on the other hand, is soundly epistemic and representational. Modal Rational-
ism gives this epistemic thesis metaphysical bite. One can resolve the tension by
denying physicalism (Chalmers (1996a)) or by denying the epistemic gap (Jack-
son (2005), Braddon-Mitchell (2003)). But the easiest and most popular response
to the master argument is to give up the connection between the epistemic and
the metaphysical that the rationalist posits. There are many ways to do this. One
could reject inferences from conceivability to possibility or reject the search for
the fundamental constituents of reality via the search for a set of truths on the
basis of which all other truths can be known a priori.
However, I believe we should not be so quick to reject modal rationalism.
I have already laid out my reasons. If we can, we should preserve rationalist
connections between the epistemic and the metaphysical, between explanation
and fundamentality, and between modality and the a priori. The Demonstrative
Reply offers an appealing and well-motivated response to the Master Argument
Against Physicalism and the trilemma above. It is compatible with ambitious and
substantive forms of modal rationalism. The Demonstrative Reply should appeal
to the rationalist physicalists, a group of which I proudly count myself a member.
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Chapter 3
Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Ar-
gument∗
Chapter Abstract
According to Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument, Mary, a brilliant neu-
roscientist raised in a black and white room and bestowed with complete phys-
ical knowledge, cannot know certain truths about phenomenal experience. This
claim about knowledge, in turn, implies that physicalism is false. I argue that
the knowledge argument founders on a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know
the relevant experiential truths because of trivial obstacles that have no bearing
on the truth of physicalism or (ii) once the obstacles have been removed, Mary
can know the relevant truths. If we give Mary the epistemological capabilities
necessary to draw metaphysical conclusions about physicalism, she will, while
trapped in the black and white room, be able to know every truth about phenom-
enal experience.
∗This chapter is a revised and improved version of my article “Conceptual Mastery and the
Knowledge Argument”, Philosophical Studies, 54, 125-147, 2011.
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3.1 Introduction†
According to Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument (Jackson (1982, 1986)),
Mary, a brilliant neuroscientist raised in a black and white room and bestowed
with complete physical knowledge, cannot know certain truths about phenom-
enal experience. For example, she can’t know what it’s like to see red. This
claim about knowledge, in turn, implies that physicalism is false. I argue that
the knowledge argument founders on a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know
the relevant experiential truths because of trivial obstacles that have no bearing
on the truth of physicalism or (ii) once the obstacles have been removed, Mary
can know the relevant truths. If we give Mary the epistemological capabilities
necessary to draw metaphysical conclusions about physicalism, she will, while
trapped in the black and white room, be able to know every truth about phenom-
enal experience.1
3.2 Physicalism
Physicalism requires, at the least, that the physical state of the world metaphys-
ically necessitates the complete state of the world. In other words, if you copy
the actual world in all its physical respects, you copy the world in all its respects.
The knowledge argument purports to refute this modal claim. We operationalize
physicalism as follows:
†Thanks to Torin Alter, Ned Block, Bill Brewer, Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, Mark Greenberg,
Brian Rabern, Jonathan Simon, the editors at Philosophical Studies, and audiences at New York
University, the University of Warwick, and UCLA for helpful comments and criticism.
1Phenomenal experiences are associated with raw experiences or sensations. Some examples
include the sensation associated with a pain, the color-experience associated with seeing the sky
(a “blue experience”), or the sensation one has when the back of one’s neck itches. In the words
of Nagel (1974), there is something “it is like” for the subject of a phenomenal experience. I use
the terms ‘phenomenal’ and ‘experiential’ interchangeably.
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Physicalism =def Every austerely physical duplicate of the actual world is a
duplicate simpliciter.2
We duplicate worlds using propositions - if all the same propositions are true
at two worlds, they are duplicates.3 An austerely physical duplicate of the ac-
tual world is a metaphysically possible world at which every austerely physical
propositions true at the actual world is true. A duplicate simpliciter of the actual
world is a world at which every proposition true at the actual world is true. An
austerely physical proposition (or physical proposition) is a proposition composed of
concepts taken only from physics, mathematics, and logic, or which is express-
ible using only vocabulary taken from physics, mathematics, and logic.4 A truth
or fact is a true proposition. What this definition of physicalism says is this: any
possible world with the same austerely physical state as the actual world, i.e.
2In all likelihood, this is not a good definition of physicalism. I prefer a definition in terms of
the notion of fundamentality (cf. Chapter 1). But even if one does not think this a good definition
of physicalism, the modal claim embodied therein is almost certainly a necessary condition for
physicalism. The modal claim is a minimal commitment shared by many forms of physicalism.
The knowledge argument attacks physicalism via this necessary condition. Thus it serves our
purposes here to utilize this operationalized definition.
3Using propositions to account for when two worlds are the same or different requires one
substantive assumption - that any way a world is can be expressed by some proposition. All states
of affairs can be expressed propositionally. This assumption is trivial if we treat propositions as
sets of worlds. I do not treat them as such. I treat propositions in a broadly Fregean manner,
as structured entities composed of concepts. On this understanding of a proposition, there are
some reasons to doubt the assumption, including the possibility of inexpressible states of affairs.
However, such fringe cases are irrelevant to the main narrative here. I will ignore them and treat
the assumption as a given.
4On this terminology, the propositions expressed by ‘2`2 “ 4’ and ‘predicate logic is complete’
are austerely physical. This is slightly odd. I think it helpful to think of the “austerely physical”
propositions as those propositions which are physicalistically respectable. In the debate between the
physicalist and dualist, it is certainly legitimate for the physicalist to appeal to mathematics and
logic. The physicalist claims that our world is, at the fundamental level, purely physical. But this
does not mean that the fundamental layout can be expressed without using any math or logic.
The austerely physical propositions are those to which the physicalist may legitimately appeal to
in describing the world’s fundamental layer (or necessitation base) without jeapordizing his or
her materialist credentials.
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with the same arrangement of quarks, leptons, and bosons, same distribution
of physical properties (mass, charge, spin), and same physical laws, will have
the same complete state as the actual world, including the same distribution of
macroscopic objects and mental states.
I assume a fine-grained, roughly Fregean treatment of propositions.5 On this
approach, the proposition expressed by ‘Hesperus is bright’ is not the same propo-
sition expressed by ‘Phosphorous is bright’. Concepts compose propositions in
a manner similar to that by which words compose sentences. I will use small
capitals to express concepts. ‘HESPERUS’ denotes the Hesperus-concept. On the
Fregean treatment, the propositions HESPERUS IS BRIGHT and PHOSPHOROUS IS
BRIGHT are not the same proposition.
3.3 The Knowledge Argument
Here’s our quick and dirty starting version of the knowledge argument.
(1) Knowledge of all the austerely physical information does not put one
in a position to know all the information.
(2) If (1), then physicalism is false.
(3) Therefore, physicalism is false.
The argument is clearly valid. But is it sound? Neither premise is obvious;
5This assumption is not uncontroversial, but it is dialectically fair. It helps the knowledge
argument, which I plan to argue against. The knowledge argument requires there to be proposi-
tions that Mary cannot know. The Fregean approach individuates propositions more finely than
some other approaches (e.g. Russellian propositions). If Mary cannot know some coarse-grained
proposition, it follows that she can’t know some more fine-grained proposition. The converse
implication does not hold. Thus, using a fine-grained approach makes it easier for the knowledge
argument to achieve its goal of demonstrating the existence of propositions Mary cannot know.
By choosing a fine-grained approach to propositions, I have chosen to battle the knowledge argu-
ment on its preferred terrain. For example, a fine-grained approach to propositions makes it much
more difficult to launch the “same proposition, different mode of presentation” defense against
the knowledge argument (cf. Byrne (2002), Tye (1995)). I’ll argue that, even given a fine-grained
conception of propositions, Mary can know the relevant truths.
142
both have been coherently denied by physicalists.6 Support for premise (2) comes
from theorizing about modality. Support for premise (1) comes from Jackson
(1982, 1986)’s famous thought experiment involving Mary.
Jackson asks us to envision Mary, a “brilliant neuroscientist who is... forced
to investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white tele-
vision monitor. She... acquires... all the physical information there is to obtain
about what goes one when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like
‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on.” Mary has complete physical information, i.e. she knows
every austerely physical proposition, and every proposition that such knowledge
places one in a position to know. Jackson asks whether Mary learns anything new
when she emerges from the black and white room and sees a ripe red tomato for
the first time. He concludes that “it just seems obvious that she will learn some-
thing about the world and our visual experience of it.” Therefore, knowledge of
all the austerely physical information does not put one in a position to know all
the information - i.e. premise (1) is true.7
Premise (2) gets support from the desire to avoid mysterious unexplained
brute necessities and from modal rationalism, according to which there are impor-
tant (potentially constitutive) connections between modality and epistemological
notions like “in a position to know”, “a priori”, and “conceptual truth”.8 The gen-
eral physicalist idea that “all information is physical information”, knowable on
the basis of complete austerely physical information, also supports premise (2).
6Premise (1) has been denied by so-called “type-A” physicalists, premise (2) by so-called “type-
B” physicalists. This terminology originates in Chalmers (2003a).
7Enthymematic here is the claim that if Mary can’t know, no one can.
8Jackson (1998) is the most sustained argument to date for modal rationalism. Cf. also
Chalmers (forthcoming, 1999), Chalmers & Jackson (2001), Levine & Trogdon (2009), and Schwarz
(2007).
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The knowledge argument starts from premises about epistemology (what Mary
can’t know) and draws a metaphysical conclusion: the falsity of physicalism.
Physicalism is a claim about how the world is, not a claim about how we know
about the world. From the start, it should strike the reader as a bit mysteri-
ous how premises about knowledge allow one to draw conclusions about meta-
physics. Unfortunately, I won’t do much to alleviate the mystery here. There are
loads of interesting issues in this area; I will not even begin to explore them.9 In-
stead, my strategy will be to provisionally accept the general idea that one can,
in general, draw metaphysical conclusions from epistemology in the manner that
the knowledge argument does. I’ll argue that one can grant this much and still
resist the knowledge argument.10
The knowledge argument relies on a specific type of inference. The inference
moves from an epistemic gap, the lack of knowability of a target set of proposi-
tions on the basis of a base set, to a metaphysical gap, the lack of necessitation
from the base set to the target proposition(s).11 In the knowledge argument, the
9Interested readers can consult Chalmers (1999, 2012), Jackson (1998), and my dissertation.
10Replying to the knowledge argument in this way, by provisionally granting that one can get
metaphysical bite from epistemological worries, offers significant dialectical advantages. One
could respond to the knowledge argument with the dismissive reply. The dismissive reply rejects
tout court the idea that one can make knowledge argument style inferences from epistemology to
metaphysics. But there are many reasons to accept such inferences. The link between conceiv-
ability and possibility provides one example of an epistemology-to-metaphysics inference. Those
philosophers who want to preserve some form of a rationalist link between epistemology and
metaphysics can’t respond to the knowledge argument using the dismissive reply. They need a
more sophisticated reply. This paper offers such an option.
11A question that may have occurred to the reader is whether we are ever justified in inferring
from the lack of knowability of a target proposition from a base set to the fact that the the base does
not necessitate the target. This issue becomes more pressing when one recognizes the obvious
counterexamples. Even if one possesses all the relevant concepts, knowing that there is water in
the glass does not put one in a position to know that there is H2O in the glass. Yet the fact that
there is water in the glass does necessitate that there is H2O in the glass.
The worry can be addressed and the obvious counterexamples avoided. The modal rationalist
advocates of the general strategy of inferring from an epistemic to a metaphysical gap (e.g. Jack-
son (1998), Chalmers (1996b), Chalmers & Jackson (2001)) do not endorse the general claim that,
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base is the set P of all true austerely physical propositions. The target set con-
tains, at the minimum, one proposition E about phenomenal experience (perhaps
a proposition about what it’s like to see red). Because Mary knows all the propo-
sitions in P, but is not thereby in a position to know E, P does not necessitate E.
Since P does not necessitate E, physicalism is false. Or at least so the knowledge
argument maintains.12
3.4 Roadmap
We’ll see shortly (section 5 - “The Missing Concept Reply”) that the argument
can’t be as simple as I’ve just described. If metaphysical conclusions are to be
drawn from the epistemic gap that Mary’s case indicates, some epistemological
issues must be finessed first. Much of the paper will be spent finessing those
issues. However, before diving in, it will be helpful to frame the dialectic and
outline the moves to come. The knowledge argument starts from the lack of an
epistemic relationship between the set of physical propositions P and the target
for any propositions B and T, if knowing B does not put one in a position to know T, B does not
necessitate T.
The inference to a metaphysical gap is valid only for a special class of base propositions. There
is insufficient space for a full treatment here. One strategy is to require that, in order to draw con-
clusions about necessitation from facts about epistemic implication, the base propositions must
be semantically neutral - i.e. not “twin-earthable”. Famously, Putnam (1975) showed that ‘water’
is not semantically neutral. It is plausible that the vocabulary of fundamental physics, the vocab-
ulary in which the austerely physical description P is written, is semantically neutral. Anything
that acts like an electron is an electron, whereas something can act like water and be XYZ, not
water. Even if the fundamental vocabulary of physics is not semantically neutral, this merely in-
troduces an epicycle on the dialectic (cf. Chalmers (1996b): 135-6). Another important difference
between the proposition that there is water in the glass and the proposition P under considera-
tion in the knowledge argument is that, according to the physicalist, P necessitates all the facts - it
leaves the truth value of no proposition unsettled. The proposition that there is water in the glass
has no such pretensions.
12There are other ways to construe the knowledge argument. I do not consider them all here.
I deal only with the knowledge argument construed as an attack on the modal commitments of
physicalism. These commitments are represented in the operationalized definition of physicalism
from page 2, which claims that the austerely physical state of the world necessitates the complete
state. As I construe it, the knowledge argument challenges this claim.
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experiential propositions. This epistemic relationship must meet two desider-
ata. First, its absence must be good evidence for a lack of necessitation. Second,
this epistemological relationship must fail to hold between the austerely physical
propositions P and certain experiential propositions. Evidence for the failure of
this epistemological relation comes from considering what Mary can and cannot
know. She is our litmus test. I introduce a technical term, implication (verb form:
implicate), to express an epistemic relationship that might meet the desiderata.
‘Implicate’ allows us to express the following schema for the knowledge argu-
ment:
(1) P does not implicate some proposition E about phenomenal experience.
(2) If P does not implicate E, then P does not necessitate E, and physicalism is false.
(3) Therefore, physicalism is false.
Substituting for ‘implicate’ here yields different versions of the knowledge ar-
gument. A candidate notion of implication meets the two desiderata above if
and only if it validates both premises. One upshot of this paper is that finding
such a conception of epistemological implication is difficult. The rest of the pa-
per will be spent considering three different candidate notions of implication. All
such candidates founder on one premise or the other. The final result is that the
knowledge argument fails. In the next section I consider the most obvious notion
of epistemological implication:
• (Implication = in a position to know) B implicates T iff any agent who
knows all the propositions in B is thereby in a position to know T. (‘B’ stands
for base, ‘T’ for target).
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I’ll argue that this conception of implication fails to vindicate the second premise
of the knowledge argument schema. Inferring a lack of necessitation from a fail-
ure of implication in the “in a position to know” sense is a mistake. The basic
reason is that the agent might know the propositions in B but not possess the
concepts composing the propositions in T and thereby be unable to know T be-
cause the agent cannot even consider T. But this type of failure shows nothing
about necessitation (see p. 7-8).
In section 6 (“The Conceptual Mastery Reply”), I consider a more sophisti-
cated version of implication:
• (Implication = in a position to know given concept possession) B impli-
cates T iff any agent who (i) knows all the propositions in B and (ii) pos-
sesses all the concepts in T is thereby in a position to know T.
I’ll argue that this conception of implication also fails to vindicate the second
premise, and does so for reasons largely similar to the previous conception.
The final, and most sophisticated conception of implication goes as follows:
• (Implication = in a position to know given conceptual mastery) B impli-
cates T iff any agent who (i) knows all the propositions in B and (ii) has
mastered all the concepts in T is thereby in a position to know T.
For this conception of implication to make sense to the reader, I’ll need to distin-
guish between two relations one can have to a concept. One can possess a concept
or one can master a concept. I explain the difference in section 6. In sections 8-9,
I’ll argue that this conception of implication fails to vindicate the first premise
(unlike the first two conceptions, which failed to vindicate the second premise).
In other words, once Mary has mastered the concepts in the experiential propo-
sition E, she will, given knowledge of all the austerely physical propositions in
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P, be able to know E. In effect, I claim that once we target the appropriate episte-
mological relationship - “in a position to know, given conceptual mastery” - the
basic claim of the knowledge argument fails. Despite being raised in the black
and white room, Mary will be in a position to know every truth about conscious
phenomenal experience.
In the end, I propose that the knowledge argument founders on the following
dilemma:
(The Dilemma) Either Mary does not have conceptual mastery of experien-
tial concepts, in which case we cannot draw any metaphysical conclusions
on the basis of what she can and cannot know, or Mary does have concep-
tual mastery, and, with the help of knowledge allotted to her by the infor-
mational assumption, she will be able to know all the relevant experiential
propositions.
The informational assumption says that if some proposition is necessitated by P,
then Mary can know it. Proponents of the knowledge argument need the infor-
mational assumption (the argument’s second premise is an instance of the as-
sumption’s contrapositive). I plan to wield it against them. In section 8 (“The
Informational Assumption and the Second Horn”), I’ll discuss in detail both this
dilemma and the informational assumption.
3.5 The Missing Concept Reply
Consider the following version of the knowledge argument (copied from above):
(1) Knowledge of all the austerely physical information does not put one
in a position to know all the information.
(2) If (1), then physicalism is false.
(3) Therefore, physicalism is false.
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The knowledge argument, as stated, does not stand a chance. It is a mistake to
conclude that a base set of propositions does not necessitate a target proposition
from the fact that someone who knows the base propositions is not in a position
to know the target. An agent might know the base propositions but not even
possess the concepts in the target proposition. As a result, the agent won’t be in a
position to know the target propositions - because he or she can’t even consider
them! But an epistemic gap of this nature shows nothing about necessitation. The
following example demonstrates why. Imagine that Mary’s sister Jane knows all
the information in P, all the information about the state of Ralph’s body, includ-
ing where he does and does not have inflammation. But Jane does not possess,
and is not in a position to possess, the concept ARTHRITIS. Jane knows that Ralph
does not have rheumatoid inflammation in any of his joints. Ralph has aches and
pains, but no arthritis. But Jane does not know, and is not in a position to know,
that Ralph does not have arthritis. She can’t know because she does not possess
the concept ARTHRITIS. If we infer from this epistemological gap to a metaphys-
ical gap, we’ll conclude that Ralph’s lacking inflammation of the joints does not
necessitate that he does not have arthritis. But clearly this is false. Arthritis just is
rheumatoid inflammation of the joints. If Ralph lacks inflammation in his joints,
he thereby lacks arthritis. Ralph’s lacking inflammation in the joints does necessi-
tate that he does not have arthritis.
The lesson is that if we’re going to infer from an epistemic gap between two
propositions (or sets of propositions) to a lack of necessitation, and we test for
the epistemic gap by checking what hypothetical agents could come to know, we
must require that these agents possess the concepts in the target proposition, or at
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least are in a position to possess them.13 The fact that Jane, who does not possess
the concept ARTHRITIS, can’t know that Ralph lacks arthritis despite knowing
that he has no joint inflammation, shows nothing about a lack of necessitation be-
tween the propositions RALPH HAS NO JOINT INFLAMMATION and RALPH DOES
NOT HAVE ARTHRITIS.
In the case of Mary, it is plausible that Mary does not possess the relevant
phenomenal concepts.14 For example, consider the concept REDexp. REDexp is the
phenomenal, experiential, concept of red. REDexp applies to experiences with a
certain qualitative character (you know the one). Neither light-waves nor objects
can be redexp. Tomatoes, fire trucks, and strawberries are red, but they cause
redexp sensations.15 The English term ‘red’ is likely polysemous between, or a
mongrel of, the red-concepts of light waves, of surfaces, and of sensations. I
introduce a new term, ‘redexp’, and concept REDexp, to lock on to the type of red
that only sensations can instantiate.
The fact that Mary has never had a redexp experience, cannot imagine a redexp
sensation, and could not recognize a redexp sensation as redexp were she to have
one, supports the claim that Mary does not possess the concept REDexp. With the
13One might object that Jane is at least in a position to possess the concept ARTHRITIS - all she
need do is combine the concepts RHEUMATOID, INFLAMMATION, OF, THE, and JOINTS. In reply, I
make three points. First, it’s far from clear that Mary does possess those concepts. She clearly has
all the austerely physical concepts. But it’s highly doubtful that the concept INFLAMMATION can
be generated by combination from austerely physical concepts like QUARK and MASS. Second,
it’s not clear that ARTHRITIS is merely a composite of those other concepts. Lacking inflammation
of the joints can necessitate lacking arthritis without ARTHRITIS being a composite of the concepts
INFLAMMATION, OF, THE, and JOINTS. Third point: Suppose that Mary is in a position to possess
ARTHRITIS. It still remains true that were Mary not in a position to possess ARTHRITIS (perhaps
per impossibilia), then one should not infer from her inability to know that Ralph lacks arthritis to
the claim that Ralph’s lack of joint inflammation does not necessitate that he lacks arthritis. Thus
even if the objection holds, the lesson remains: don’t infer lack of necessitation from a case in
which the epistemic agents is not in a position to possess concepts in the target propositions.
14I use the terms ‘experiential concept’ and ‘phenomenal concept’ interchangeably.
15All tomatoes mentioned in this paper are ripe tomatoes with brilliant red skins.
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“concept possession requirement” in place, the physicalist has an easy reply to
the knowledge argument - deny premise (2). It is foolish to conclude, from the
fact that Mary’s knowledge of base physical propositions does not put her in a
position to know target experiential propositions, that the base does not necessi-
tate the target. Mary can’t even consider the target propositions because she does
not possess the concepts that compose them! Only an inability to know, for an
epistemic agent that possesses (or is in a position to possess) all the concepts in
the target propositions, has any hope of yielding the desired metaphysical conse-
quences.16
This discussion yields an obvious suggestion for how to fix the knowledge
argument. Perhaps “B implicates T” means that any agent who has knowledge
of B, and possesses all the concepts in T, is thereby in a position to know T. In the
next section I argue that this suggestion fails.
3.6 The Conceptual Mastery Reply
Some philosophers have pointed out that Mary, raised in her black and white
room, can possess the relevant experiential concepts.17 She can acquire them from
her co-workers, who have seen ripe red tomatoes and the big blue sky. Mary
won’t have as good a grasp of these concepts as her co-workers. After all, Mary
has never experienced redexp. But Mary will at least possess the relevant concepts
and be able to grasp propositions that contain them.18 However, it seems that
16Byrne (2006), Hellie (2004):348, ?:474-5, and Tye (2000):17-8 all make similar points. They
all note that one cannot draw any substantive conclusion from the Mary case if Mary does not
possess experiential concepts and cannot even consider the experiential propositions in question.
17Ball (2009) and Tye (2009), among others, make this point.
18A full defense of the claim that Mary can possess the relevant concepts in this way would take
us too far afield. It is certainly the consensus view in philosophical research on content. Here’s a
brief argument for the claim. If Mary thinks that the sky causes redexp sensations, her thought is
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Mary’s acquisition of these concepts from her co-workers won’t help her learn
the missing experiential information. If so, then Mary can possess all the concepts
in the target experiential propositions, know all the austerely physical proposi-
tions, and yet still not be in a position to know the experiential propositions. The
knowledge argument can overcome the objection raised in the previous section
and adapt to incorporate its lesson, which is that the relevant epistemic agents
must possess the concepts in the target proposition.
In this section, I argue that we need additional constraints on implication. We
should not infer from “knowledge that B does not put someone who possesses
all the concepts in T in a position to know that T” to the fact that B does not
necessitate T. Possessing the concepts in T is not enough; we must require more
of the epistemic agent.
There are (at least) two different levels of understanding a concept. The first is
concept possession. If one is able to grasp propositions that contain the concept, or
think propositions a component of which is the concept, then one possesses the
concept. Concept possession is easy to obtain. Burge (1979)’s Alfred possesses
the concept ARTHRITIS, but Alfred does not know what every doctor knows -
that arthritis affects joints and not limbs. Some of the doctors have a more so-
phisticated and demanding relation to the concept ARTHRITIS - they have con-
ceptual mastery. The proverbial “experts”, to which laymen defer, often possess
wrong - the sky causes blueexp sensations, not redexp ones. This is so because her thought has the
same truth-conditions the thought we would express with ‘the sky causes redexp sensations’ does.
It has the same truth conditions because it contains the same concepts, which contribute to the
truth-conditions of the complete thought. Mary’s concept has the same veridicality conditions
our concept REDexp does. Therefore, Mary thinks with the same REDexp concept the rest of us do.
Here’s another brief argument: If Mary does not think with our REDexp concept, she thinks with
some other idiosyncratic concept (perhaps her REDexp concept is similar to our BLUEexp concept).
Interpreting her charitably, her idiosyncratic thought is most likely correct. But her thought is not
correct; she is wrong. Therefore she does not think with another concept.
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conceptual mastery. One can possess a concept and still be grossly wrong about
its extension, and even about constitutive a priori truths regarding the concept.
Conceptual mastery is less tolerant of such errors.19
Once we have distinguished these two levels of understanding a concept, we
can improve our grip on the connection between epistemic gaps and absence of
necessitation. We said above that when inferring from lack of implication to lack
of necessitation, only lack of knowability for agents who possess all concepts in
the target proposition is relevant. We can do better: only lack of knowability for
agents who have mastery of all concepts in the target proposition is relevant. The
following example demonstrates why.
Imagine again Mary’s sister Jane. By engaging with her co-workers, Jane
comes to possess the concept ARTHRITIS. She knows that Esther, who has a
rheumatoid inflammation in her knee, has arthritis. She knows that Hilary does
not have arthritis. But Jane is not a master of the concept ARTHRITIS; she thinks
that one can have arthritis in the forearm. Jane has complete knowledge of P
and knowledge of who has what type of inflammation where. She knows that
Ralph does not have any ailments of the joints, but he does have inflammation in
his forearm. Unlike the previous case, because Jane now possesses the concept
ARTHRITIS, she can consider the proposition that Ralph does not have arthritis.
19The distinction between concept possession and conceptual mastery also appears in Green-
berg (MS, 2009) and Bealer (2002b). Of course, the distinction has its roots in the seminal discus-
sions of Burge (1979) and Burge (1986). Mark Greenberg deserves credit for stressing to me the
importance of the distinction and the pitfalls into which philosophers can fall when they ignore
or pay insufficient attention to it. In several places (Ibid.), Greenberg uses an argumentative strat-
egy similar to the one I adopt here. His use pre-dates mine. The strategy involves identifying a
philosophical argument or position that implicitly assumes that possession of a concept entails
mastery. (This assumption is often masked by an ambiguity, between possession and mastery, in
the terminology of “understanding / possessing a concept”). This assumption undermines the
position. Once we restrict attention to cases in which the assumption holds, the argument fails to
accomplish its goal. For example, I will argue (sections 8-9) that once we focus on cases in which
Mary has conceptual mastery, she can know the target experiential propositions.
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But because of her erroneous view that one can have arthritis in non-joints, Jane
will not come to know that Ralph does not have arthritis. If we don’t require,
in the inference from an epistemic to a metaphysical gap, that the relevant epis-
temic agents have conceptual mastery (i.e. if mere concept possession is enough),
then we will be forced to conclude, on the basis of Jane’s inability to know that
Ralph does not have arthritis, that Ralph’s lacking any ailment of the joints does
not necessitate that he does not have arthritis. But that conclusion is preposter-
ous. Thus, we must require, if we are to infer from a lack of implication to a
corresponding lack of necessitation, that the epistemic agents have mastery of all
concepts in the target proposition(s).20
The conceptual mastery requirement offers a reply to the amended version of
the knowledge argument in which Mary does possess experiential concepts such
as REDexp.21 Mary, despite coming to possess the concept REDexp via interaction
with her co-workers, does not have conceptual mastery. In order to have con-
ceptual mastery of REDexp, one must be able to identify a redexp sensation when
experiencing one. One might also maintain that conceptual mastery of REDexp
requires that one have experienced redexp and/or be able to imagine a redexp
patch. Mary has never had a redexp experience, is unable to imagine a redexp
sensation, and cannot identify a redexp experience as an instance of her concept
REDexp. Therefore, she does not have conceptual mastery of REDexp. As a result,
Mary’s inability to know propositions containing REDexp on the basis of the aus-
terely physical information shows nothing about necessitation. Only if such an
20For obvious reasons, the epistemic agent must have conceptual mastery of all concepts in the
base propositions as well.
21The missing concept reply has appeared in the literature before (e.g. Hellie (2004), Loar (1990),
?, and Tye (2000)). To the best of my knowledge, the “conceptual mastery” reply has not.
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epistemic gap occurs for an agent with mastery of REDexp can we begin to make
claims about necessitation.22
3.7 Aside: The Phenomenal Concept Strategy
The philosophical study of conscious experience and the way we think about it
has fostered a large body of literature on phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal con-
cepts characterize the nature of conscious phenomenal experience by the way
those experiences feel to the subject. REDexp is one such concept. In this sec-
tion, I take a moment to highlight some applications of the points made thus far
to the so-called “phenomenal concept strategy” and to phenomenal concepts in
general. The phenomenal concept strategy responds to the knowledge argument
and its siblings (such as the zombie argument) by appealing to special features of
phenomenal concepts to explain how a lack of epistemic implication between the
physical and the experiential truths could be compatible with physicalism.23 The
strategy locates the problem in our ways of thinking about consciousness rather
than in the metaphysics of consciousness.
In section 5, we considered one implementation of the phenomenal concept
strategy, “the missing concept reply”, which uses facts about the conditions un-
der which a thinker can possess a phenomenal concept to defend against the
knowledge argument. In this section, I will argue that fans of the phenomenal
concept strategy have misplaced their allegiance. They have focused too much on
concept possession and not enough on conceptual mastery. Switching to concep-
22Thus far, I’ve argued that if we are to draw conclusions about necessitation, we must require
that the epistemic agents we use to check for an epistemic gap must both possess and have con-
ceptual mastery of the relevant concepts. I will not argue the point here, but I actually think that
even more is required. Cf. Rabin (MS).
23Cf. Chalmers (2003a): 107 for the zombie argument.
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tual mastery yields a vastly improved version of the phenomenal concept strat-
egy. The conceptual mastery oriented incarnation of the phenomenal concept
strategy I suggest is more powerful, less vulnerable, and more plausible than
previous versions.
In a strict sense, this section is not part of paper’s main argument. But for
many readers, especially those familiar with the vast literature on the phenome-
nal concept strategy (by far the dominant response to the knowledge argument),
this section should prove interesting enough to merit its inclusion. The impatient
reader can skip to the next section. For later argumentation, the only essential
information from this section is the introduction of the three candidate require-
ments on possession and/or mastery of a phenomenal concept (which can be
found immediately below).
We can delineate three different requirements on possession of an experien-
tial/phenomenal concept.
• Experiential requirement: Possession of a phenomenal concept requires hav-
ing had experiences that fall under the concept.
• Imaginative requirement: Possession of a phenomenal concept requires the
ability to imagine instances of the experiential quality that falls under the
concept.
• Recognitional requirement: Possession of a phenomenal concept requires the
ability to recognize experiences that fall under the concept as falling under
the concept.
Fans of the phenomenal concept strategy have endorsed versions of these re-
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quirements, and others still.24 I deny them all; concept possession is too easy to
obtain.
Historically, many defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy have en-
dorsed the experiential requirement on possession of a phenomenal concept. Pa-
pineau (1998): 5 writes that anyone “who has never seen anything red cannot
deploy a phenomenal concept of red visual experience.” According to this line,
Mary has not experienced redexp and does not possess the concept REDexp. Since
she cannot consider the relevant propositions, her inability to know them demon-
strates nothing about physicalism. This strategy has been popular, but less than
effective.
Once the possibility of possessing a concept without mastery, potentially through
deference to others, is recognized, the experiential requirement looks implausi-
ble. Blind people, who have never seen redexp, can possess the concept REDexp.
They can truly think and say, “Tomatoes cause redexp experiences.” Ball (2009)
and Tye (2009) correctly press this objection against the experiential requirement
and its use against the knowledge argument.25 They point out that one can run
a knowledge argument in which Mary does possess the relevant phenomenal
concepts, but in which this possession will not help her learn the truths about ex-
24Papineau (1998): 5 endorses the experiential requirement. Loar (1990) endorses the recogni-
tional requirement. For a good discussion cf. ?.
25Ball (2009) and Tye (2009) use the term ‘phenomenal concept’ for any concept possession of
which requires having had experiences that fall under that concept. On this terminology, the
experiential requirement on possession of a phenomenal concept is true by definition. Ball de-
nies that there are any such concepts. But neither Ball nor Tye denies that there are experiential
or phenomenal concepts in my sense - concepts that characterize experiences by the way those
experiences feel to the subject. Ball and Tye also use the term ‘phenomenal concept strategy’
for a response to the knowledge argument that endorses the experiential requirement on posses-
sion of experiential/phenomenal concepts. I use ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ more generally,
applying it to any view that appeals to special features of experiential or phenomenal concepts
to explain how necessitation from the physical to the experiential is compatible with a lack of
epistemic implication.
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perience (this is effectively the version of the argument I suggested at the begin-
ning of section 6). Unfortunately, this move does not cut much ice. As argued in
the previous section, the epistemic capabilities of someone who merely possesses
the concept indicate nothing about necessitation, and hence cannot be brought to
bear on the question of physicalism. Epistemic considerations involving agents
with less than conceptual mastery are simply a non-starter.
The experiential, imaginative, and recognitional requirements on concept pos-
session have obvious analogs for conceptual mastery. I do not bother to state
them. All three requirements are more plausible for conceptual mastery than for
concept possession. One can’t draw metaphysical conclusions from absence of
epistemic implication unless the epistemic agents have conceptual mastery. Thus,
as a reply to the knowledge argument, an experiential requirement on concep-
tual mastery of experiential/phenomenal concepts can do all the same work as
an experiential requirement on possession. But the experiential requirement on
conceptual mastery of REDexp is not subject to the Ball/Tye-style criticism from
deference. The original experiential requirement (on possession) looks bad be-
cause it’s very plausible that Mary can possess REDexp without ever having had a
redexp experience. She can acquire the concept from others who have had redexp
experiences. On the other hand, it’s not obvious that Mary can have conceptual
mastery of REDexp without having had such an experience. I advise fans of the
original experiential requirement to transfer their allegiances to the experiential
requirement on conceptual mastery. It can do all the same work in replying to the
knowledge argument without incurring the obvious costs.26 Furthermore, once
26Alter (forthcoming) replies to Ball (2009) and Tye (2009) in a similar way, and offers the same
advice. He also makes the important observation that the epistemic capabilities of mere posses-
sors of a concept are not good indicators of metaphysical necessitation. However, this observation
plays a far less central role in his discussion than in mine. Alter has his own version of the concept
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we distinguish between concept possession and conceptual mastery, the concep-
tual mastery reply is a natural extension of the original phenomenal concept strat-
egy.
I neither endorse nor deny the experiential or the imaginative requirement on
conceptual mastery of experiential concepts. The experiential requirement seems
counterexample-able by a “swamp case”. Take a conceptual master of REDexp.
Imagine an atom-by-atom duplicate, generated by erratic random forces in the
swamp mist. It is plausible that the duplicate will have conceptual mastery of
REDexp despite never having seen a red thing. Whether one can be a concep-
tual master of REDexp without satisfying the imaginative requirement seems more
questionable. However, one might be willing to attribute conceptual mastery to
creatures who lacked certain cognitive imaginative capacities, but nonetheless
had experienced redexp and were very reliable in their redexp judgements.
Perhaps the requirements can be softened by including a clause about “nor-
mal conditions” - i.e. conditions that allow for exceptions involving erratic swamp
forces, genies, and fantastical neuro-surgery. Officially, I endorse only the recog-
nitional requirement on conceptual mastery of experiential concepts.27 How-
possession / conceptual mastery distinction. He uses the terminology of possessing a concept un-
der a “deferential” or “non-deferential” mode of presentation. This terminology is misleading for
two reasons. First, on the most natural extension of Fregean modes of presentation to our cur-
rent framework, concepts are modes of presentation. Talk of modes of presentation of modes of
presentation is misleading at best. Second, whether an individual defers to someone else, in the
sense of accepting correction regarding the use of his or her concept, is only a defeasible guide
to whether he or she has mere concept possession or mastery. One can use the term ‘deferen-
tial possession’ as a technical term for “possessing a concept without conceptual mastery, in a
manner similar to Burge’s arthritis-man does”. But if deferential possession is defined in this way,
then there is an open question about whether the fact that an individual defers, in the sense of
accepting correction, implies anything about whether he “deferentially possesses” the concept in
the defined sense.
27Disclaimer for the counterexample mongerers: I don’t endorse the crazy version of the recog-
nitional requirement. A conceptual master of BLUEexp need not be infallible in her blueexp judge-
ments. If she is drunk, temporarily mentally impaired, or some such thing, all bets are off.
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ever, even without the experiential requirement on conceptual mastery, it remains
quite plausible that Mary does not have conceptual mastery of REDexp. Her inabil-
ity to know experiential propositions cannot be wielded against physicalism.
3.8 The Informational Assumption and the Second Horn
The second premise of the Knowledge Argument requires an inference of the
following type: “P does not implicate T, therefore P does not necessitate T.” The
contrapositive of this inference is: “P necessitates T, therefore P implicates T.” In
this section, we turn our attention to this contrapositive. I lay out the Informational
Assumption, which says that Mary can know every proposition necessitated by P.
The knowledge argument needs the informational assumption for two reasons.
First, the informational assumption provides the link between epistemology and
metaphysics on which the knowledge argument relies. Second, not making the
informational assumption hands the physicalist an easy reply to the knowledge
argument.
Suppose the informational assumption is false. Then there is some proposi-
tion R (perhaps the proposition that the rate of inflation in Australia is increasing),
necessitated by P, that Mary cannot know. Suppose also that premise (1) of the
knowledge argument is true - despite complete physical knowledge, Mary can’t
know that tomatoes cause redexp sensations. The dualist wants to conclude that
P does not necessitate that tomatoes cause redexp sensations (they could have
caused blueexp sensations instead). But the existence of exceptions to the infor-
mational assumption gives the physicalist an immediate reply. She’ll say that
the proposition that tomatoes cause redexp sensations is, like R, one among many
propositions that are necessitated by P yet not knowable by Mary. To cut off this
reply the dualist needs the informational assumption – there are no propositions
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like R.
From here on, we make the informational assumption, and assume that Mary,
using her knowledge of P, can know every proposition necessitated by P.28 With
the help of the informational assumption, we precisify the basic dilemma of this
paper.
The Dilemma: Either Mary does not have conceptual mastery of experien-
tial concepts, in which case we cannot draw any metaphysical conclusions
on the basis of what she can and cannot know, or Mary does have concep-
tual mastery, and, with the help of knowledge allotted to her by the infor-
mational assumption, she will be able to know all the relevant experiential
propositions.
The dilemma is related to my claim that it is difficult to find a notion of epis-
temic implication that satisfies both premises of the knowledge argument schema
of section 4 (page 5). On the first horn of the dilemma, Mary lacks conceptual
mastery, and we cannot draw metaphysical conclusions from her case. On any
notion of implication that does not require epistemic agents to have conceptual
28The dualist can accept some exceptions to the informational assumption without weakening
her dialectical position. For example, suppose dualism is true and the experiential truths are not
necessitated by the austerely physical state of the world described in P. Let ‘Bob’ be a name
whose reference is fixed by the description ‘the actual greenest thing in the universe’. Suppose
Bob is, in fact, a meadow in Vermont. It is plausible that the proposition BOB HAS SURFACE AREA
OF MORE THAN 10 M.2 is necessitated by P despite the fact that someone who knows P will not
(if dualism is true) be in a position to know it (because he or she will not be in a position to know
the experiential facts about greenexp). We seem to have a counterexample to the informational
assumption. The lesson is that the knowledge argument is compatible with the existence of some
propositions that are both necessitated by P and not knowable on the basis of P.
Advocates of the knowledge argument must hope that there are not too many exceptions to
the informational assumption. Every exception opens up space for the physicalist to reply to the
knowledge argument with the claim that the proposition that tomatoes cause redexp sensations is
also an exception, and hence Mary’s inability to know it does not demonstrate a lack of necessita-
tion. Thankfully, the exceptions look to be of a special sort. Many of them will contain rigidified
descriptions involving phenomena not necessitated by the physical (e.g. dualistic experiential
properties). In this paper, the informational assumption will be brought to bear only on proposi-
tions that are not of this special type. If the reader thought that many or most terms (or concepts)
were rigidified versions of phenomenal descriptions, then the informational assumption would
not be of much use. I assume this is not the case.
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mastery, premise (2) of the schema is false. On the second horn, Mary has con-
ceptual mastery. But this mastery, in combination with the knowledge allotted
to Mary by the informational assumption, will generate an epistemic route to
knowledge of experiential propositions. On this horn, premise (1) of the schema
is false - Mary can know.
I have already argued for the first horn of the dilemma. In the next section
I argue for the second horn. I demonstrate exactly how Mary’s conceptual mas-
tery of, e.g. REDexp, in combination with the informational assumption, yields an
epistemic route to knowledge that, e.g., tomatoes cause redexp sensations.
Advocates of the knowledge argument grant that the informational assump-
tion gives Mary knowledge of every proposition necessitated by P. But the du-
alist and physicalist disagree about which propositions these are. The physicalist
claims that experiential propositions are necessitated; the dualist denies. In or-
der to wield the informational assumption against the knowledge argument, we
must apply it only to propositions the dualist admits P necessitates. I introduce
a heuristic - the zombie heuristic - for determining which propositions these are.
To determine whether the dualist grants that P necessitates a proposition, check
whether the proposition is true at both the actual and zombie worlds. The zom-
bie world is an austerely physical duplicate of the actual world that contains no
experiential properties. Zombies walk the walk and talk the talk (they even do
zombie philosophy), but there is nothing “it is like” to be a zombie.
Our basic strategy is to play along with the dualist, using the zombie world to
get him to agree that certain propositions are necessitated by P, and thus know-
able by Mary. We then use Mary’s knowledge to refute the claim that Mary cannot
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know that tomatoes cause redexp sensations.29 Consider some applications of the
heuristic. Rocks exist at both the actual and zombie worlds; the dualist grants that
P necessitates that rocks exist. By the informational assumption, Mary knows that
rocks exist. More interestingly, the dualist acknowledges that people in both the
zombie and actual worlds enter neural state N whenever they see a ripe tomato.
Thus P necessitates the proposition that a person enters neural state N whenever
they see a ripe tomato; Mary can know it. On the other hand, the dualist denies
that, at both the actual and zombie worlds, people experience redexp whenever
they enter neural state N. The zombie heuristic tells us we cannot assume, via the
informational assumption, that Mary knows this.30
I offer a brief clarification of how I use the term ‘dualist’. There are many vari-
eties of dualist. Not all of them accept the metaphysical possibility of the zombie
world. Nor are all dualists proponents of the knowledge argument. Here, when
I speak of “the dualist”, I intend those who, at the least, deny the operational-
ized modal definition of physicalism from page 2. The knowledge argument, as
I construe it here, attacks this modal claim and thereby physicalism itself. My
target here is the dualist who attempts to use the knowledge argument to yield
anti-physicalist results about necessitation relations between the physical and the
experiential. However, even this type of dualist need not accept the metaphysical
possibility of zombies. However, they must accept the metaphysical possibility
of worlds that are like the zombie world in the sense that they are austerely phys-
29Use of the zombie heuristic does not require that the zombie world be metaphysically possi-
ble.
30The zombie heuristic is fallible. A proposition might be true at both the actual and zombie
worlds, but false at some other world where P is true. Maybe there are exotic worlds at which P
is true but rocks do not exist. This is unlikely, but a proposition’s truth at the actual and zombie
worlds does not guarantee its necessitation by P. Here, we apply the informational assumption
only to propositions that are plausibly necessitated by P and granted by dualists as such.
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ical, but not complete, duplicates of the actual world. Any dualist who uses the
knowledge argument to establish such possibilities must accept the informational
assumption. We can then use something like the zombie heuristic to wield the in-
formational assumption against them. Rather than concoct a variety of heuristics
for each variety of dualist, I’ll lump them all together and pretend they all ac-
cept the possibility of zombies. What really matters is that all such dualists, in
order to wield the knowledge argument, must grant the informational assump-
tion. The zombie heuristic is merely a method for gauging what knowledge the
informational assumption gives Mary.
The informational assumptions gives epistemological considerations meta-
physical bite. It allows dualists to infer from a lack of epistemic implication (and
Mary’s inability to know) to a lack of metaphysical necessitation. But the infor-
mational assumption is a two-edged sword. It also cuts the other way. I’ll use the
informational assumption to infer from the fact that a truth is necessitated to the
claim that the truth is implicated by the austerely physical truths. I’ll argue that,
in fact, enough truths are implicated in this way to get Mary, while still in the
black and white room, knowledge of all the truths about conscious experience.
3.9 Lonely Mary and the Pincer Argument
In order to draw metaphysical conclusions from what Mary can and cannot know,
we must insist that Mary has conceptual mastery of experiential concepts, in-
cluding REDexp. In the knowledge argument as originally described, Mary did
not have such mastery. But there is an obvious suggestion for how to proceed.
If Mary did have conceptual mastery of REDexp, would she be able to know the
troublesome experiential propositions?
There are a variety of ways we could give Mary conceptual mastery of expe-
164
riential concepts. We might let her out of the black and white room and allow
her to experience redexp (and other colors), then re-capture her and give her an
amnesia pill which eradicates her knowledge of what color experience tomatoes
cause.31 She’d then have experienced redexp, greenexp, and blueexp, and plausible
have mastery of the associated concepts. But she would not yet know which of
those color experiences is caused by tomatoes, and which by the sky. If she can’t
come to know, despite her conceptual mastery, then the knowledge argument
would survive my criticisms thus far. We might also give Mary conceptual mas-
tery by performing neuro-surgery that allowed her to imagine color experiences.
Allowing Mary out of the black and white room, or performing neuro-surgery
on her, introduces complications that I wish to avoid. The staunch defender of the
knowledge argument might deny both the experiential and imaginative require-
ments on conceptual mastery of REDexp. In order to give my argument widest
possible appeal, I adopt the following strategy. I deprive myself of argumen-
tative resources to avoid taking for granted anything with which the dedicated
defender of the knowledge argument could take issue. In particular, I will not
assume that conceptual mastery of a phenomenal concept requires either having
had experiences of or the ability to imagine the relevant qualities.
Here is the most difficult Mary case I have been able to cook up. Suppose that
Mary (a) is the only person ever to have existed, (b) never leaves the black and
white room, (c) has never experienced a redexp sensation, (d) cannot imagine a
redexp sensation, but has conceptual mastery of redexp nonetheless.32 By making
31The use of “re-captured Mary”, or a version of Mary who has had the relevant experiences,
appears in Lewis (1988), Nida-Rumelin (1996), and ?. They all use re-captured Mary as a method
of enabling Mary to possess phenomenal concepts. Here, I’m suggesting re-capturing Mary as a
method for giving her conceptual mastery, not mere possession.
32In Rabin (2011a) (sections 9-10), I discuss Mary cases in which Mary is not the only person
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these assumptions I make it exceedingly difficult to argue that Mary can know.
But I shall argue that even having granted the proponent of the knowledge argu-
ment this much, Mary can still know all the experiential propositions. All Mary
needs is the recognitional ability to recognize a redexp experience were she to have
one, along with the knowledge granted her by the informational assumption. (Of
course, there is a mystery here about how Mary came to acquire conceptual mas-
tery (or even possession) of the concept REDexp. Remember the dialectic: I wish
to make no assumptions about how Mary acquires mastery and only minimal
assumptions about what mastery requires, so that opponents cannot take issue
with such assumptions.)
Before launching into the pincer argument, just below, I offer a comment for
the reader. The pincer argument is difficult to understand. I’ll present the mate-
rial as clearly as I am able. However, the confused, annoyed, or impatient reader
should feel free to skim this material and/or skip ahead to sections 10 and/or 11.
In section 10 I consider objections to the pincer argument and the paper in gen-
eral. In section 11 I expand the discussion and consider some big picture issues
and the overall philosophical upshot.
The pincer argument goes as follows:
(1) Mary can know that tomatoes cause her to think a thought of the form THIS
SENSATION IS R.
(2) Mary can know that the semantic value of the ‘R’ part of this thought is the
ever to have existed, Mary leaves the black and white room, and Mary experiences redexp. As it
turns out, in such cases it is surprisingly easy for Mary to know the relevant experiential truths
by relying on the testimony of others, her expedition outside the black and white room, and her
episode of experiencing redexp, respectively. Readers interested in those cases should consult
sections 9-10 of Rabin (2011a). The case that matters most is the one I am about to consider, in
which assumptions (a)-(d) make it more difficult to argue that Mary can know.
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concept REDexp.
(3) If Mary can know that tomatoes cause her to think THIS SENSATION IS R,
and that ‘R’ means REDexp, then she can know that tomatoes cause her to
think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp.
(4) If Mary can know that tomatoes cause her to think THIS SENSATION IS
REDexp, then she can know that tomatoes cause redexp sensations.33
(5) Therefore, Mary can know that tomatoes cause redexp sensations.
I briefly sketch the support for each premise here; then I go into detail. The
informational assumption ensures that Mary knows lot of facts about brain states
and about how those brain states relate to representational states, especially to the
syntax of those representational states. These facts will get Mary to the knowl-
edge attributed to her in premise (1). Mary will integrate knowledge about her
brain state at a time and knowledge about what she was thinking at that time to
acquire the knowledge premise (2) attributes to her. Premise (3) is obvious. Mary
can know that she is not in a deviant case, which is all that is needed to acquire
the knowledge attributed to her in premise (4).
Since Mary has conceptual mastery of REDexp, the recognitional requirement
entails that Mary is disposed to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp (not THIS SENSA-
TION IS BLUEexp) whenever she sees a ripe tomato. If Mary can learn that seeing
a tomato causes her to think THIS SENSATIONS IS REDexp, then she can figure out
that tomatoes cause redexp sensations. By the recognitional requirement, concep-
33The causation here must be of the appropriate type. For example, if tomatoes miraculously
cause Mary to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp whenever they strike her forehead, there is no
reason to think that tomatoes cause redexp sensations. I leave the qualification about causation
implicit.
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tual masters of redexp are disposed to think THIS SENSATIONS IS REDexp if and
only if they’re having a redexp sensation. Mary learns that tomatoes cause her
to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp by combining two bits of information. First,
she’ll learn that tomatoes cause her to think THIS SENSATION IS R (premise (1)).
Second, she’ll learn that the semantic value of the ‘R’ portion of this thought is
her concept REDexp (premise (2)).34 Premise (3) says Mary can combine these two
pieces of information in the obvious way.
The proposition that tomatoes cause Mary to think THIS SENSATION IS R is ne-
cessitated by P. By the informational assumption, Mary knows it. Evidence for
this necessitation comes from considering the zombie world. Zombie Mary also
thinks a thought of the form THIS SENSATION IS R. The difference between Mary
and zombie Mary is that Mary’s mental type ‘R’ has as its semantic value REDexp,
whereas zombie Mary’s ‘R’ means REDzombie. Actual speakers and zombies both
mean THIS, IS, and SENSATION by their uses of ‘this’, ‘is’, and ‘sensation’, respec-
tively. The dualist should grant that these semantic facts are necessitated by P,
and grant that P necessitates that tomatoes cause Mary to think THIS SENSATION
IS R.35 By the informational assumption, Mary can know that tomatoes cause her
to think THIS SENSATION IS R. Premise (1) is true.
To complete her epistemic route to knowledge that tomatoes cause Mary to
think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp, Mary needs only to learn that the ‘R’ compo-
nent means REDexp. The informational assumption ensures Mary knows the state
34When I speak of ‘semantic value’ here, I mean (something like) Fregean sense, or meaning,
not extension. On this terminology, the semantic values of ‘this’ and of ‘Mary’ differ, even on an
occasion where a token of ‘this’ demonstrates Mary.
35In section 10, I address how the argument fares if the dualist denies that some of these facts
are necessitated. In particular, I consider the objection that the zombies’ use of ‘sensation’ does
not mean what we mean by ‘sensation’.
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of her own brain at every moment in history, both past and future. She also
knows how her brain state relates to, and realizes, certain features of her repre-
sentational or intentional state. For example, the syntactic structure of Mary’s
representational state is plausibly shared by zombie Mary, and necessitated by
P. Therefore, Mary knows the syntactic structure of her representational state at
every moment in history, and she knows which aspects of her brain realize which
aspects of that syntactic state. It follows that Mary knows exactly what brain
state-type realizes the ‘R’ token-type of her representational state. Mary knows
exactly at which moments she has thought, and will think, an ‘R’ token, because
she knows when her brain is in the state that realizes the ‘R’ token.
Mary needs to figure out the semantic value of her ‘R’ tokens. ‘R’ might mean
REDexp, or BLUEexp, or MANGO, or it might mean something else. Mary figures
out which of these concepts ‘R’ means by thinking each concept in turn. By the
informational assumption, Mary already knows the neural correlate of ‘R’ to-
kens. She can tell, on the basis of P alone, when she’s actively considering a
proposition containing ‘R’. (I’m assuming a neurologically realized difference be-
tween actively considering a proposition and merely believing it). When Mary
actively considers the proposition THIS MANGO IS A SUCCULENT MANGO, she
does not actively consider a proposition containing an ‘R’ component. She’ll de-
duce that ‘R’ does not mean MANGO. When Mary considers the proposition ALL
REDexp THINGS ARE REDexp (almost any thought containing REDexp will do), she
does actively consider a proposition containing ‘R’. She’ll deduce that ‘R’ means
REDexp. Therefore, premise (2) is true. (This argument requires a very minimal
and tremendously plausible assumption about knowing one’s own thoughts. It
requires the assumption that when Mary considers the proposition ALL REDexp
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THINGS ARE REDexp, she can know that she is considering a proposition contain-
ing REDexp, and not MANGO or BLUEexp.)
Premise (3) is obvious. It says that if Mary can know both that tomatoes cause
her to think THIS SENSATION IS R and that ‘R’ means REDexp, then she can know
that tomatoes cause her to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp.
Premise (4) says that Mary can infer from the fact that tomatoes cause her to
think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp to the fact that tomatoes actually cause redexp
sensations. To do this, Mary needs to check that she is not being misled in the
particular case of tomatoes. For example, if Mary applied the concept REDexp, for
the most part, to all and only redexp experiences, but misapplied to tomato-caused
blueexp sensations (perhaps because tomatoes trigger her allergies), then tomatoes
would cause Mary to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp without tomatoes actually
causing redexp sensations. Mary knows she is not in such a deviant case. She
knows that tomatoes, strawberries, and fire engines all emit light of wavelength
700 nanometers, have dramatically similar effects on the color processing com-
ponent of her visual system, and generate the same sensational neural correlate.
She knows tomatoes do not trigger an allergic reaction that causes her system to
misfire and label her experiences in a non-standard way. Premise (4) is true.
Premises (1)-(4) of the pincer argument are true. The argument is valid. There-
fore the conclusion is true: Mary can know that tomatoes cause redexp sensations.
By combining (i) knowledge “from below” about brain states and the syntax of
the representational states those brain states realize (knowledge allotted to Mary
by the informational assumption) and (ii) knowledge “from above” about what
thought (ALL REDexp THINGS ARE REDexp) she was thinking at a given time, Mary
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can know that tomatoes cause her to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp.36 From
there, it’s only a short step to knowledge that tomatoes cause redexp sensations.
3.10 Objections
In this section, I consider five objections. The first two are objections to claims
about intentionality used in the pincer argument; the third is an objection to the
recognitional requirement on conceptual mastery of REDexp; the fourth and fifth
are objections to my presentation of the knowledge argument.
One objection to the pincer argument says that the intentional facts I claim
Mary knows are not necessitated by P, and thus the informational assumption
does not give Mary knowledge of them – premise (1) is false. The important
question here is “Are the intentional propositions needed by Mary to learn that
tomatoes cause redexp sensations necessitated by P?” If the answer is ‘yes’, then
these propositions are, by the informational assumption, known by Mary, and
the objection is answered. The objector, a dualist, claims the answer is ‘no’.
One view that supports this objection claims that all intentional facts depend
on facts about conscious experience – phenomenology is prior to intentionality.
Something like this view is suggested in Horgan & Tienson (n.d.), Graham et al.
(2007), and Strawson (1996). If this is correct, and zombies are possible, then there
is no intentionality at the zombie world, no representational states are necessi-
tated by P, and no intentional facts are knowable by Mary via the informational
assumption. However, the “phenomenology first” view couples badly with du-
alism. If you believe that zombies are possible, you should believe that at least
36The “pincer argument” gets its name from Mary’s two-pronged approach to knowledge that
tomatoes cause her to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp. In military strategy, a simultaneous attack
from two sides is called a ‘pincer movement’ or ‘double envelopment’.
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some intentional facts are independent of phenomenology. Zombies appear to
utter sentences and think thoughts. Intentional explanations and idioms will be
tremendously successful in predicting and explaining the behavior of zombies.
This does not guarantee that zombies have intentionality or represent the world,
but it is very good evidence. (Similarly, the great success of the heliocentric model
of the universe in predicting and explaining the motion of the planets does not
guarantee its truth, but it provides very strong evidence). At least some zombie
sentences and thoughts are true, others false. If so, then at least some intentional-
ity floats free of consciousness. For example, it is very plausible that the syntactic
form of sentences, and of thoughts, does not depend on conscious experience,
and thus does not vary between Mary and zombie Mary. Furthermore, it is plau-
sible that the meaning of many terms, such as ‘is’, ‘that’, and ‘basketball’, does
not shift between the actual and zombie worlds. If these two claims are correct,
then the pincer argument can fend off the objection. That argument required only
that P necessitates the proposition that tomatoes cause Mary to think THIS SEN-
SATION IS R. The dualist should admit that enough intentionality is independent
of phenomenology to make this proposition true at the zombie world. If so, the
proposition is plausibly necessitated by P and knowable by Mary, as premise (1)
claims.
The second objection, closely related to the first, claims that the meaning of
‘sensation’ varies between the actual and zombie worlds. Since zombies have
no phenomenal experiences, they mean something different by ‘sensation’. But
I claimed that ‘sensation’ has the same meaning in our mouths that it does in
zombie mouths. I reply that the claim that ‘sensation’ has the same meaning at
the actual and zombie worlds is inessential to the pincer argument. Even if the
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meaning shifts, Mary can learn the meaning of ‘sensation’ using the same trick
she used to learn the meaning of ‘R’. By the informational assumption, she’ll
know that tomatoes cause her to think THIS S IS R. She can then use the method
previously described (of actively considering thoughts containing the concept
REDexp, or SENSATION), to deduce that ‘S’ means SENSATION.
This reply offers a lesson and bolsters the reply to the first objection. The
pincer argument requires only that facts about the syntactic structure of Mary’s
representational states are necessitated by P (and thus knowable by Mary ac-
cording to the informational assumption). Once Mary knows she is thinking a
thought with a given syntactic form, and is able to re-identify mental language
tokens as being of the same type, she can use the familiar trick to determine the
semantic values of those tokens. By “the familiar trick”, I mean the process by
which Mary deduces the semantic value of some syntactically individuated neu-
ral state. Mary knows that some (potentially vastly complicated) neural state N
has a semantic value. She does not know which value, but she can deduce the
value by checking - by “the familiar trick”. Does N mean MANGO? To find out
Mary need only actively consider a MANGO thought and check whether, when
she did so, her brain entered the N state. If it did not, then N does not mean
MANGO. This is exactly the trick Mary used to determine that ‘R’ meant REDexp.
This syntactical information about brain states is knowable by Mary because it is
tremendously plausible that the syntax of an agent’s language (both spoken and
mental) is necessitated by P and shared by Mary and her zombie twin.
The pincer argument relies on the informational assumption and Mary’s con-
ceptual mastery of REDexp. Only the recognitional requirement on conceptual
mastery – not the experiential or imaginative requirement – is needed. Using
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only the recognitional requirement gives the argument wider appeal. Deniers of
the experiential and imaginative requirements can be convinced. But the true
skeptics will remain doubtful. Why think that conceptual mastery of the experi-
ential concept REDexp requires so much? Why think that recognitional capacities
are a requirement on conceptual mastery of REDexp, or on phenomenal concepts
in general? I do not have a knock-down argument against the dedicated skeptic.
I ask the reader to consider a case, and consult his or her intuition.
Conceptual mastery is the type of understanding had by the proverbial “ex-
perts” to whom users who merely possess the concept, but do not have mas-
tery, defer. The thought contents of mere possessors are determined by those
who have full-fledged conceptual mastery. Imagine a case in which conceptual
mastery of REDexp does not require the ability to recognize a redexp experience as
REDexp. Suppose we are all blind, but use the concept REDexp, and defer in our use
to the sighted master, whom we call ‘Sensei’. The reference, content, and Fregean
sense of our REDexp concept is determined by Sensei’s. Sensei, when presented
with three color sensations, one redexp, one blueexp, and one greenexp, and asked,
“which of these sensations is redexp?” will throw up his hands and say, “I have no
idea!” Given that Sensei is the ultimate authority here (he does not defer to fur-
ther experts), it’s unclear what makes the concept REDexp have redexp rather than
blueexp sensations in its extension. One way to ensure that REDexp refers to redexp
sensations is to have the expert to whom everyone defers identify redexp sensa-
tions as falling under REDexp, and blueexp sensations as not. Conceptual mastery
is that which is had by the proverbial experts. The experts regarding REDexp must
be able to recognize redexp sensations as such; otherwise they aren’t experts, and
don’t have conceptual mastery.
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An objector might disagree with my interpretation of the knowledge argu-
ment. He or she might think that I’ve targeted the wrong propositions and claim
that there is some other proposition that Mary does not know. I disagree: there is
no such proposition. By the informational assumption, Mary has a tremendous
amount of information at her disposal. This information will allow her to know
any proposition you like, often by means similar to those I have outlined.
An objector might instead maintain that the knowledge Mary lacks is not
propositional. I have no beef with this claim. I say only that there is no proposi-
tional knowledge that Mary lacks.37 If the knowledge Mary lacks is not proposi-
tional, it is difficult to see how her ignorance entails the falsity of the physicalist’s
necessitation claim. Necessitation is a relation between propositions (or perhaps
between states of affairs, which are easily translated into the language of proposi-
tions). The objector would need to explain how Mary’s lack of non-propositional
knowledge entails the falsity of physicalism construed as a claim about necessi-
tation.
3.11 Taking Stock
One upshot here is that Mary, sitting in her black and white room, bestowed
with conceptual mastery of experiential concepts such as REDexp, BLUEexp, and
TICKLISHexp, can know every true proposition involving those concepts. This is a
tremendously surprising result. It is worth noting that the result does not depend
on the claim that physicalism is true. Even if dualism is true, Mary will still be
able to know the experiential propositions.
37More accurately, I claim that there is no propositional knowledge Mary lacks in a way that
challenges physicalism. There is no knowledge that Mary lacks for reasons other than lack of
concept possession and/or conceptual mastery.
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My position is very different than traditional phenomenal concept strategies,
and I do not think my view is deserving of the name or the lineage. All phe-
nomenal concept strategies accept that (a) Mary cannot know certain experiential
truths on the basis of the physical truths and (b) the physical truths necessitate
these experiential truths nonetheless. Special aspects of “phenomenal concepts”
are then wheeled in to explain how (a) and (b) could both obtain. Phenomenal
concepts explain how there could be necessitation from the physical to the expe-
riential without epistemic implication. My strategy is very different. I claim that
once we give Mary the conceptual capacities necessary to draw any metaphysi-
cal conclusions, Mary will be in a position to know the experiential truths. Thus I
deny the datum (a) with which phenomenal concept theorists begin.
The most popular response to the knowledge argument is to deny the modal
rationalist claim that one can draw metaphysical conclusions about necessitation
from epistemological considerations. Phenomenal concepts supplement this re-
sponse. Special features of phenomenal concepts are wheeled in to explain how
there can be “opaque” necessitation – necessitation without epistemic implica-
tion.
My response is much different. I’m ready to spot the advocate of the knowl-
edge argument his modal rationalism. Let’s assume that one can draw meta-
physical conclusions on the basis of some epistemological notion.38 Even then, I
argue, we can preserve our physicalism in the face of the knowledge argument.
This gives my account two dialectical advantage over most extant responses to
38Of course, I’m not willing to spot the advocate of the knowledge argument any inference he
likes. Section 6 demonstrates that, if the modal rationalist claim that metaphysical conclusions
follow from epistemology is to have any chance of being true, we must insist that the epistemic
agents have conceptual mastery. The rationalist position I’m willing to play along with must
acknowledge at least this much.
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the knowledge argument.39
First, a modal rationalist can endorse my reply, and not most others. Second,
since most responses deny the modal rationalist connection between metaphysics
and epistemology, the debate quickly shifts into deep issues in the philosophy
of modality. With this shift comes the risk of devolution into a clash of basic
intuitions about links between modality, knowability, a priority, and conceptual
truth. I avoid the devolution by granting the modal rationalist his connections
between epistemology and metaphysics, while still offering the physicalist an
adequate reply to the knowledge argument.
Finally, I take pain not to overstate my position. Some philosophers, most
notably Chalmers (1996b) and Jackson (1998), interpret the knowledge argument
as an attempted demonstration that there is no a priori implication from P to the
experiential truths. Have I demonstrated that there is such an a priori implication
- at least for a subject who has conceptual mastery? This question is difficult. The
answer depends on the relationship between a priori knowledge and introspec-
tion, and whether certain types of introspection can yield a priori justification.
In the pincer argument, Mary used a four step procedure to figure out the
REDexp facts. First, by the informational assumption, Mary knew that tomatoes,
fire engines, and the like cause her to token ‘R’ representations. Second, she
needed to determine that Rs are REDexp representations and not BLUEexp represen-
tations. She did this by actively thinking a thought involving the REDexp concept.
At the moment she does so her brain realizes a R token. From this she learns
that R tokens are tokens of REDexp (not of BLUEexp). Importantly, Mary had to ac-
tively consider a thought involving REDexp at time t and use her knowledge that
39Thanks to Ned Block for encouraging me to advertise this selling point and stress the differ-
ences between my account and those already in the literature.
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she considered that thought (a thought containing REDexp), and not another, at t.
This move is certainly introspective. The relevant question is whether the type of
introspection by which one determines what thought one is thinking, and what
concepts that thought contains, yields a priori, or merely a posteriori, justifica-
tion.
I cannot address here the difficult questions surrounding the relationship be-
tween a priori justification and introspection. One move available to Chalmers,
Jackson, and others, is to define a notion of a priori justification that does not al-
low introspection of the type at issue here. They can then use Mary as evidence
that there is no a priorino introspection implication from the austerely physical facts
P to the experiential facts, and attempt to draw metaphysical conclusions. I ad-
mit that I have not shown that there is an a priorino introspection route from P to
the experiential facts, even if the agent has conceptual mastery. However, this
stipulative move does not resolve the debate. The knowledge argument requires
the existence of a link between epistemic implication and metaphysical necessi-
tation. The a priori version of the knowledge argument requires an important
(potentially constitutive) link between a priori implication and metaphysical ne-
cessitation. Defenders of the a priori knowledge argument can stipulate what-
ever sense of “a priori” they like. But they are not free to stipulate that it is a
priorino introspection, rather that some other conception of the a priori, that has the
vital link to metaphysical necessity. This latter claim requires argument.
For now, I leave it open (i) whether there is any notion of a priori implication
that allows the drawing of conclusions about necessitation and (ii) if there is such
a notion, whether it does or does not allow introspection. If it does not, then a
strict a priori version of the knowledge argument might survive my criticisms. In
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this case, I will have shown only that there is an armchair implication from P to
the experiential facts. This result is itself significant. If the relevant notion of the a
priori does allow introspection of the relevant type, then I take my arguments to
demonstrate that there is an a priori implication from the complete physical facts
P to the experiential facts, and the knowledge argument is sunk.
3.12 Conclusion
The knowledge argument has a tough row to hoe. It requires a perfect storm of
epistemological and metaphysical conditions. It requires that Mary have the ex-
periences and capacities necessary to possess and master phenomenal concepts.
And the argument requires that Mary simultaneously be unable to know expe-
riential propositions and, by the informational assumption, able to know every
proposition necessitated by the complete austerely physical truth P. That’s a lot
to require.
The informational assumption gives Mary a lot to work with - information
about the neural correlates of sensations, about what every human being has said
throughout the history of time, about the relationship between brain states and
intentional or representational states, and a tremendous deal more to boot. With
such a plethora of information, it is not difficult to figure out the experiential
truths themselves. Even in variations on the knowledge argument in which no
one speaks the word ‘red’, or in which Mary is the only person ever to have ex-
isted, Mary can use the knowledge allotted to her by the informational assump-
tion to figure out the experiential truths.
We could continue doing variations on the argument, on Mary’s situation,
and on what proposition cannot be known, until the cows come home, but these
basic constraints remain. We cannot draw any metaphysical conclusions unless
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Mary has conceptual mastery of experiential concepts. But once she has concep-
tual mastery, Mary will be able to know all the experiential propositions she likes.
She’ll know about the redness of a ripe tomato, the greenness of a grassy field,
and the brilliant blue of a clear sky on a cold winter day. The knowledge argu-
ment is a beautiful and provocative piece of philosophy. Jackson sketches a very
promising line of anti-physicalist attack. But when it comes to the details, it is
surprisingly difficult to fill in the sketch, and make good on Mary’s metaphysical
potential.
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Chapter 4
Toward a Theory of Conceptual Mastery
Chapter Abstract
This paper investigates the question “Under what conditions does a thinker fully
understand, or have mastery of, a concept?” A thinker can possess, and think
thoughts with, concepts he or she does not fully understand. I argue against
three views of conceptual mastery, according to which conceptual mastery is a
matter of holding certain beliefs, being disposed to make certain inferences, or
having certain intuitions. None of these attitudes is either necessary or sufficient
for conceptual mastery. I propose and respond to objections to my own “meaning
postulate view” of the conditions under which a thinker has mastery of a concept.
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4.1 Introduction
Concepts are the basic units of thought. The thought OSTRICHES LIKE CHOCO-
LATE is composed of the concepts OSTRICHES, LIKE, and CHOCOLATE. An agent
possesses a concept when he or she can think thoughts of which the concept is a
component. An agent has conceptual mastery of a concept when he or she fully
understands that concept. One can possess a concept without having mastery.
Many people use technical concepts that have worked their way into public con-
sciousness without fully understanding them (examples include DARK MATTER,
CHAOS THEORY, CLOUD COMPUTING, TRANSISTOR, ID, FRACKING, and HEDGE
FUND). Any theory of conceptual mastery must answer the following fundamen-
tal question: “Under what conditions does an agent have conceptual mastery?”
This is the question I hope to answer, at least in part, in this paper.
I will argue for “the meaning postulate view” of conceptual mastery, accord-
ing to which mastery of a concept is a matter of taking certain core rules to govern
the use of the concept. These rules, are, in effect, “meaning postulates” that help
give the concept its meaning.1 I will argue against “the belief view”, “the infer-
ence view”, and “the intuition view”, according to which mastery of a concept
involves believing, inferring, or intuiting in accordance with certain propositions
or inferences.
I now offer a roadmap of the paper. In section 4.2 (“Preliminaries”) I clarify
terminology, lay out assumptions, argue briefly against skepticism about concep-
tual mastery, and canvas four potential views about what it is to master a concept.
Each of the three views against which I argue maintains that some set of attitudes
1I use ‘meaning’ in the generous sense, to cover any variety of representational quality, not just
the representational features of language. On this approach, non-linguistic mental states, such as
(some) conceptual thoughts and perceptual states, have meaning.
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(beliefs, inferences, or intuitions) is necessary and sufficient for mastery of a con-
cept. In sections 4.3 (“Deviant Masters”) and 4.4 (“The Special Status Problem”)
I argue against the necessity and sufficiency (respectively) of these attitudes for
conceptual mastery. The failures of these views point the way toward a successful
theory, which I present in section 4.5 (“The Meaning Postulate View”). Section 4.6
(“Three Objections”) considers and replies to objections to the meaning postulate
view.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Terminology and assumptions
In this section, I’ll lay out assumptions, clarify terminology, and sketch a frame-
work in which to commence inquiry. First, I use the term ‘proposition’ to describe
a structured composite of concepts. For example, the proposition OSTRICHES
LIKE CHOCOLATE is composed of the concepts OSTRICHES, LIKE, and CHOCO-
LATE. I use small capitals, e.g. OSTRICH, to express elements at the conceptual
level, either concepts or complex propositions. Following Frege (1952/1892b), I
will also use the term ‘thought’ to denote propositions so described. I adopt a
broadly Fregean approach to concepts and propositions. This approach is not in-
tended to be controversial. Inevitably, due to prior commitments about the nature
of propositions, some readers will take it as such. Readers who bridle at my use
of ‘proposition’ should substitute the word ‘propersition’ for every occurrence of
‘proposition’. Propersitions are the complete thoughts I am currently describing.
I assume that one can, and for many purposes should, type mental states using
propositions (propersitions) so described.
A certain class of mental states (the so-called “propositional attitudes”) can
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usefully be categorized by a combination of a mode and a proposition. The mode
characterizes (at least one of) the thinker’s attitude(s) toward the proposition. Ex-
amples of modes include belief, desire, and fear. Examples of complete proposi-
tional attitudes include a belief that ostriches like chocolate, a desire that ostriches
like chocolate, and a fear that ostriches like chocolate. I don’t deny that there are
lots of other ways to type and describe mental states and propositions, or that
those ways are useful, informative, or illuminating. I assume only that the locu-
tions I’ve described constitute one useful way of thinking and talking about con-
tentful mental states. Something like the above approach should be compatible
with and fruitful for a wide variety of philosophical and psychological projects.
I’ll assume this approach throughout the paper.
I assume that there is a distinction between merely possessing a concept (i.e.
being able to take some attitude toward a proposition that contains the concept)
and fully understanding that concept.2 Not uncontroversially, I assume also that,
sometimes, thinkers entertain thoughts containing concepts they do not fully un-
derstand, and thus possess those concepts without mastery of them. Theorist
of content and of concepts tend to assume, often implicitly, without argument,
and without recognizing that any such assumption has been made, that posses-
sion of a concept (i.e. the ability to think thoughts containing the concept) entails
mastery of that concept. Often they fail to note any distinction at all between pos-
session and mastery. The difficulty is partly due to ambiguity in the terminology
of “having/possessing a concept”. That locution can be used to express either a
relation of possession or a relation of mastery between a thinker and a concept.
2For further discussion of this distinction, cf. Burge (1979, 1986), Greenberg (MS): 13-4, passim,
Greenberg (2001): 28-9, passim, Greenberg (2005): 300-1, 307, Greenberg (2014), Bealer (2002a):
221-222.
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Here, I reserve the locution “x possesses the concept C” to mean that x can think
thoughts that contain C. x may or not may have mastery of C.
In so far as theorists do recognize the possibility of concept possession without
mastery, they often chalk up the phenomenon to and add a proviso about “defer-
ence”, and then continue to ignore the possibility of possession without mastery.
Here, I do not wish to tackle issues about the relation between concept posses-
sion and conceptual mastery and their relations to the theory of content and of
concepts more generally. (I point the reader to the discussions of Greenberg (MS,
2001, 2014), Burge (1979, 1986), and Peacocke (1992, 1999, 2008)). Instead, I will
simply assume that thinkers can possess concepts that they have not mastered.
Given that assumption, I then seek to answer the question, “What does it take for
a thinker to master, or fully understand, his or her concept?”
I take no official position on what is required to possess a concept. I require
only that whatever is required to possess a concept, it does not always entail that
one have mastered the concept. However, I believe (but will not assume) that the
requirements on concept possession are relatively minimal. It’s easy to acquire
a concept, especially when that concept is expressed by a public language term.
Hearing someone utter a term that expresses a concept not previously possessed,
and then using that term and concept in thought, without intending to appropri-
ate the term and give it new meaning, will often be sufficient for acquisition of
the concept. For example, if I hear a doctor declare that the patient has lupus,
and begin believing that the patient has lupus, then I can come to possess, but
not master, the concept LUPUS. This is so despite my ignorance regarding LUPUS.
I know little about LUPUS other than that it refers to some type of ailment.
Most controversially, I assume a distinction between “core” elements associ-
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ated with a concept and “non-core” elements. These elements might be proposi-
tions, inferences, mental transitions, rules, or something else. Core elements are
in some sense especially important to the meaning of the concept. They play a
special role in the concept’s having the representational qualities that it does and
being the concept that it is. One might further claim that core elements partly or
wholly constitute the nature of the concept. For example, I take the proposition
ALL BACHELORS ARE MALE to be a “core” proposition for the concept BACHE-
LOR. ACHILLES IS A BACHELOR is non-core. One might also maintain that core
propositions are “analytic” or contribute to a priori justification. I remain agnos-
tic on this count. To accept the distinction between the core and the non-core, one
must resist, at least to some degree, the arguments of Quine (1951) against the
analytic/sythentic distinction.
4.2.2 Cores and Conceptual Roles
According to a broad philosophical tradition called the “conceptual role approach”
to mental content and concepts, a concept’s role in thought, and especially its
connections to other concepts, plays a vital role with respect to the concept. For
example, according to Greenberg (MS)’s characterization, conceptual role theo-
ries (which he calls ‘inferential-role theories’) maintain that “what makes it the
case that a thought involves a particular concept is that the thinker deploys a dis-
position to move between mental states that is appropriately isomorphic to the
conceptâA˘Z´s canonical or defining connections to other concepts.” (21) The main
rival to conceptual role theories are informational/covariational accounts, which
maintain that a concept’s reference, rather than its relations to other concepts,
plays the vital role.
My use of the phrase ‘a/the vital role’ is intentionally vague, because extant
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theories tend to run together a variety of theoretical roles that conceptual or in-
ferential roles, or transitions between mental states more broadly, might play. I
envision at least six. First, one might claim that conceptual roles partly or wholly
individuate concepts. Second, one might claim that conceptual roles partly or
wholly constitute the nature of the concept. Third, one might claim that a con-
cept’s role determines the extension of a concept. For example, a theory might say
that the extension of the concept is that which makes the concept’s canonical tran-
sitions truth-preserving. Fourth, one might tie concept possession to conceptual
role, in the sense that possession of a concept requires having a mental item that
plays the appropriate role. Fifth, one might further claim that conceptual roles
make it the case that a particular mental state or thought contains one concept
rather than another. (These last two are closely connected, but there is a differ-
ence. The former concerns a general ability (possession), while the latter pertains
to the content of a particular mental state.) Sixth, one might claim that conceptual
roles determine mastery of the concept, in the sense that one has mastery of the
concept if and only if one appropriately grasps the concept’s conceptual role or
canonical transitions.
My project and sympathies fall with the conceptual role tradition, broadly
conceived. My acceptance of a distinction between “core” and “non-core” ele-
ments, which I described as “propositions, inferences, mental transitions, rules,
or something else”, places me in this camp. The core elements are something
like the “canonical transitions” on which conceptual role theories rely. All the
accounts of conceptual mastery that I will discuss fall broadly within the con-
ceptual role approach. (For an approach to conceptual mastery that bridges the
conceptual role vs. co-variational/informational divide, cf. Greenberg (2014).)
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It’s worth laying my views on the table, partly to help the reader understand
the angle from which I approach this inquiry. I believe that canonical transitions
partly, but not wholly, individuate concepts (reference does some individuation
as well). I believe that canonical partly constitute the nature of the concept. I do
not believe that canonical transitions determine extension. I tie neither concept
possession nor what makes a thought contain one concept rather than another, to
conceptual role. My favored account of conceptual mastery, the “meaning pos-
tulate view” (section 4.5), says (roughly) that mastery of a concept amounts to
understanding of the canonical transitions. I will not assume any of these beliefs
in the discussions to follow. I will argue for (not assume) the claim that concep-
tual mastery involves understanding of canonical transitions. The three elements
of conceptual role approaches that I endorse (concept individuation, nature and
mastery) fit together. From the claim that concepts are partly or wholly individ-
uated in terms of canonical transitions, it’s a short step to the claim that those
transitions form part of the concept’s nature. It’s then natural to claim that un-
derstanding the concept is a matter of understanding that nature, which entails
understanding those canonical transitions.3
4.2.3 Precisifying the Notion of Conceptual Mastery
In this section, I clarify the target notion: mastery, or full understanding, of a con-
cept. A thinker has mastery of the concept FLYING BUTTRESS exactly when she
fully understands FLYING BUTTRESS. I believe that the notion of full understand-
3Greenberg (2014)’s account of conceptual mastery manifests a similar connection between
nature and understanding of that nature. He writes (1,7) that mastery of a concept is a matter of
“having a practically available understanding of its nature or essence.”
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ing, or having mastery, of a concept, is relatively pre-theoretical and everyday.4
We express the relation using locutions like ‘she fully understands the concept
flying buttress’, ‘she grasps the meaning of the concept flying buttress’, and ‘she
fully understands the meaning of ‘flying buttress’ ’.5 Mastering a concept is not
an impossible feat, or an idealized state achievable only by hypothetical thinkers.
You and I have mastery of many concepts.
Mastering a concept is not merely a matter of knowing many truths involving
the concept. One might know many truths containing CHAIR, but if one fails
to realize that chairs are for sitting, then one fails to master CHAIR. Mastery is
tied to grasping certain important or key insights about the concept. Mastery of
a concept is compatible with ignorance of important truths about that to which
the concept refers. For example, I believe that mastery of the concept WATER is
compatible with ignorance of the fact that water is H2O.6 Someone who knows
that water is H2O knows more about water than someone who does not. She
4Greenberg (2014): 6-7, Greenberg (MS): 14, Greenberg (2001): 28-30 agrees that the notion of
conceptual mastery, or full understanding, is pre-theoretic and everyday, roughly mirroring the
notion of fully understanding or mastering a word.
5We must be careful here. It’s possible that fully understanding the linguistic meaning of a
word and fully understanding the concept it expresses could come apart. Burge (1990) claims that
this is possible, and attributes Gottlob Frege a similar view. The example Burge offers involves
the mathematical concept LIMIT from the calculus. In the early days of the development of the
calculus, both Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz used the notion of a limit. Both possessed the
concept LIMIT, but neither thinker had a clear grasp on it. The linguistic meaning of the word
‘limit’, however, is determined by how individual speakers have used the term. With respect to
the linguistic usage of ‘limit’, Newton and Leibniz were the experts. They fully understood the
linguistic meaning of ‘limit’. Yet they failed to fully understand the concept LIMIT that the word
expressed. If this description of the case is accurate, then it seems possible to fully understand
a term’s linguistic meaning yet fail to fully understand the associated concept. We might take
the expression ‘x fully understands the meaning of term t’ to have two uses. It can be used to
say that x fully grasps the linguistic meaning of t. Or it can be used to say that x fully grasps
the concept that t expresses. Only when ‘x fully understands the meaning of t’ is used in the first
sense does mastery of a concept come apart from full understanding of the meaning of a linguistic
item. Throughout this paper, I’ll use the expression ‘fully understanding the meaning of term t’
exclusively in the second sense.
6Greenberg (2001): 134, 137-8 agrees.
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also better understands water (the stuff) and its nature. But I deny that she better
understands the concept WATER. That water is H2O is a deep, necessary, and
constitutive truth about water. But H2O-ness is not part of the concept WATER
itself.
Consider another case.7 Suppose that it turns out that all chairs are, in fact,
artifacts left by an alien civilization. By an odd quirk of physics, the alien tech-
nology is necessary to create any object that can be sat on like a chair. Nothing
can be a chair unless it is an alien artifact. If this is so, then “all chairs are alien
artifacts” will be a deep and important truth about the nature of chairs. Nev-
ertheless, I claim that one can fully understand and master the concept CHAIR
without knowing about the chair-alien artifact link. Such masters of CHAIR will
fail to fully understand chairs and their nature. But their understanding of the
concept CHAIR need not be lacking. I take these claims about WATER and CHAIR
to be intuitive. But even if one finds them controversial, they should help the
reader grasp the notion of conceptual mastery as I conceive it.
4.2.4 Against Skepticism
In developing a theory of conceptual mastery, I take as my starting point the
seminal discussions of Burge (1979, 1982, 1986). Burge deserves much credit for
bringing into the philosophical arena the phenomenon of incomplete understand-
ing. Consider Burge (1979)’s example of Alf. Alf approaches his doctor, com-
plaining of arthritis in his thigh. Alf’s doctor corrects him, pointing out that one
cannot have arthritis in the thigh. Arthritis, by definition, affects only joints. Alf
accepts the correction, admits that he was mistaken to believe that he had arthritis
7This case is based on a thought experiment in Burge (1986): 263-64. I have altered the case
and put it to a different use.
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in his thigh, and modifies his usage of ‘arthritis’ and ARTHRITIS accordingly. The
important point here is that Alf was able to think the thought I HAVE ARTHRITIS
IN MY THIGH, and thereby possessed the concept ARTHRITIS, while significantly
misunderstanding the concept. Alf incompletely understood ARTHRITIS. Exam-
ples of this nature can be cooked up for almost any concept whatsoever.
If agents can possess concepts while incompletely understanding them, it’s
natural to ask what agents must do to possess a concept and completely under-
stand it - i.e. to have conceptual mastery. It’s natural to think that such complete
understanding is attainable by everyday people. Not everyone is like Alf.
Some will be skeptical that there is any such thing as “mastery” or “full un-
derstanding”, or that such notions are theoretically significant or useful.8 I won’t
tackle such skepticism head on, but I want to make a few remarks to clarify what
full-blooded skepticism about conceptual mastery must be and to lay out some
considerations against it.
One can understand better or worse. Understanding is, in general, a matter of
degree. Thus mastery of a concept will be a matter of degree. We might rank hy-
pothetical understanders of a concept according to their understanding. On one
end of the spectrum we have agents who meet only the minimal requirements
(whatever they may be) for possession of the concept. On the other end of the
spectrum we have agents who are omniscient with respect to the concept. They
know every true proposition containing the concept and know all the important
truths about the thing in the world to which the concept refers.
The strongest form of skepticism about conceptual mastery maintains that
there are no theoretically significant breaks, marks, or groupings among the hy-
8Among the skeptics I count Ball (forthcoming) and Williamson (2008, draft), [p.c.].
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pothetical agents so ranked. Instead there’s a continuous spectrum. A weaker
form of skepticism admits that there are theoretically significant groupings, but
none of those groupings corresponds to the notion of conceptual mastery as I
describe it. One initially tempting form of skepticism about conceptual mastery
goes something like this. Every concept occurs in a wide variety of truths. Some
of these truths are known by almost everyone who uses the concept. They’re
common knowledge. We use the term ‘fully [completely] understands the con-
cept C’ as a label for those individuals who know all the common knowledge
truths involving C. On this view, there is such a thing as conceptual mastery, but
it marks only a linguistic accident.
I deny all three forms of skepticism. I believe that there are some theoretically
significant breaks, marks, or groupings among the hypothetical agents described
above. I believe that one (perhaps rough and ready) way to informatively group
the agents is to divide them into those that have mastered the concept and those
that have not.
I offer a brief argument against the skeptic. It relies on two claims. First claim:
Incomplete understanding occurs. Second claim: With respect to a given concept,
there is a distinction between core truths and non-core truths. “All bachelors are
male” is core vis-a-vis BACHELOR. “No bachelors live on Mars” is not. Between
two agents who are otherwise the same, there’s a big difference, with respect
to understanding of BACHELOR, between (i) the agent who fails to accept that
all bachelors are male while accepting that no bachelors live on Mars and (ii)
and the agent who fails to accept that no bachelors live on Mars but accepts that
all bachelors are male. The second understands BACHELOR much better than
the first. Once we have a theoretically significant distinction between core and
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non-core truths, we can define up a theoretically significant level of conceptual
mastery according to which mastery involves having a “grip” on the core truths.
(We might also use core inferences, rules, or what have you). This tells against
both the strong and weak forms of skepticism above.9 The linguistic form of
skepticism I described is defeated by the above argument in combination with the
observation that both “all bachelors are male” and “no bachelors live on Mars”
are common knowledge.
One might resist the above arguments by maintaining that most concepts are
not like BACHELOR. According to this line, BACHELOR permits a distinction be-
tween core and non-core elements, but most, and perhaps almost all, concepts do
not. I admit that BACHELOR in special in certain respects, and in some ways not
representative of concepts more generally. BACHELOR has a particularly “strong”
core. One can reasonably maintain that the core elements determine the reference
of BACHELOR, provide necessary and sufficient conditions or bachelor-hood, or
give the meaning of BACHELOR. For many (perhaps most) concepts, analogous
claims will not be as plausible.
But, importantly, many concepts other than BACHELOR yield core elements.
Consider some examples. CHAIR: chairs are for sitting. ARTWORK: artworks are
created. MUG: mugs function to hold liquid. WINE: wine is made from grapes.
BLANKET: blankets have a large surface area to thickness ratio. CAVE: caves are
enclosed spaces. SWORD: a sword has a blade. The method of examples cannot
possibly show that even a significant minority of all concepts have cores. But
hopefully the examples alleviate some of the fear that BACHELOR is idiosyncratic
in having any core at all, and lend some support to the idea that a significant
9Greenberg (2001): 134, Greenberg (MS): 14-17, Greenberg (2014): 7-11 implements a similar
strategy in arguing against skepticism about conceptual mastery.
193
portion of concepts have a core. The reader can further satisfy him or her self by
doing a few cases on his or her own. My discussion of conceptual mastery and
full understanding will not apply to those concepts which do not admit of a core
vs. non-core distinction. (I do not assume that there are any such concepts). From
here, I will speak as if all concepts have a core vs. non-core distinction, but one
can take my comments as restricted to those concepts which do.
In sum, if one is (a) externalist enough to believe that there is such a thing as
possessing and using a concept with incomplete understanding, and (b) resistant
enough to the arguments of Quine [1951] to believe in a distinction (even a rough
distinction) between “core” and “non-core” elements associated with a concept,
then one already has a theoretically significant notion of conceptual mastery (at
least for whichever concepts admit of the core vs. non-core distinction). To resist
motivation (a) is to reject the tremendously successful arguments of Burge (1979,
1982, 1986), the conclusions of which have since become philosophical orthodoxy.
To resist motivation (b) is to deny ALL BACHELORS ARE MALE any special status,
vis-a-vis BACHELOR, above and beyond JAVIER IS A BACHELOR. Few are willing
to pay either price. If they do not, they deny the skeptical view.
4.2.5 Four Theories of Conceptual Mastery
I’ve already laid out the distinction between core and non-core elements relative
to a concept. The elements might be propositions, inferences, rules, or something
else. With the core/non-core distinction in place, a view naturally suggests itself.
Fully understanding a concept, i.e. having mastery of that concept, entails having
some type of “grip” on that core. This much leaves room for variation. Theories
of conceptual mastery can vary according to what they take the grip to consist in.
I consider four views.
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1. the belief view
2. the inference view
3. the intuition view
4. the meaning postulate view
I plan to argue against the first three views (belief, inference, and intuition),
and in favor of my own meaning postulate view. But first let’s get the views on
the table.
According to the belief view of conceptual mastery, an agent has mastery of
concept C if and only if he/she believes all of C’s core propositions. On this view,
the elements of the core are propositions. To grip the core elements is to believe
them. According to the inference view of conceptual mastery, an agent has mas-
tery of concept C if and only if he/she is disposed to infer in accordance with all
of C’s core inferences. On this view, the elements of the core are inferences. To
grip the core elements is to be disposed to infer in accordance with them. Propo-
nents of the inference view include Peacocke (1992, 1999).10
The belief and inference view are similar. Let’s consider an example of each.
Suppose that “all bachelors are male” and “all bachelors are unmarried” are the
core truths for BACHELOR. The belief view claims that an agent has mastery of
BACHELOR if and only if she believes both that all bachelors are male and that
10Peacocke (1992) offers a theory of what he calls “concept possession”. However, Peacocke
does not mean what I mean by ‘concept possession’ or ‘possess(es) a concept’. Peacocke (29-30)
states that a thinker can consider propositions, and entertain thoughts, that contain the concept
while failing to possess the concept. On my use of ‘possess a concept’, to possess a concept just is
to be able to entertain thoughts or propositions that contain the concept. Thus Peacocke does not
mean what I do by ‘possess a concept’. His theory of “concept possession” is a theory of a more
demanding relation: what I call ‘conceptual mastery’.
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all bachelors are unmarried. The inference view claims that there are two core
inferences associated with BACHELOR. We might express them as follows:
x is a bachelor x is a bachelor
x is male x is not married
The variable ‘x’ represents the fact that the agent is willing to infer from “x is a
bachelor” to “x is male” for any x.
According to the intuition view of conceptual mastery, an agent has mastery of
concept C when he/she has intuitions that the core propositions are true (Bealer
(2002a): 221-23011 ). On this view, the elements of the core are propositions. To
grip the core elements is to intuit their truth. The intuition view relies on a rela-
tion of intuition between an agent and a proposition. There is a rich philosophical
literature on the nature of intuition. I wish to be as non-committal as possible re-
garding those debates. Some maintain that intuition is its own sui generis mental
attitude (Bealer (2002a,b)). Others claim that intuition is a form of belief (Sosa
(1996, 1998), Williamson (2004, 2008)). Even if intuition is a form of belief, the
intuition view will, most likely, not reduce to the belief view, because the belief
view claims that conceptual mastery requires belief simpliciter, whereas the in-
tuition view claims that conceptual mastery requires a particular form or type of
belief (whichever type of belief intuitions are).
According to the meaning postulate view of conceptual mastery, an agent has
mastery of concept C if and only if he/she takes all the core elements to govern
the use of C. The view is liberal regarding the nature of core elements. To grip a
11Bealer calls mastery of a concept “determinate possession” of the concept. His theory is quite
a bit more nuanced, and quite a bit more complicated, than the simplistic intuition view that I
consider. I will not explain his view in full here. However, his theory of conceptual mastery is a
form of the intuition view, shares its same general shape, and has most of the same advantages
and disadvantages.
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core element is to take it to govern the use of the concept. In section 4.5.2 (“Taking
to Govern Use”) I explain what it is to take something to govern the use of the
concept.
There are a variety of dimensions of variations even among these views. One
could claim that mastery requires only a grip on some, perhaps a majority, of the
elements in the core. Or one might hybridize views, claiming that mastery is a
matter of believing some propositions, inferring in accordance with others, and
intuiting the truth of a third class. For simplicity’s sake, I ignore these possibili-
ties. I believe they do not significantly alter the dialectic.
4.3 Deviant Masters: Against the Necessity of Belief, Inference,
or Intuition for Conceptual Mastery
4.3.1 Overview
In section 4.3 I argue against the necessity of belief in, inference in accord with,
or intuition of the truth of, core elements for conceptual mastery. The argument
revolves around the possibility of non-standard (“deviant”) masters of the con-
cepts in question. The deviant masters fully understand the concept but neglect
to believe, infer, or intuit in accordance with core elements.
The inference view will be my representative stalking horse. In sections 4.3.2-
4.3.5 I discuss only the inference view. The belief and intuition views can be
defeated by arguments exactly analogous to those I discuss. The modifications
required are minimal and obvious.
4.3.2 The Argument
In this section, I’ll argue against the inference view. The basic problem with the
view is that an agent can fully understand a concept (i.e. have conceptual mas-
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tery) without being disposed to infer in accordance with core inference patterns.
Being disposed to infer in accordance with a concept’s core inferences is not nec-
essary for mastery of the concept.
Consider the concept BOCHE, a racial pejorative applied to Germans. BOCHE
has two core inference rules.
x is German x is a boche
x is a boche x is cruel
If a thinker is disposed to make both these inferences, then she is disposed
to infer from “x is German” to “x is cruel”. According to the inference view, an
agent who has mastered BOCHE must be disposed to infer from “x is German” to
“x is cruel”.
Here’s the counterexample. Consider Agnes, who at one point in time fully
understood BOCHE. She was disposed to infer, and often did infer, in the manner
just described. However, during her travels in Germany, Agnes dined, lived, and
fraternized with many Germans. She made German friends. As a result of her ex-
periences, Agnes ceased to be disposed to infer from a subject’s German-hood to
his or her cruelty. Agnes stopped believing that all Germans are cruel. However,
Agnes still realizes that the inference patterns above play a central role in rela-
tion to the meaning of BOCHE and in the use of ‘boche’. This thought experiment
yields the following argument against the inference view.
(P1) If the inference view is true, then Agnes has lost her conceptual mastery
of BOCHE.
(P2) Agnes has not lost her conceptual mastery of BOCHE.
(C) Therefore: the inference view is false.
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Premise (P1) follows from the statement of the inference view in combination
with the description of the thought experiment. Premise (P2) is tremendously
plausible. Agnes understands BOCHE at least as well as, and perhaps better than,
her unenlightened co-linguals.12 Agnes still recognizes the inference patterns as
rules that govern the use of BOCHE. She simply refuses to obey them. The argu-
ment is valid. The conclusion follows: the inference view is false, because being
disposed to infer in accordance with core inferences in not necessary for concep-
tual mastery.
4.3.3 Response 1: Agnes remains disposed to infer
Proponents of the inference view might respond by denying premise (P2), claim-
ing that Agnes remains disposed to infer from “x is German” to “x is cruel”. This
disposition is not manifested because it is masked by her belief that not all Ger-
mans are cruel.
Two points should be made against this response. First, the move is unmoti-
vated and ad hoc. Prima facie, Agnes lacks the disposition. To maintain otherwise
one must posit reasons in favor of her having a masked disposition. Proponents
of the inference view have offered no such reason, other than that a masked dis-
position supports their favored theory. Second, a version of the Agnes case can
be cooked up in which Agnes clearly lacks the disposition. Whatever the criteria
are for having the disposition to infer, we can imagine a case in which Agnes fails
to meet those criteria yet has explicit knowledge of the inference rules governing
the use of BOCHE. We can generate such a case as long as it’s possible to know
what the inference rules governing a concept are without being disposed to obey
them. This is possible, so we’ll able to generate counterexamples to the inference
12Williamson (2009): 141 seems to agree.
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view, whatever opponents claim about what it is to have a disposition to infer.
4.3.4 Response 2: BOCHE is not a concept
BOCHE is an odd concept. Its inference rules are not truth-preserving. Some-
one who follows its constitutive inference rules will be led, quite rapidly, into
error. (Few Germans are cruel). Such concepts can be called ‘defective’. Propo-
nents of inference-style views have sometimes claimed that there are no concepts
like BOCHE (e.g. Horwich (2010): 203-4, Peacocke (1992): 21, 171-5, Boghossian
(2001)). If there is and cannot be any BOCHE concept, my counterexample fails.
I’ll make four points in response to the claim that there are no concepts such
as BOCHE. First, the move is (once again) ad hoc. Denial of BOCHE and its ilk is
motivated purely by the desire to save the theory from counterexample. Second,
rival views, including my preferred meaning postulate view, can accept the exis-
tence of such defective concepts. Other things being equal, this counts in favor of
the meaning postulate view and against the inference view. (Similar points apply
against the belief and intuition views). Third, the move is implausible. Prima
facie, BOCHE is a concept. People think thoughts containing it, including THAT
JERK IS BOCHE. The behavior of those who use BOCHE is repugnant precisely
because they use a racist concept and express racist thoughts, not because they
use no concept and fail to express any thought.13 Fourth, and perhaps most im-
portantly, the argument can be made without using a defective concept such as
BOCHE. In the next section, I’ll offer a version of the argument using the concept
of the material conditional and its core inference modus ponens, often taken to be
the paradigm on which the inference view builds its theory of all concepts.
13Boghossian (2003): 242-3 and Williamson (2009): 140 agree.
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4.3.5 A Counterexample Without a Defective Concept
We all encounter the concept of the material conditional −Ñ in logic class, and
think with the concept long before that. In this section, I’ll argue that one can
master this concept while denying that modus ponens, a core inference for −Ñ, is
a valid form of inference. My case is taken directly from Williamson (2008)’s case
of the deviant logician (chapter 4, pp. 92-4). These are the two core inferences
associated with the concept −Ñ:
P −Ñ Q P
P R −Ñ P
Q
Consider the deviant logician Professor X. Professor X is a distinguished pro-
fessor of logic, world-renowned with many seminal publications to his name.
If anyone is an expert on modus ponens, and on the concept −Ñ, Professor X is.
Professor X, for highly theoretical reasons, denies the validity of modus ponens.
Perhaps he has been convinced by the alleged counterexamples of McGee (1985).
Professor X is wrong to deny its validity, but he has well-considered reasons. This
thought experiment yields the following argument against the inference view.
(P1) If the inference view is true, then Professor X does not have mastery of
the concept −Ñ.
(P2) Professor X does have mastery of −Ñ.
(C) Therefore: the inference view is false.
Premise (P1) follows from the statements of the inference view in combination
with the description of the thought experiment. Premise (P2) is tremendously
201
plausible. If anyone has mastery of arrow, Professor X does. He is the one of, if
not the, world’s foremost experts on the conditional. The argument is valid. The
conclusion follows: the inference view is false. Importantly, this argument does
not rely on a defective concept such as BOCHE. The inference rules associated
with −Ñ are truth-preserving. Professor X wrongly denies the validity of modus
ponens.
4.3.6 Extending the argument against the belief and intuition views
Arguments analogous to those given above can be used to defeat the belief and
intuition views. The modifications required to counterexample these affiliated
views are minimal. I won’t go through the details.
The intuition view fares slightly better than the belief or inference views. The
intuition view allows that a thinker might fail to believe a core proposition, or be
disposed to infer in accordance with a core inference, yet still master the concept
nonetheless, as long as the thinker intuited, or somehow otherwise felt, that the
core propositions were true. However, the case of Agnes and BOCHE still defeats
the intuition view. She has no intuitions that all Germans are cruel, yet masters
the concept nonetheless.
4.4 The Special Status Problem: Against the Sufficiency of Be-
lief, Inference, or Intuition for Conceptual Mastery
4.4.1 Overview of the Special Status Problem
In this section I’ll argue that the simple belief, inference, and intuition view can-
not work. Believing, inferring, or intuiting are not, by themselves, sufficient for
mastery. Instead, a thinker must take the core elements (propositions, inferences,
etc.) to have some special status. For example, a thinker might believe core
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propositions because they are core or otherwise central to the concept. The initial
failure of the simple belief, inference, and intuition views lends itself to an obvi-
ous fix. However, the fix must take a certain form in order to succeed. I argue
that some existing ways of coping with the problem do not work.
4.4.2 Not Merely Belief
Consider two agents who believe all of BACHELOR’s core propositions. Sofia and
Felipe both believe that all bachelors are male and that all bachelors are unmar-
ried. Sofia believes these propositions because she takes them to be central to
the meaning of ‘bachelor’ and the concept BACHELOR. Felipe, on the other hand,
believes that all bachelors are male, but that this is a matter of happenstance.
Felipe is open to the possibility of female bachelors, though he does not believe
that any currently exist. Felipe’s attitude toward ALL BACHELORS ARE MALE is
similar to our attitude toward THERE ARE NO BACHELORS ON MARS.14 It’s true
that there are no bachelors on Mars. But that has nothing in particular to do with
the meaning of ‘bachelor’ or ‘Mars’ and no particular salience vis-a-vis BACHE-
LOR or MARS. Sofia has conceptual mastery of BACHELOR. Felipe does not. This
counterexamples the belief view. Similar counterexamples can be given to the
inference and intuition views.
(P1) Felipe believes all of BACHELOR’s core propositions.
(P2) If the belief view is true, then if Felipe believes all of BACHELOR’s core
14One might take this case as motivation to move toward a view on which the core proposi-
tions are all necessary in form. The core proposition is not “all bachelors are male” but rather
“necessarily, all bachelors are male”. This view does not work. There is still a difference between
someone who takes “necessarily, all bachelors are male” to have special status with respect to, or
to be “part of the meaning” of, BACHELOR and someone who does not. For example, y might take
“necessarily, all bachelors are male” to be true because the actual world is the only possible world
and actually, all bachelors are male. But x could believe that maleness has nothing to do with the
meaning, or nature, of bachelors.
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propositions, he has conceptual mastery of BACHELOR.
(P3) Felipe does not have conceptual mastery of BACHELOR.
(C) Therefore: the belief view is false.
Premise (P1) is a stipulation of the case. Whatever the core propositions are,
suppose Felipe believes them. (P2) follows from the statement of the belief view.
(P3) is very plausible. Felipe is open to the possibility of female bachelors. There-
fore he does not have mastery of BACHELOR. The argument is valid. The conclu-
sion follows: the belief view is false.
4.4.3 Sophisticated Views
One lesson of these examples is that to fully understand, and to have concep-
tual mastery, one must, in some sense, take the core truths (inferences, rules)
to have some special status. This point has been recognized before (Peacocke
(1992), Greenberg (MS): 16fn.17, Greenberg (2014): 8fn.6). According to the in-
ference view of Peacocke (1992), an agent who makes the appropriate inferences
need not fully understand the concept (in Peacocke’s terminology, ‘possess the
concept’ (cf. fn. 11). To fully understand, the agent must find those inferences
primitively compelling. Peacocke correctly recognizes the importance of the agent’s
taking some special stance toward the core inferences. Peacocke’s version of the
special stance is finding the inference primitively compelling.
Peacocke’s stratagem can be adopted by any of the belief, inference, or intu-
ition views. It can be implemented in a variety of ways. That the thinker find
the inferences primitively compelling is one way. One might also maintain that
the thinker infer, or believe, because she takes the inferences (or propositions) to
be core. Proponents of the intuition view could claim that the agent’s intuit that
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the propositions are core, or that taking them to be core plays some role in the
creation of the intuition. There are a variety of options. I can’t and won’t can-
vas them all. Let’s call any version of the belief, inference, or intuition view that
adopts some method of requiring that beliefs in, dispositions to infer in accor-
dance with, or intuitions with respect to core elements a special status a sophisti-
cated belief/inference/intuition view.
4.4.4 The All and Only Problem
Taking a special attitude toward core elements (e.g. finding primitively com-
pelling) is still not sufficient for conceptual mastery. The special attitude must be
taken toward all and only the core elements. An agent who, in effect, builds ex-
tra elements into her conception of the concept, loses her mastery of the concept,
despite the fact that she bears the special attitude to every element of the core.
Consider Peacocke’s theory. Suppose Malik finds the inferences from “x is
a bachelorâA˘Z´âA˘Z´ to “x is male” and from “x is a bachelor” to “x is unmar-
ried” primitively compelling. Suppose that these inferences completely consti-
tute BACHELOR’s core. According to the sophisticated inference view endorsed
by Peacocke, Malik has mastery of BACHELOR. But, unfortunately, Malik also
finds the inferences from “x is a bachelor” to “x always wears a baseball cap”, “x
never cleans his apartment”, “x plays too many video games”, and “x drinks the
blood of cats” primitively compelling. Malik has an absolutely insane conception
of what bachelors are like, and he takes these inferences to be part of the meaning
of BACHELOR. Malik lacks mastery of the concept BACHELOR.
The obvious move is to modify Peacocke’s view accordingly. On such a mod-
ified view, a thinker has conceptual mastery of C if and only if she is disposed
to infer in accordance with C’s core inferences and finds all and only those in-
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ferences primitively compelling. But this view is crazy. It entails that a thinker
can’t fully understand (master) more than one concept at a time. If an agent is to
master more than one concept, she’ll need to find the core inferences of at least
two concepts primitively compelling. So she can’t find all and only the inferences
associated with C primitively compelling.15 Thus she does not have mastery of
C.
I see no way around this problem while sticking with the notion of “primi-
tively compelling inference”. Analogue notions of “primitive belief” and “prim-
itive intuition” (whatever those may be) will face the same problem. The deep
problem lies in the logical form of the primitively compelling relation. It is a two-
place relation: finds-primitively-compelling(thinker T, inference I). The problem
can only be solved by a three-place relation. For example, one might use the
“finds primitively compelling in virtue of concept C” relation: finds-primitively-
compelling-in-virtue-of(thinker T, inference I, concept C). With this relation, a
thinker could find some inferences primitively compelling because of the role C1
plays in the inference, while finding other inferences primitively compelling be-
cause of the role C2 plays. With a 3-place relation, concepts cease stepping on
each other’s toes by preventing the thinker from mastery of the other.
On further thought, we can motivate the need for a 3-place relation without
the problem of concepts preventing mastery of other concepts. Suppose Felipe
finds the inferences from “x is a bachelor” to “x is male” and “x is unmarried”
primitively compelling. (Any two-place special attitude will work for the exam-
ple). But Felipe finds the inference from “x is a bachelor” to “x is male” prim-
itively compelling because of the role that MALE plays in the inference. Felipe
15I make the trivial assumption that a thinker can master two concepts with non-identical cores.
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accords this inference no special status vis-a-vis BACHELOR. Instead, Felipe has
a quirky conception of MALE, according to which he finds every inference of the
form “x is F” to “x is male” primitively compelling. Without a 3-place relation
with the concept itself as a relata, a thinker could take the special attitude toward
all and only the concepts core elements, but lack conceptual mastery nonetheless.
Summarizing, we’ve covered two distinct reasons for moving from a 2-place
special attitude toward core elements to a 3-place relation. First, a 2-place relation
does not allow a thinker to adopt the special attitude toward all and only the core
elements of C while simultaneously having mastery of more than one concept. A
3-place relation does. Second, a thinker can adopt a special 2-place attitude to all
and only the core elements of a concept C while failing to master that concept.
The Felipe-BACHELOR demonstrates this point. Instead, the thinker must accord
the core elements some special status with respect to C. Again, a 3-place relation
yields the correct results.
4.4.5 Moving On
I don’t think the special status problem is fatal for any of the belief, inference,
or intuition view. Something more than mere belief, inference, or intuition must
be appealed to, but the theories can be modified appropriately. Peacocke (1992)
recognized this point. The thinker must adopt a special attitude toward the core
elements. But not even this is enough. The special attitude must be taken to core
elements vis-a-vis the concept. The concept itself must play a role in the special
attitude, whatever it is.
The belief, inference, and intuition views have problems. Neither belief, nor
inference, nor intuition is either necessary of sufficient for conceptual mastery.
The views must be modified to include a 3-place attitude the thinker can take
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toward a core element and a concept.
4.5 The Meaning Postulate View
4.5.1 From the Failures of Rivals to the Meaning Postulate View
In this section, I offer my own positive view of what it is required to have mas-
tery of a concept. The view is motivated by the two failures of the inference,
belief, and intuition views. These views first failed by neglecting the possibility
of masters of concept C who failed to believe, intuit, or be disposed to infer in
accordance with core elements. Agnes has mastery of BOCHE without believing
that all Germans are cruel. Neither believing in, inferring in accordance with,
or intuiting the truth of, core elements is necessary for conceptual mastery. The
second failure was ignoring the need for thinkers to adopt some special attitude
toward core elements. Mastery of a concept C requires more than merely believ-
ing C’s core propositions. One must believe them, and in some sense, take the
propositions to have some important status vis-a-vis C. Neither belief in, infer-
ring in accordance with, or intuiting the truth of, core elements is sufficient for
conceptual mastery.
The inference, belief, and intuition views are overly demanding in one sense
and not demanding enough in another. They’re overly demanding by requiring
conceptual masters to actually believe, be disposed to infer, or intuit. They’re not
demanding enough because they don’t require thinkers to accord core elements a
special status. The meaning postulate view jettisons the overly demanding aspect
of these views and adds the feature they neglect. According to the meaning pos-
tulate view, conceptual mastery is purely a matter of taking core elements to have
a special status with respect to the concept. That’s it. Taking the core elements
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to have a special status vis-a-vis C, or to govern the meaning of C, is compatible
with not believing those core elements, inferring according to them, or intuiting
their truth.
• The Meaning Postulate View of Conceptual Mastery: If an agent has mas-
tery of concept C, then he/she takes all and only the elements in C’s core to
govern the use of C.
The meaning postulate view is agnostic about the nature of the elements in a
concept’s core. The elements could be propositions, patterns of inference, mental
transitions, rules, or something else altogether. In semantics, meaning postulates
are axioms laid down to help establish the meaning of a term. I think of core
elements as playing a similar role. The core elements help to give the concept its
meaning. A different core would yield a different concept.16 The view is so titled
because the “meaning postulate view” (of conceptual mastery) because to have
conceptual mastery requires taking the core elements to play something like the
role of meaning postulates. (A more accurate, though less elegant, title might be
the “take to be a meaning postulate view”).
4.5.2 Taking to Govern Use
To explain the meaning postulate view, I must explicate what it is for an agent
to take a core element to govern the use of C. For ease of exposition, I’ll speak of
core elements as rules. I intend to construe ‘rule’ as broadly as possible. On this
16One might wonder whether two concepts could have the same core. Probably not, for trivial
reasons. C1’s core will likely mention C1, not C2. C2’s core will mention C2, not C1. So if C1 and
C2 are distinct they have distinct cores. The more interesting question is whether there could be
two distinct concepts with homomorphic cores, in which each element of the core of C1 could
be mapped to an element of C2’s core by swapping occurrences of C1 for occurrences of C2, and
vice-versa. On this question I am officially agnostic.
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terminology, inference patterns, propositions, and mental transitions all count as
rules.
I will not offer a reductive theory of the “taking” relation. One should not
view the taking relation in too heavy-weight a manner. A thinker need not have
the concepts CONCEPT, GOVERN THE USE, MEANING POSTULATE, or MEANING
CONSTITUTING RULE in order to take a core element to govern the use of the
concept. Whether the thinker takes a rule to be a core rule governing use of the
concept is determined by idealization from the psychology of the agent. The
agent’s past usage and present dispositions should be taken into account. The
“takes to govern the use” relation is psychologically real. Whether an agent takes
a core proposition to govern is a genuine fact about the agent’s psychology. It
is not merely a “stance” that theorists take toward the agent. The taking will, in
general, have ramifications on the thinker’s behavior. However, the best way to
determine whether a thinker takes a proposition to govern the use (rather than,
say, merely taking the proposition to be true) will often be by testing her behavior
in counterfactual situations, idealized in various ways.
There are many ways to take a given proposition to govern the use of a con-
cept. Consider the proposition ALL BACHELORS ARE MALE. Most straightfor-
wardly, a sophisticated thinker might directly believe that ALL BACHELORS ARE
MALE governs the use of BACHELOR. Professor X’s taking of modus ponens to gov-
ern the use of the material conditional seems to have something like this form.
More commonly, a thinker’s taking ALL BACHELORS ARE MALE to govern the use
of BACHELOR will be less sophisticated. She’ll be confounded or perplexed when
someone claims that some bachelors are not male. This perplexation will have a
different feel than the perplexation she’ll experience when someone claims that
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several bachelors live on Mars. She’ll predict the interlocutor who claims that
bachelors live on Mars to be misinformed. Perhaps he or she heard that the Mars
rover Opportunity is a manned mission involving a crew. In contrast, she’ll tend
to think that the interlocutor who claims that some bachelors are not male mis-
understands how to use BACHELOR and what it is to be a bachelor.
Conceivability provides a useful heuristic for gauging what an agent takes to
govern the use of a concept. A proposition is conceivable for an agent when he or
she finds the proposition possible. A proposition is inconceivable when she finds
the proposition to be impossible. In general, an agent who takes a proposition
P to govern the use of a concept will find P inconceivable. For example, some-
one who takes ALL BACHELORS ARE MALE to govern the use of BACHELOR will
tend to find SOME BACHELORS ARE NOT MALE impossible. Someone who does
not take it to govern the use of BACHELOR will find such a situation conceivable.
This heuristic yields the correct verdict in the case of Sofia and Felipe (section
4.4.2). Both Sofia and Felipe believe the proposition ALL BACHELORS ARE MALE.
Sofia, who has mastery of BACHELOR, finds SOME BACHELORS ARE NOT MALE
inconceivable. Felipe, who lacks mastery of BACHELOR, finds SOME BACHELORS
ARE NOT MALE conceivable. The heuristic does not work well for deviant mas-
ters. We can flesh out the BOCHE/Agnes case (4.3.2) so that Agnes finds SOME
BOCHES ARE NOT CRUEL conceivable, despite the fact that she takes ALL BOCHES
ARE CRUEL to govern the use of BOCHE.17
17There are a variety of ways to precisify the BOCHE/Agnes case. Not all of them yield this
result. In the case as originally described, it’s not clear what Agnes’s attitudes toward BOCHE are.
There are many possibilities. Perhaps she thinks that no one is a boche. Perhaps she thinks that
all Germans are boches but not all boches are cruel. Perhaps she thinks that only some Germans
are boches, all of which are cruel. Or perhaps she thinks that some Germans are boches, and some
boches are cruel. What Agnes finds conceivable will depend on how we precisify the case. All I
claim is that on one reasonable way of precisifying the case the conceivability heuristic will not
yield the correct verdict regarding Agnes’s mastery of BOCHE.
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In sum, I claim that there is a psychologically real difference between an agent
who takes ALL BACHELORS ARE MALE to be true because it bears a special status
with respect to the use of BACHELOR and the otherwise identical agent who takes
ALL BACHELORS ARE MALE to merely happen to he be true. In my terminology,
the first takes ALL BACHELORS ARE MALE to govern the use of BACHELOR. The
second does not, and thereby does not have mastery of BACHELOR. Furthermore,
this distinction applies even to agents that do not have sophisticated concepts
such as CONCEPT, MEANING, or GOVERN THE USE.
4.5.3 Governing Use
In this section, I’ll explain the sense in which a core element, or rule, governs the
use of a concept. I explained earlier (section 4.5.1) that core elements play some-
thing like the role of meaning postulates in semantics. Meaning postulates help
give a linguistic term its meaning. Similarly, core elements help give a concept its
meaning. The core elements, or rules, are guidelines laid down for the use of the
concept. They have normative force, indicating how one should and should not
use the concept. In this sense they govern the use of the concept.
The possibility of defective concepts poses a special problem for this approach
to core elements as use-governors. I’ve claimed that conceptual mastery of con-
cept C entails taking C’s core elements to govern the use of C. However, some
concepts, such as BOCHE, have core inferences that do not preserve truth. (Al-
ternatively, one could take BOCHE to have core propositions the conjunction of
which is false). An agent who realizes that a concept’s core elements do not
preserve truth should in fact cease thinking (and inferring) in accordance with
that element. Agnes is in that situation. She recognizes that inferring from “x is
German” to “x is cruel” is a bad inference, despite the fact that’s BOCHE’s core el-
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ements suggest the inference. If core inferences need not preserve truth, in what
sense do they “govern the use” of the concept?
I’d like to use an analogy with the laws of a nation to explain the sense in
which core elements can govern the use of a concept while failing to yield truth.
Suppose that the law, and particular laws, have certain goals, purposes, or func-
tions: to give citizens a better life, to promote equality, to prevent injustice, to
prohibit immoral action, etc. (That law, or laws, do have goals or functions in this
way, that are not merely the goals of law-makers, is controversial. But the posi-
tion is certainly coherent. Coherence is all my analogy requires.)18 Sometimes the
law achieves these goals. Sometimes it does not. When a law does not achieve its
goal, it remains a law nonetheless and retains its legal normative force. The fact
that the law does not, e.g., promote equality, does not thereby render the law no
longer legally binding. Those who disobey the law still violate a legal norm. If
the law is immoral, then violating the legal norm may be the only way to obey a
moral norm.
Rules of use have a certain function as well. They aim, broadly speaking,
toward truth. They can aim at truth itself, or at the preservation of truth. (The
former is more appropriate to core propositions, the latter to core inferences.)
Rules may have other functions as well. But rules of use, much like the laws of a
nation, can fail to achieve their aims. The core rules of defective concepts such as
BOCHE fail in exactly this way. They fail to meet their truth-oriented functional
goal. But nonetheless the rules remain rules that govern the use of BOCHE. They
retain normative force. In some cases, the only way to obey the epistemic norm of
believing truth will be to flout the meaning norm governing the use of a concept
18For discussion of laws as functional, or as having a purpose, cf. Greenberg (2011): 84-88).
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such as BOCHE. Agnes recognizes something like this fact about her situation.
She elects to obey the epistemic norm at the cost of flouting the use norm.
In sum, there is a clear sense in which a rule can generate a norm that governs
the use of a concept. In the case of a defective concept, this norm of use might
conflict with the epistemic norms of truth and truth-preservation.
4.6 Three Objections
4.6.1 Overview of the Objections
In this section, I consider three objections to the meaning postulate view. The
first is that the theory appeals to a convoluted and under-explained notion of
“taking a rule to govern the use of the concept”. The second objection is more
direct. It claims that an agent can have conceptual mastery without taking core
propositions to govern the use. Thus taking to govern use is not necessary for
conceptual mastery. The third objection maintains that taking to govern use is
not sufficient for conceptual mastery. Mastery of some concepts requires certain
abilities.
4.6.2 Objection 1: Against the notion of “taking a rule to govern the use”
Opponents might object to the notion of “taking a rule to govern the use” on
which the meaning postulate view relies. Opponents might maintain that the
notion is under-explained. Or they might maintain that the notion is too close the
target notions of conceptual mastery and “full understanding” of a concept.
Perhaps the notion of “taking a rule to govern the use” is under-explained.
I’ve done some work to get the reader on to the idea. One reason for under-
explanation is that I’ve tried to be relatively agnostic about the nature of core
rules. They could be propositions, rules of inference, or something else altogether.
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I’m inclined to think that different types of concepts will require different types
of core elements. My agnosticism has a theoretical basis. Clearly, there is further
work to be done in exploring the notion of “taking a rule to govern the use of a
concept”. But I take myself to have made some headway.
I admit that “taking a rule to govern the use” is more similar to “fully under-
standing, or mastering, the concept” than believing or inferring. But I think that
this is a step in the right direction. The failures of the belief and inference views
are partly due to their overly reductive ambitions. To achieve a successful theory
of conceptual mastery, we must appeal to notions that are closer in nature to un-
derstanding itself. “Taking to govern the use” is closer to understanding. That’s
part of the reason the meaning postulate view succeeds where its rivals fail.
My main reply to the objection is the “it’s everyone’s problem” response. In
section 4.4.2 I argued that the simple versions of the belief, inference, and intu-
ition view do not work. There’s a significant difference in understanding between
someone who merely infers and someone who infers because that inference gov-
erns the use of the concept, or plays some other special role vis-a-vis the concept.
The sophisticated versions of these views accommodate the point. But any view
that accommodates the point must appeal to something like “taking a rule to
govern the use”. Peacocke (1992) does so with the notion of a “primitively com-
pelling” inference. Thus, every theory of conceptual mastery (or at least all the
options I’ve considered) will appeal to something like “taking a rule to govern
the use”. Perhaps the notion is under-explained. Or perhaps it is close to the tar-
get notion of full understanding of a concept. But everyone must appeal to some
notion in the vicinity. So it’s everyone’s problem. (I admit that some “notions
in the vicinity” might be more or less problematic than others. Perhaps “primi-
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tively compelling inference” is less problematic than “taking to govern the use”.
I’m not sure. If it is, I’d like to see the arguments.)
4.6.3 Objection 2: Mastery Without Taking to Govern Use
This objection maintains that a thinker can have conceptual mastery of a concept
without taking a core rule to govern the use. Thus the meaning postulate view
is false, because taking to govern the use is not necessary for conceptual mastery.
Here’s the counterexample. Consider Professor Y, a philosopher of mind and lan-
guage. She works on concepts. She had read this paper. She detests it. Professor
Y believes that there is no distinction between core and non-core rules, no such
thing as a rule that “governs the use” of the concept. Professor Y’s theoretical
commitments lead her to deny every claim of the form “Rule R governs the use
of concept C”. This thought experiment leads to the following argument against
the meaning postulate view.
(P1) Professor Y has conceptual mastery of many concepts.
(P2) Professor Y does not take any rules to govern the use of those concepts.
(P3) If (P1) and (P2), the meaning postulate view is false.
(C) Therefore: the meaning postulate view is false.
Premise (P1) is very plausible. Everyone has mastery of at least a few con-
cepts (e.g. AND, HERS, HERE). Furthermore, Professor Y is a world-authority on
many concepts, including the concepts CONCEPT, MEANING, TRUTH, and RULE
OF USE. If anyone fully understands these concepts, she does. Premise (P2) is
quite plausible as well. Professor Y denies that rules govern the use of concepts.
Thus she does not take any rules to govern the use of any concept. Premise (P3)
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follows from the statement of the meaning postulate view, which maintains that
taking rules to govern use is a necessary condition for conceptual mastery.
I deny premise (P2). Professor Y denies all claims of the form “rule R governs
the use of concept C”. She believes many statements of the form “rule R does not
govern the use of concept C”. I claim that, nonetheless, Professor Y takes many
rules to govern the use of many concepts. Consider her behavior. She will look
at you blankly when you talk about female bachelors. She won’t understand if
you attempt to use the term ‘here’ to refer to a location other than the current one
(or the location demonstrated). She’ll claim (perhaps unreflectively) that you’re
incorrectly using the concept HERE. Professor Y’s belief that rules do not govern
use, and her taking them not to govern use, is compatible with her taking certain
rules to govern use. Furthermore, I don’t see how Professor Y could think, or use
any concepts at all, if she never took any rule to govern the use of any concept.
The rules guide her use of the concepts.
4.6.4 Objection 3: Taking to Govern Use Without Mastery
I have claimed elsewhere (Rabin (2011a)) that mastery of phenomenal experi-
ential concepts such as REDph requires certain abilities, including the ability to
recognize a red sensation as an instance of REDph.19 If this is correct, then it seems
that someone could take whatever the core rules associated with REDph (perhaps
“redph is a sensation”) are to govern the use of REDph whilst being unable to rec-
ognize a redph experience as redph. Let Jane be a color-blind person who does not
19REDph is the phenomenal, experiential, concept of red. REDph applies to experiences with a
certain qualitative character (you know the one). Neither light-waves nor objects can be redph.
Tomatoes, fire trucks, and strawberries are red, but they cause redph sensations. The English term
‘red’ is likely polysemous between, or a mongrel of, the red-concepts of light waves, of surfaces,
and of sensations. I introduce a new term, ‘redph’, and concept REDph, to lock on to the type of
red that only sensations can instantiate.
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experience redph at all. She experiences greenph instead. She cannot recognize a
redph sensation as an instance of REDph. She’s never experienced redph. But Jane,
a philosopher of mind and meaning, is an expert on the semantics of ‘red’ and
on the concept REDph. She certainly seems to know what the rules governing the
use of the concept are. This thought experiment leads to the following argument
against the meaning postulate view.
(P1) Jane takes all and only the rules governing the use of REDph to govern
the use of REDph.
(P2) If (P1), then if the meaning postulate view is true, Jane has conceptual
mastery of REDph.
(P3) Jane is unable to recognize a redph sensation as an instance of REDph.
(P4) If (P3), then Jane does not have conceptual mastery of REDph.
(C) Therefore: the meaning postulate view is false.
Premise (P1) seems to follow from Jane’s philosophical expertise regarding
the concept REDph. (P2) follows from the statement of the meaning postulate
view. (P3) is a stipulation about the case. (P4) is a plausible claim about any
phenomenal concept, including REDph. I argue for (P4) in Rabin (2011a).
One simple response would be to accept the argument and weaken the mean-
ing postulate view by claiming that taking all and only a concept’s core rules
to govern use is only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for mastery of
the concept. But doing so significantly reduces the interest and the scope of the
meaning postulate view.
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I prefer to deny premise (P1). The key idea here is to consider the possibility
that the ability to recognize redph experiences as instances of REDph is itself a core
rule. An inference rule is a form of mental transition. The shift from an experience
of redph to a labeling of that experience as REDph is also a mental transition. This
transition could be a core rule governing the use of REDph. On reflection, this
seems exactly correct. There is something about labeling redph experiences as
redph that is central to the meaning and use of REDph. Here, we see a broadening
of the kinds of elements that can occur in a concept’s core.20 Before we considered
propositions and inference rules. Now we include mental transitions considered
more broadly. (In some sense, perhaps the transition from a redph experience to a
labeling as redph is a variety of “inference”, broadly construed. Not much turns
on the nomenclature.)
If it is correct that the mental transition from a redph experience to a recog-
nition that the experience is ph is a core rule governing the use of REDph, then
premise (P1) is false. The fact that Jane cannot recognize redph experiences as
redph entails that she fails to take a core rule governing the use of REDph as such.
As should be expected by now, merely making the transition from experi-
encing redph to believing the experience to be redph is not sufficient to take that
transition to be a core rule governing REDph. A thinker might identify a redph
experience as an instance of REDph because that experience occurs in the area of
the visual field occupied by an image of a fire truck. The thinker knows that fire
trucks cause redph experiences. The thinker must instead categorize the experi-
ence on the basis of its phenomenal qualities, and take the fact that objects of this
quality are redph to help govern the use of REDph.
20Peacocke (1992): 7-8 adopts a similar move.
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4.7 Conclusion
For now, this ends my attempt to answer the question “Under what conditions
does an agent master, or fully understand, a concept?” Even if the reader does
not agree with my positive theory, the meaning postulate view, he or she should
find the criticisms of the belief, inference, and intuition views illuminating. The
phenomenon of deviant masters and the special status problem must be dealt
with by any theory of conceptual mastery.
I conclude that mastering, or fully understanding, a concept is not a matter
of merely having certain beliefs, making certain inferences, or intuiting certain
truths. Mastering a concept is a matter of recognizing, perhaps implicitly, the
rules governing the use of the concept. This should not come as a surprise. Using
a concept includes being subject to a normative standard associated with that
concept. This normative standard is determined, in large part, by the rules that
govern the use of the concept. To understand the concept is to grasp those rules.
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